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Chapter 1  Preface 
 
1.1.  Area of research and description of method 
 
This doctoral thesis follows the developments of training and warfare in 
Athenian cavalry between 550 – 350 BC. It will focus on horsemanship, as I 
agree with Xenophon who states that this is the most important factor for a 
cavalry unit to win any battle:  
 
It is clear, however, that no troops will be able to inflict loss on a much 
stronger army with impunity, unless they are so superior in the practical 
application of horsemanship to war that they show like experts 
contending with amateurs. [2] This superiority can be attained first and 
foremost if your marauding bands are so thoroughly drilled in riding 
that they can stand the hard work of a campaign. For both horses and 
men that are carelessly trained in this respect will naturally be like 
women struggling with men.1 
 
This may look like a very obvious statement, but in truth horsemanship has not 
much been dealt with by historians, who usually focus on numbers, ranks, 
social status and weaponry of hippeis in general or give large descriptions of 
battles. Which of course are all important aspects, but the level of horsemanship 
of a cavalry commander and his men would forge all these other factors into 
either a victory or defeat. As Xenophon says, if they fail in horsemanship, they 
will fail to win any battle at all.  
 
                                                
1 CC 8.1-2. 
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This will put my dissertation in the fields of both military and hippological 
science. These sciences will be connected by the research question which is ‘Is 
there an explanation from the perspective of horsemanship why the Athenian 
cavalry seems not to be able to dominate the battlefield, especially in 
Xenophon’s time?’   
 
This question first occurred to me, when I noticed, while studying Xenophon, 
that in contrast to the apparently highly effective cavalry of the Athenian 
Empire, the cavalry of the 4th century apparently was not very effective. 
Xenophon even seems to complain about the state of the Athenian cavalry and 
so it appeared to me that he did not only want to put forward his own expertise 
in his works, but he had another, more hidden, motivation for writing these 
treatises On Horsemanship and Cavalry Commander. 
 
1.2. Literary sources 
 
To answer this question I have made extensive use of many sources available. 
The list of publications on horses, warfare and horsetraining in general is 
endless. I will discuss only the ones that are relevant to my research. The books 
that are currently available on the subject deal in the main with the array of 
weaponry, the composition of the cavalry, tactics and description of battles or 
concentrate on social and economical issues. A number of scholars have 
completed research on the Greek cavalry.2  
                                                
2 J.K. Anderson wrote a book on Xenophon and horsemanship (J.K. Anderson, Ancient Greek 
Horsemanship, University of California Press 1961). But this mainly deals with horsemanship 
in general and not in a military context. In another book he sets forth Greek cavalry theory and 
practice in the age of Xenophon, in which he discusses weapon training, tactical training and 
battles (J.K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, University of 
California Press 1970); other publications are G.R. Bugh, The Horsemen of Athens, Princeton 
  9 
Of course, this is a rather busy area of research. The general assumption 
regarding Greek cavalry at the time can be expressed as follows: ‘All it came to, 
in most cities, was that a few wealthy men rode on horses; they were useful for 
scouting or raiding supplies, but they rarely played any serious part in battle; 
there is no case of Greek cavalry in Greece, putting Thessaly aside, either 
employing shock tactics or turning the enemy’s flank’.3  
The reason why Athenian cavalry apparently remained subordinate to the 
hoplites is outlined as follows: ‘the usual explanation is the lack of stirrups. 
According to Spence it had to do with social attitudes and conditions. The most 
important of these in much of Greece was the domination of military thinking 
by the hoplite ethos and traditions – although the high cost of owning a horse 
also contributed by restricting the number of cavalrymen available.’4 
It is also believed though that the hoplite was probably not so effective in 
Greece: ‘Hoplites were developed to fight pitched battles on level ground. But 
most of Greece is not level, and pitched battles were rare’.5 Nevertheless it can 
hardly be said the Greek hoplite was ineffective on the battlefield, whereas this 
tended to be the case with the Greek cavalry.  
 
As to training, it looks like there has not been much evidence of armies training 
on a daily basis. According to Lazenby, one cannot expect too much 
professionalism in Greek armies since there were no professional armies at the 
                                                                                                                             
University Press 1988); I. Spence, The Cavalry of Classical Greece (Oxford Clarendon Press 
1993); L.J. Worley, Hippeis, The Cavalry of Ancient Greece (Westview Press, Boulder 1994) 
and R.E. Gaebel, Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World (University of Oklahoma 
Press 2002). 
3 Ellis,  Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, (London: Thames and Hudson 1976) 56; 
HMND (Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments, (W.W. Tarn 1930) 5. 
4 Spence (1993) xix. 
5 Anderson (1970), 111. 
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time nor was there any basic tactical training.6 Cavalry training in Greece 
apparently depended on the political situation: in times of peace armies hardly 
exercised and the cavalry would neglect its routine. During times of war the 
cavalry got enough practise and its effectiveness would increase by the day.7  
J. Ober, on the other hand, writes that the development in Greek warfare is 
evident. At first, raiding played an important role in the ‘old’ warfare.8 The 
cavalry had an important role to play herein. Raiding was an important strategic 
part of Greek warfare. During the Peloponnesian War and thereafter, Greek 
warfare became more economically driven. It was more important to close off 
the supply routes to cities. This was to give the cavalry an important role.  
 
As will be clear by now, in my doctoral thesis, I refer predominantly to 
Xenophon. Xenophon was taken prisoner by the Boiotians in 411 when he was 
20 years old and he befriended Proxenus, a Boeotian with whom he travelled to 
Asia to assist Cyrus the Younger. From 401 he remained in Persia and after his 
‘March of the Ten Thousand’ he was exiled from Athens because he was 
suspected of oligarchic, pro-Spartan sympathies. He fought against his own 
country together with his good friend, Agesilaus of Sparta, in the battle at 
Coronea in 394 BC. His son Gryllus served in the Athenian cavalry but died in 
the Battle at Mantinea in 362 BC.  
 
In classical Antiquity, Xenophon was already regarded, similarly to 
Thucydides, an accurate historian.9 He wrote the Hellenica, a large work 
dealing with the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, starting from the point in 
                                                
6 J. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (Warminster: Aris & Philips 1985) 24. 
7 CC 1.18 – 19.  
8 J. Ober, Fortress Attica (Leiden: Brill 1985) 35. 
9 Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica 1.37.4. 
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time at which Thucydides had stopped. He also wrote the Anabasis, a history of 
50 000 Greek mercenaries who fought with Cyrus the Younger against the King 
of Persia,  Artaxerxes. In the first encounter at the Battle at Cynaxa in 401 BC 
they lost Cyrus and their cause. During their return to Greece, known as the 
Anabasis, Xenophon leads them.  
Xenophon’s most important works for this dissertation are his On 
Horsemanship and the Cavalry Commander which were written after the 
Peloponnesian War10 although the exact year is not clear.  
These works may be seen as an amalgam of Greek cavalry expertise. They are 
based on his own experiences. Xenophon’s work outlines best practice over a 
period of 150 years and it is not strange that Xenophon combines so many 
influences in his works. He had after all befriended the Spartan king, Agesilaus, 
and a Boiotian young man, Proxenus. He participated with both of them in 
campaigns and would no doubt have discussed cavalry issues and tactics. He 
gained an intimate knowledge of Persia and even became acquainted with 
Cyrus the Younger. Xenophon is said to have written the Anabasis under the 
pseudonym of ‘Themistogenes from Syracuse’, according to Plutarch.11 This 
could point to Syracusan sympathies as well, although this is not very obvious 
in his works.  
 
In Classical Antiquity, Xenophon had his followers. Polybius in any case was 
aware of the military writings of Xenophon, for he makes a casual remark in his 
Historiae to the works at the city of New Carthage, which in the words of 
Xenophon are described as ‘a workshop of war’12.  
                                                
10 According to CC 7.4 the book was written after the Peloponnesian war.  
11 Plutarchus, De Gloria Atheniensium 1; Hell 3.1.2: W.E. Higgins, Xenophon the Athenian 
(Albany, State University of NY Press 1977) 93 and 98. 
12 Polybius, Historiae 10.20.7. 
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Xenophon writes about the horse’s character and exterior, and discusses the 
training of cavalry horses and riders. He says his work is partly similar to 
Simon’s, to whom he refers briefly in his introduction of the On 
Horsemanship.13 Works said to be attributed to Simon are titled, On 
Horsemanship, Hippoiatrikon and Hipposkopikon.14  
It is interesting to note that Xenophon’s work also forms the basis of classical 
horsemanship. He still forms part of the compulsory literature for students 
taking British Horse Society15 examinations. 
 
Together with Xenophon I have used the Histories of Herodotus and 
Thucydides, dealing with respectively the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian 
War. Apart from these sources, I have also used works written by Arrian, 
                                                
13 The main predecessor of Xenophon was Simon of Athens, though little survives of his work. 
Xenophon makes reference to him and for that reason so do I. According to Pliny, the first 
person to write about horsemanship was Simon of Athens. (Pliny, 34.19.76) He was probably a 
hipparch (in the Hippeis of Aristophanes we also encounter a hipparch by that name) who had 
his own achievements carved in stone with a bronze horse on top. This statue was placed in the 
Eleusinium. Simon would appear to have been quite well known in view of the fact that a 
horseman statue was carved of him by the sculptor Demetrios (Pliny 34.76).  
Hirt describes a relief found at the Eleusinium which appears to depict Simon with a horse at an 
altar of the goddesses Ceres and Proserpina. (A.L. Hirt, Die Geschichte der Baukunst bei der 
Alten (Berlin: Reimer 1821 – 1827) 191) Unfortunately I could not trace this relief as it now 
forms part of a private collection.  
Around 450 BC, Simon wrote a standard work on horsemanship that was renowned in classical 
antiquity.  Unfortunately only a few paragraphs remain. Xenophon, he writes, copied some of 
Simon’s findings and added material based on his own experience as a cavalry commander and 
horse trainer.  
14 Suidas t 987, a 4739 and k1621; Suda: alpha, 4739; Suda: kappa,1621. 
15 ‘The BHS Manual Of Equitation (Kenilworth Press 2011) the official handbook on learning 
to ride and training the ridden horse. Essential for students taking British Horse Society 
examinations. Offers a complete and authoritative system of training for horse and rider, from 
complete novice through to advanced. The methods outlined are based on the classical concepts 
first written about by Xenophon (430-343BC), maintained by the Spanish Riding School in 
Vienna and now amended for competitions by the Federation Equestre International (FEI). This 
expanded and updated edition takes account of modern-day teaching methods and practices in 
the horse world.’ 
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Plutarch, Polybius, Diodorus Siculus and Strabo to verify or clarify Xenophon, 
Herodotus or Thucydides.  
 
For argumentation purposes I shall draw on specialist literature from a later 
date, compiled by people who themselves had received practical cavalry 
training. Horses and the training of horses have not changed over time and 
neither has the need for the training of cavalry. Now and then, in order to clarify 
ancient sources I will allude to passages from later works when I believe this 
serves a useful purpose and I will make reference to military horsemanship 
experts such as Dom Duarte, King of Portugal in the 15th century and an 
excellent horseman, a 19th century US Cavalry Colonel who wrote a note on 
training the US cavalry, and Alois Podhajsky, Officer in the former Austro-
Hungarian cavalry and former director of the Spanish Riding School in 
Vienna.16 Again, this will not lead to anachronisms or chronological disorder, 
because horsemanship and horsetraining did not fundamentally change over 
time. 
 
1.3. Non-literary sources 
 
In this doctoral thesis I was grateful that I could use a number of archaeological 
sources. Aside from decorated vases which are also referred by Greenhalgh 
(1973) and Worley (1994)  in their works on archaic cavalry, I looked at 
                                                
16 Dom Duarte wrote a book on knightly horsemanship and jousting: L. Preto et alii, Dom 
Duarte, The royal book of jousting, horsemanship, and knightly combat : a translation into 
English of King Dom Duarte's 1438 treatise Livro da ensinança de bem cavalgar toda sela (The 
art of riding in every saddle) (Chivalry Bookshelf 2005); the ordnance note of the US Colonel 
is to be found in Appendix A; Podhajsky wrote several handbooks on horsemanship and 
includes references to cavalry practice at war in: A. Podhajsky, My Horses, My Teachers, 
(Trafalgar Square Publishing 1997, original print 1967). 
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excavated bridles and bits (Pernice 1896 and Donder 1980) and lead tablets 
containing catalogues of Athenian cavalrytribes and men (Braun 1970 and Kroll 
1977). I also had acces to extensive Spanish archaeological research on bridles, 
weaponry and other cavalry-associated material (Quesada Sanz 2005).  
 
These sources can provide us with much direct information on bits and bridles, 
with details of who served in the cavalry and even on the colour of the horses. I 
have endeavoured to demonstrate the significance of these archaeological finds 
from the perspective of horsemanship.  
 
1.4. ‘A workshop of war’ 
 
Now I will first give a brief overview of the research questions which lie at the 
basis of each chapter. 
 
I will begin in chapter 2 by outlining what horsemanship entails. As I have said 
above, this is a factor that is important to the functioning of the cavalry which 
has been largely overlooked by historians, who tend to concentrate on numbers, 
rank and the status of the horsemen. The functioning of the cavalry, which in 
fact depends mostly on the horsemanship of the riders and their commanders, is 
all too often set aside. 
 
I will then take a look at war practice in the period between 550 and 350 BC. 
This will be the focus of Chapter 3 in which I will be dealing with cavalry 
tactics. Most of what we know, both from literary and archaeological sources, is 
about Athens. The focus, therefore, will be on Athens. A number of key 
moments in Greek military history are examined, starting with the Persian Wars 
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(500 – 479 BC). I will then move on to the Peloponnesian War, particularly the 
Sicilian Expedition and after that, the period after the Peloponnesian War.  
 
During the Peloponnesian War, which started with the Archidamian War (431-
425 BC) many battles took place and we see an increase in cavalry battles. For 
example, the Battle at Delium (424) at which the cavalrymen of the Boiotians 
and Spartans fought against the Athenian cavalry. I will also be discussing the 
Sicilian Expedition (418 – 415 BC), which, in first instance, might not seem to 
be an obvious choice. Given its geographical location, Sicily was a repository 
for different cultures. There was Carthage to the south; in the west, the 
Celtiberian warlike tribes, and the Etruscans in the north. The Sicilian Greek 
cities still had contact with the Greek motherland.  
 
In a passage from Herodotus we read that Sicily had to be constantly on the 
alert. Gelon, for example, was forever keeping Carthage at bay. The Sicilian 
population comprised Siculi, Sicani, Elyni, Greeks, Iberians, Carthaginians, and 
perhaps others from Italy also. The island was therefore always divided in terms 
of loyalty. These cultures were exposed to each other not only in peacetime but 
particularly also in times of war and this makes Sicily interesting from a 
military perspective. 
 
After the Peloponnesian War (431 – 401 BC), several Greek cities were 
constantly in conflict with their allies. These decades also saw the rise to power 
of Sparta with Agesilaus defeating the Persian cavalry and the rise of Thebes. 
Some famous battles from this period are the Battle at Coronea (394 BC), the 
Battle at Leuctra (371 BC) and the Battle at Mantinea (362 BC). At Coronea, 
Xenophon fought together with Agesilaus. 
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I will look at these battles to get a clear view of the development in cavalry 
tactics. The most important focus of this dissertation will be the idea that tactics 
change in times of war and both sides learn from and react to each other. 
Archidamus of Sparta remarks that when fighting amongst themselves, the 
Greeks know what to expect from each other. Thucydides states: ‘In a struggle 
with Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the same character, and it 
is possible to move swiftly on the different points.’17 But as soon as the Greeks 
wage war on other peoples, change becomes imperative.  
 
This corresponds with How, who writes: ‘wars fought between two widely 
separated races accustomed to a different physical environment (...) it may 
naturally happen that each race or nation has developed an armament and a 
style of fighting suitable to the nature of the country in which it dwells, and is 
practically unable to alter its national arms and tactics. In such cases it will be 
the rule rather than the exception, that the nature and character of the arms used 
by the two nations will determine the tactics and the tactics in turn the strategy 
of the campaign. The reason for this is that the issue of a battle may often 
depend entirely on the nature of the ground on which it is fought; hence it will 
often be the main object of a general's strategy to compel or induce the enemy 
to fight on ground which decisively favours one method of fighting, or fatally 
handicaps another.’18  
 
This war practice then forms the basis for my interpretation of Xenophon’s 
theoretical manuals. In this Chapter I will try to provide a new context to 
                                                
17 Thuc 1.80.3. 
18 W.W. How, Arms, Tactics and Strategy in the Persian War (The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 
Vol. 43, Part 2 1923) 117. 
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Xenophon’s writings as I will be discussing why Xenophon wrote about 
horsemanship and the commandership of the cavalry in relation to the military 
and political situation in Athens in this time. I will be describing developments 
in Greek cavalry warfare which, I believe, have caused Xenophon to write his 
treatises about specific subjects. I believe these treatises should not be seen as 
works written isolated from the military developments in Xenophons time and  
were merely meant as manuals. His advice is not entirely theoretical because his 
writing was in fact based on his own experience and expertise and thus forms ‘a 
workshop of war’.19 This analysis and the advice contained therein and how we 
should look upon Xenophon’s works are discussed in this chapter. 
 
In Chapter 4 I will rely on Xenophon’s own analysis of the situation in Athens 
as outlined by him in various works and I endeavour to apply the advice in his 
manuals to the situation in Athens at the time that he was writing these works. I 
also try to establish whether his advice was implemented in the city of Athens 
or not.  
 
In my conclusive Chapter 5, therefore, I hope to put Xenophon in a different, 
partly new context, based on the discussed war practice in his time. I also hope 
to provide an answer as to why the Athenian cavalry did not manage to 
dominate on the battlefield in Xenophon’s time. 
 
                                                
19 Ag 1.26; Hell 3.4.16-17. 
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Chapter 2.  Horsemanship 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will describe horsemanship and explain why it was so 
important to the cavalry and for purposes of evaluating the performance of the 
cavalry on the battlefield. Riding skills are naturally fundamental to all of this, 
as Dom Duarte, king of Portugal and an enthusiastic rider himself confirmed in 
1438: 
 
‘And we can really understand the great advantage that the skilled 
horsemen have when at war, compared to others less qualified in the art 
of riding, even if they have identical abilities in the other necessary arts; 
riding skills are one of the most valuable skills for warriors. And those 
who have very good horses can get very little advantage out of them if 
they do not really have the appropriate riding skills, as they would not 
know how to do it.’20  
 
But horsemanship does not concern just riding, as we are informed by a 19th 
century US cavalry commander: 
 
As long as cavalry exists, however it may be armed or manoeuvred, the 
fundamental principle of such instruction will be horsemanship; that 
science which gives the soldier perfect control over the machine which 
transports him; which makes it safe for himself and effective against his 
enemy; which gives him confidence in his own prowess, and which 
inspires him with an esprit de corps, and a love for his horse and the saddle 
                                                
20 Dom Duarte (1438) in translation of Antonio Fanco Preto & Luis Preto (2005) 6. 
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which every cavalryman who is really master of his steed must feel. There 
is nothing chimerical in these ideas.21  
 
Horsemanship among other things entails that: 
 
No one can claim that our tactics do not contemplate instruction in 
equitation and the knowledge of the horse, for, brief as its requirements are, 
and skeleton-like as are its elementary rules upon the former subject, it 
does prescribe that officers shall "have a thorough knowledge of the 
structure and powers of endurance of horses," and be "familiar with the 
rules for their management under all circumstances. To understand in detail 
the method of shoeing them, and to be able to treat all ordinary cases of 
injury and disease."22  
 
As already outlined by the cited experts, all these factors combined with good 
horsemanship are necessary for a properly functioning cavalry. Horsemanship 
has to do with a number of factors. First and foremost, horse riding itself; an 
understanding of horses, knowledge of the horse’s build; expertise in horse 
care; how and why certain bridles are preferred; the training of horses to 
prepare them to perform appropriately on the field with pleasure and devotion, 
and, specifically where the cavalry is concerned: knowledge of weaponry; 
military formations and how a cavalry unit should function on the battlefield. 
In this chapter, based on Xenophon’s and contemporary accounts, I will explain 
all these facets of horsemanship in order to demonstrate as clearly as possible 
the key factors governing professional cavalry practices. We shall begin with 
the horse. 
                                                
21 Appendix A, lines 21 – 29.  
22 Appendix A, lines 36 – 44. 
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2.2.  Horses 
 
Horses are herd animals and this makes it possible to ride a horse. A herd is 
steered by means of  pressure from the animals themselves: the most 
experienced horses lead or are at the sides or at the rear. These horses push their 
bodies against the horses next to them or in front of them to make them turn, go 
faster or slower. It is natural to the horse to yield to pressure. This is why we 
can ride horses: they yield to pressure exercised either by the bit, the legs or the 
weight of the rider. These are the so-called ‘aids’, through which we are able to 
ride horses and make clear what we want them to do. Because these aids come 
naturally to them, horses will understand them immediately and by instinct, if 
they are applied correctly. 
 
Another characteristic of the horse’s nature is its docility and willingness to 
cooperate. Not cooperating in the herd will mean isolation and certain death. 
Most horses therefore are willing to cooperate and endure hardships to the 
extent of harming themselves because of this herd instinct. Only the most 
dominant and self-conscious horses will not put up with such treatment. Horse 
riding is based on the nature of the horse, and good training should never go 
against the nature of the horse. Most horses by nature have a high level of 
trainability.23  
 
In antiquity too, people were aware of the benevolent character of horses and 
their will to please their riders. To quote Aelian:  
 
                                                
23 http://www.classical-equitation.com/documents/Parttwoforwebsite.pdf (last visited: 26 July 
2009). 
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‘if a horse receives careful attention, he repays his benefactor by being 
good-natured and friendly. How Bucephalus bore himself to Alexander is a 
story that is current everywhere and would give me no pleasure to repeat. I 
shall also pass over the horse of Antiochos (Soter) which avenged his 
master by killing the Gaul (his name was Centoarates) who slew Antiochos 
on the battlefield. Socles then, about whom not many seem to know, was 
an Athenian who was esteemed, and indeed was a comely boy. Now he 
bought a horse, handsome too like its master but of a violently amorous 
disposition and with a far sharper eye than other horses. Hence it 
conceived a passionate love for its master, and when he approached, it 
would snort; and if he patted it, it would neigh; when he mounted, it would 
be docile; when he stood before it, it would cast languishing glances at 
him. These actions already savoured of love, but were thought pleasing. 
When however the horse, becoming too reckless, seemed to be meditating 
an assault upon the boy, and tales about the pair of a too monstrous nature 
began to circulate, Socles would not tolerate the slander, and in his 
detestation of a licentious lover sold the horse. But the animal could not 
bear to be separated from the beautiful boy and ended its days by a 
rigorous starvation.’ 24 
 
Plinius also writes that the horses in the Circus Maximus knew very well when 
they were being encouraged by the crowds and cheered on at a victory.25.  
 
The intelligence of the horse and its innate will to please is a valuable asset on 
the battlefield.  For example, Cyrus the Younger dismounts from his chariot and 
mounts his battle horse to give battle to the Persian king.26 He gives the 
                                                
24 Aelian, Varia Historia 6.44. 
25 Plinius, Historiae 8.159: ‘nam in circo ad currus iuncti non dubie intellectum adhortationis et 
gloriae fatentur’. 
26 Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.3. 
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following reason for so doing: a horse with rider is more manoeuvrable than a 
chariot and he can make use of his horse’s senses. A rider has four eyes and 
ears, so to say.27 He states:  
 
‘For they say that a horse actually sees many things with his eyes before 
his rider does and makes them known to him and that he hears many 
things with his ears before his rider does and gives him intimation of 
them.’28  
 
Horsebreeds 
 
Evidence from excavations at Dereivka, Southern Russia, seems to show that 
the oldest fighting cavalry was a mounted cavalry.29 In the Afanasjevo culture, 
antler cheek fragments of bits provide evidence that the horse was used for 
riding; there is no evidence that it was used as a draught horse.30 
 
The second Millennium witnessed the development of new equestrian art. The 
solid wheel was superseded by lighter, spoked wheels and the heavy carts 
evolved into the light, highly manoeuvrable two-wheeled war chariot. From this 
period on, the horse was used as a draught animal instead of oxen and asses.31 
 
In the Middle East the horse was coupled with the chariot throughout the 
second Millennium. Figures of mounted horsemen appear in Egyptian art of the 
18th and 19th Dynasties. From the 1st Millennium onwards, mounted cavalry 
                                                
27 Cyr 4.4.14 – 20.   
28 Cyr 4.4.21. 
29 A. Azzaroli, An Early History of Horsemanship (Brill/W. Backhuys 1985) 7 – 8: Dereivka is 
dated 4350 and 3720 B.C by radiocarbon dating and dendrochronology.  
30 Azzaroli (1985) 13. 
31 Azzaroli (1985) 15. 
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developed in the Middle East, at first together with chariotry, which was 
deemed more useful. Mounted cavalry became standard among the Hittites and 
the Assyrians. They had predecessors, however. In the regions of the barbarian 
tribes farther north, mounted cavalry had developed earlier. These barbarian 
riders had already developed a remarkable skill in handling the bow from 
horseback. The horse reached the Eastern Mediterranean through Eastern 
Europe and Southwestern Asia. Rounded cheekpieces of bone are known from 
Mycenae since the early Helladic period (about 2000 BC). These bits are of the 
pattern used for draught horses, but rough clay figurines from Mycenae, Cyprus 
and Crete also show riders on horseback. In the 16th and 15th centuries BC, 
horses and chariots appear in figures from Crete and Cyprus. 32 
 
In antiquity, people were endeavouring to improve their horses and to 
strengthen the qualities of their breeds. We know of breeding programmes that 
existed in Mitanni and Assyria to improve horses’ height.33 As a rule horses 
today are not larger than horses in antiquity: the horses in ancient Caucasus 
were larger than the present day Caucasian breeds.34 To quote Azzaroli: 
 
“The barrow grave and ochre tomb cultures that superseded the Srednij Stog 
civilizations in southern Russia are the cradle of the great Indo-European and 
Indo-Iranian ethnic group which expanded widely over Eurasia and dispersed 
the horse into far away countries. Horsemanship developed primarily under 
their influence and for a long time, until late in the first Millennium, these 
tribes held an undisputed supremacy in equestrian art.”35 
                                                
32 Azzaroli (1985) 42 – 46. 
33 In Urartu programmes to breed larger horses were established by the court. (M. Junkelmann, 
Die Reiter Roms I (1998, 3rd print) 230. 
34 Azzaroli (1985) 20. 
35 Azzaroli (1985) 12. 
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The horse seems to have reached the Near East through Armenia or Iran; the 
Sumerians, who called their asses ‘anshu’, gave the name of ‘anshu-kur-ra’ to 
the newcomer: ‘the ass from the mountains’ or ‘the ass from the east’. The 
horse was not considered a fitting riding animal for people of high rank. 
Azzaroli cites the following text: 
 
“Let my Lord honour his kingly dead. If you are the king of the Cananeans, 
you are also the king of the Akkadians. Let my Lord not ride horses. Let him 
mount only chariots or half-asses and honour his kingly head.”36 
 
The horse was probably of little importance to the economy of Mesopotamia 
until the late 18th century BC: it is not mentioned in Hammurabi’s code which 
dates from approximately 1750 BC. The necessity for breeding larger animals 
came from the plundering of Cimmerian and Scythian horsemen in the 8th and 
7th century. Scholars assume that Egyptian, Hittite and Mesopotamian horses 
originated from Central Asia.  
 
“It may be concluded that ancient Egyptian horses of which the Buhen 
skeleton is the earliest known representative (measuring 150 cm at the 
withers), together with Hittite horses, and probably also the later 
Mesopotamian horses, all belong to the same group. Contemporary 
pictures show that these horses bore a close resemblance to the modern 
'Arab' breed. Measurement of the bones establishes that at least some of 
these horses were larger than had been previously supposed. Their 
origins should be looked for in Central Asia.”37  
                                                
36 Azzaroli (1985) 27. 
37 Clutton-Brock, “The Buhen Horse,” Journal of Archaeological Science (1974) 1: The Buhen 
horse is an example of a horse measuring 150 cm at the withers (1700 BC); M.A Littauer, J.H 
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Xenophon does not write about horse breeds. Yet many tribes and peoples were 
famous for their breeding and horsemanship. Vergil mentions Epidaurus,38 
Thessalia,39 Epirus and Mycenae,40 as well as Scythia41, Elis42, Gallia43, the 
Bisaltes and Geloni44. Vegetius mentions Epirus and Sarmatia.45 Arrian speaks 
of Celts, Iberians, Getae, Raiti; Thessalians, Scythians, Thracians, Persians, 
Greeks, Sicilians and ‘those who are famous for their horsemanship’; Alans and 
Sarmatians46. Simon and Strabo consider Thessalia to be the most important 
Greek breeding area.47 
 
Gaebel believes that there should be some scepticism about ‘breeds’ in 
Antiquity: ‘horse and pony types can be and have been altered significantly in 
less than a century by the conscious introduction of new bloodlines.’48 But a 
recent study on Scythian horses in kurghans confirms that horse breeds with 
lineages did exist in the past. Furthermore the researchers involved conclude 
that the diversity in our own modern horse breeds probably is not a result of 
trade and breeding programmes, but rather of the survival of these ancient 
lineages.49 Such a lineage is to be found with Nesaian horses50 that were very 
                                                                                                                             
Crouwel (2001) The Earliest Evidence for Metal Bridle Parts (Oxford Journal of Archaeology 
20 (4)), 329–338). 
38 Vergil, Georgica 3.44: ‘(…) domitrixque Epidaurus equorum’. 
39 Ibidem, 3.94: ‘Pelion’ and 3.115: ‘’Pelethronii Lapithae’. 
40 Ibidem, 3.121: ‘Epirum (…) Mycenas’. 
41 Ibidem, 3.197: ‘Scythiae’. 
42 Ibidem, 3.202: ‘Elei’. 
43 Ibidem, 3.204: ‘Belgica (…) esseda’. 
44 Ibidem, 3.461: ‘ Bisaltae (…) Gelonus’.  
45 Vegetius, Mulomedicina 3.6. 
46 Arrian, Ars Tactica 44.1; 33.1 ; 16.1 ; 4.1. 
47 Simon, De Re Equestri 1; Strabo, Geographica 8.8.1. 
48 Gaebel (2002) 19. 
49 “Hundreds of large burial mounds are found in the region of Arzhan, a necropolis located at 
the foothills of the Sajan mountains in the Tuva district (South Siberia). These are kurgans of 
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expensive and highly sought-after because of their height.51 This breed is 
alternately called Persian, Median and Parthian. These horses may have been of 
Scythian origin.52 Strabo inform us that Scyths emigrated from Southern Russia 
to the Near East and the North of Greece. To quote Strabo: 
 
‘The Sacae (Scyths) however made raids like those of the Cimmerians 
and Treres, some into regions close to their own country, other into 
regions farther away. For instance, they occupied Bactriana, and 
acquired possession of the best land in Armenia, which they left 
named after themselves Sakasene and they advanced as far as the 
country of the Cappadocians.’53  
 
Recent research has demonstrated that the Nesian horse was not bred on the 
plains of Nisaion, as first presumed, but rather in the area of Nisa near the Oxus 
river in Chorasan. This is in the northeast of Iran close to the modern border of 
Turkmenistan.54 
 
                                                                                                                             
the Scythians, a nomadic people of the Eurasian steppes. Excavations have been conducted at 
two kurgans, Arzhan 1 (8th century BC) and Arzhan 2 (late 7th century BC). They provided 
numerous horse skeletons, i.e. the remains of horses that were buried along with the Scythian 
kings. We amplified the mitochondrial control region from bone samples of those horses and 
compared these sequences to an existing database of more than 600 living horses. An 
unexpectedly high genetic diversity was found within the Scythian horse population. These 
findings show that the Arzhan horses had a diversity similar to more recent horse breeds. We 
conclude that horse breeds with a variety of ancestral lineages existed in the distant past. 
Current diversity in horse breeds is probably not a product of historic trade and breeding 
practices, but rather a result of overall survival of ancient lineages.” (Weber C., J. Burger, A. 
Ludwig, K.-W. Alt, & N. Benecke (2005): Molecular typing of a Scythian horse population. 
18.06-19.06.2005, 2th Archaeozoology and Genetics ICAZ Workshop, Cambridge, UK). 
50 Her 7.40; Her 9.20.  
51 Strabo 2.13.7. 
52 Diodorus Siculus 2.43.4 – 7.  
53 Strabo 11.8.4. 
54 J. Dum – Tragut, Kilikische Heilkunst für Pferde (Olms Verlag, Hildesheim 2005) 44. In this 
book a translation of a Cilician veterinarian work is offered (13th century AD). 
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To secure a frequent supply of horses for the Persian army, Cappadocia and 
Armenia were obliged to pay an annual tribute in horses to the Persian king. It 
is remarkable that after the Scythian invasion in the Near East, programmes to 
breed larger horses were started by the Assyrians around the 7th Century BC. 
This may indicate a supply of new blood by larger horses from the Eurasian 
steppes. The Assyrian knowledge of horses and horse breeding was adopted by 
the Medes in the 6th Century BC and through them, by the Persians55. 
Archaeological and literary evidence indicates that larger horses from the 
Eurasian Steppes found their way into the Near East and Greece, together with 
Indo-Iranian peoples,56 as commented on by Pausanias:  
  
‘Now after the Persian invasion the Lacedaimonians became keener 
breeders of horses than any other Greeks.’57  
 
After the Persian Wars, Greece developed large scale horse-breeding 
programmes; specialised horse breeders started to produce better war and race 
horses.58 These breeders may have used Persian horses to improve their native 
                                                
55 Dum-Tragut (2005) 44. 
56 M. Jankovich, They Rode Into Europe, the Fruitful Exchange in the Arts of Horsemanship 
between East and West (1968, English version London 1971). In his book Jankovich explains 
the spread of the steppehorse and the horsemanship of the nomads via southern Russia and 
Bactria into the west. He states these horses were known as the Soulon-horses (as they were 
called by the Chinese) from Bactria, closely related to the Akhal Tekke-horses of southern 
Russia.)  
57 Pausanias, Hellados Periegesis 6.2.1. 
58 Strabo 16.2.10: ‘Apameia also has a town called Chersonnese (...) it was also called Pella at 
one time. Here too, were the waroffice and the royal [Macedonian] stud. The royal stud 
consisted of more than 30000 mares and 300 stallions. Here too, were coltbreakers 
(poolodamnai) and instructors in heavy-armed warfare.’; Famous horsebreeders in Pausanias 
6.2.1.: ‘Xenarkes, Lykinos, Arkesilaos and his son Lichas. Xenarkes won in Delphi, Argos and 
Corinth; Lykinos in Olympia.’; 6.4.10: Lampos who was a hippotrophos, so not a breeder; 6.1.3 
: Cleogenes who won on a selfbred horse. 
Not only men took part in these races, women too: 3.8.1: ‘Archidamos left sons when he died of 
whom Agis was the elder and inherited the throne instead of Agesilaos. Archidamos also had a 
daughter  whose name was Cynisca, she was exceedingly ambitious to succeed at the Olympic 
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stock. According to Herodotus, the Persians raced their horses against 
Thessalian horses, reputed to be the best in the whole of Greece, and won.59 
Gaebel60 questions whether there was an actual horse race, but I believe this is 
not that important; the anecdote shows that the Greeks were becoming 
increasingly aware of the differences in quality between the Greek indigenous 
and other breeds. 
 
A closer look at the brands listed in Braun’s publication leads us to the idea that 
there must have been a lively horse trade in Greece, or more probably, in the 
Mediterranean. At least 57 brands must have existed, including the S-brand 
(‘san’) which has to do with the sanphora61!or san-bearers from Sicyon. Other 
symbols, such as pictures of animals, indicate horses or breeds from Thessalia, 
Macedonia and Corinth.62 Most of the brands on the tablets are found in literary 
or artistic contexts and are described in Braun’s list, in which brands are called 
Zeichen.63  
 
On the tablets, a dolphin brand is also listed which originates from South Italy, 
as is indicated by a fourth century volute crater.64 Some brands, like the 
caduceus and snake (Braun Z 11 and 18), are shown on horses in Attic vase 
painting as early as the 6th century BC The caduceus brand (Braun Z 18), for 
example, appears also on the coins of King Alexander I (498 – 454 BC) and of 
                                                                                                                             
Games, and was the first woman to breed horses and the first to win an Olympic Victory. After 
Cynisca other women, especially women of Lacedaimon have won Olympic victories but none 
of them was more distinguished for their victories than she.’ 
59 Her 7.196. 
60 Gaebel (2002) 73. 
61 Aristophanes, Hippeis 602.  
62 J. Kroll., An Archive of the Athenian Cavalry (Hesperia 46, 1977, No. 2) 88. 
63 K. Braun, Der Dipylon-Brunnen B1 Die Funde (Tafeln 54-93), Mitteilungen des Deutschen 
Archäologischen Instituts, Athenischen Abteilung, Volume 85 (1970) 256 – 264.  
64 H. Sichtermann, Griechische Vasen in Unteritalien, (Tuebingen 1966) Pl 58. 
  29 
King Pausanias (390 – 389 BC) of Macedonia, probably the mark of the finest 
Macedonian chargers. The brands must have been the trade marks of the 
established stables and herds that provided finer mounts for the whole of 
Greece.65 Athens imported most of its horses from Thessaly, Macedonia, 
Corinth, Sicyon and the South of Italy.66 
There must have been horse trading not only amongst peoples in the eastern 
Mediterranean, but also in the West. Research results have shown that Greek 
colonies existed on the Iberian peninsula.67 These might well be the Greek 
trading posts to which Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse in the 5th century, refers.68  
 
We also find that the Sicilian Greeks sent out horses on a regular basis to the 
Peloponnese. The Syracusan tyrant Hiero I, for example, wins a number of 
horse races in Greece with horses he himself had bred. His Sicilian horses were 
‘world-famous’ at that time. During the Classical era, Athens encounters 
Sicilian horses and cavalry again and again, once during their infamous Sicilian 
Expedition and again during the Peloponnesian Wars. It seems that the Greeks 
had secured access to the Iberian horse markets via Sicily. Xenophon writes 
about the Celt, Iberian and Sicilian mercenaries who were sent by Dionysius of 
Syracuse, and their horses may have come with them from their own lands.69  
 
Attica is not regarded as a suitable area for breeding horses. I would like to 
begin by making a clear distinction between breeding horses and boarding 
                                                
65 Kroll (1977) 86 – 88. 
66 Kroll (1977) 87. The dolphin brand (South Italy) was found on the 4th century tablets only. 
67 F. Quesada Sanz, ed., Gladius XXV (Madrid 2005). 
68 Her 7.154. 
69 Hell 7.1.20 – 22. 
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horses. Although the Greek hippobotos is usually translated as both, I would 
prefer hippobotein as horse breeding and hippotrophein as horse boarding.70  
Breeders keep a few stallions with large herds of mares with foals, weanlings 
and yearlings. They sell off the redundant horses. Owners only keep horses 
which are of use to them, for example racehorses, draught horses or cavalry 
horses. Xenophon makes reference to horse breakers to whom young horses 
should be sent,71 therefore breeders would sell off their young unbroken horses, 
probably at the age of three or four years old. Once trained by the horse 
breakers, the horse would receive its basic training from its owner, as 
Xenophon explains. I am therefore assuming that the horse at that stage would 
be about four years old. Virgil writes that the right starting age for a racehorse 
or warhorse was after they had become four years of age.72 Horse breeders 
would need access to large pastures to keep their horses. They might collect 
their horses once every year and sell off all the sound ones.  
 
As soon as a horse comes into training, the horse can be kept in a stable and a 
paddock. It would have to be fed hay and grains.73 In ancient Attica the 
situation was no different. Athenian cavalry horses could be kept stabled and 
fed on grains and hay, dried grass that can be transported over large distances. It 
is for this reason that cavalry men received a corn allowance. Although some 
scholars assume that the lack of a cavalry force is due to the deficiency of 
pastures, this is not altogether true. On the contrary, trained horses are even 
better off when not grazing on grass because it contains a lot of protein and 
sugar which can even make a horse go lame or become colicky. Horses should 
                                                
70 CC 1.11. 
71 PH 1.1. 
72 Vergil, Georgica 3.193. 
73 Aristotle, Historia Animalium 8.27; CC 1.16. 
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not be fed too much grain or grass because they easily become overweight and 
develop diseases accordingly. By nature, horses are steppe grazers and do not 
benefit on rich grass pastures.  
 
Today we have large horse producing areas, such as Normandy in France and 
the Blue Grass region in Kentucky, USA, where stud farms keep their herds and 
young horses, usually racehorses. These horses are sold off at auctions when 
they are yearlings and transported to the racing stables, which are usually 
located in the vicinity of racetracks near cities. As soon as they advance into 
training, their diet will change from grass to hay and grains.  
 
Admittedly, Herodotus does say that Attica is not suitable for cavalry. He was 
not referring however to the breeding or keeping of cavalry horses, but to the 
situation of the land from a strategic point of view. It was unsuitable for cavalry 
because in the case of a defeat, the cavalry would only be able to retreat by 
narrow mountain passes and so only a handful of armed infantry would be 
needed to finish them off.74 Herodotus was not claiming that Attica was 
unsuitable for keeping horses, or that Athens could not have had a cavalry force 
of its own.  
 
In Athens itself, there is substantial evidence of the cavalry’s presence. Various 
monuments were erected by victors in the annual cavalry competitions75 and 
some decrees of hippeis, which were set up near the Herms or in the stoa of the 
                                                
74 Her 9.13-15. 
75 Bryaxis Base, I.G. II2, 3130 between the Stoa of Zeus and the Royal Stoa; a base found 
before the southeast corner of the Stoa of Zeus (Hesperia 15, 1946, 176 – 177) and a relief 
showing cavalrymen of Leontis, found behind the Royal Stoa (Hesperia 40, 1971, 271 – 272). 
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Herms.76 Xenophon mentions the Herms as a place for the cavalry.77 According 
to Mnesimachos, also, the area of the Herms was a centre for cavalry activity: 
 
‘Go to the Agora, to the Herms, the place frequented 
by the phylarchs, and their handsome pupils, whom 
Pheidon trains in mounting and dismounting.’78 
 
According to publications based on recent research, this area was closely 
connected to the Athenian cavalry; here it performed its exercises and 
parades.79  
 
As for the Athenian warhorses, they tended to be imported from the large stud 
farms in Thessaly, Corinth, Macedonia or Sicily. These horses might be 
branded or unbranded, and since neither Simon nor Xenophon put the emphasis 
on the breed of the horse, branding was probably not the most important 
feature.  
Prices for race and war horses were probably high. From excavated tables with 
names of cavalrymen together with the pricing of their horses and other 
                                                
76 J. Threpsiades and E. Vanderpool, Pros Tois Hermais in Deltion 18, 1963, Meletai 104 - 105 
and 109 – 110. 
77 CC 3.2.  
78 Mnesimachus, Fragment 4, translation: W.E. Wycherley, The Athenian Agora, III, The 
Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia, Princeton 1957, 105, no. 303. Of Pheidon symbola are 
recovered together with the lead tablets (Kroll (1977) 84). 
79 For general discussion of the Herms and the Stoa of the Herms: E.B. Harrison, The Athenian 
Agora, XI, Archaic and Archaistic Sculpture, Princeton 1965, 108 – 110; H.A. Thompson and 
W.E. Wycherley, The Athenian Agora, XIV, The Agora of Athens, Princeton 1972, 94 – 95. 
Specifically on cavalry: Ch. Habicht, Neue Inschriften aus dem Kerameikos, Athenische 
Mitteilungen 76, 1961, 136 – 138. E. Vanderpool, ‘Victories in the Anthippasia,’ Hesperia 43, 
1974, 311. 
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sources80 we know that they varied between 200 and 1200 drachmae.81 Work 
and travel horses will probably have been far cheaper, in view of the lower 
requirements regarding build, stamina and character. In Lysias 24, the 
defendant speaks of a horse he had rented as a disabled person, which cost him 
less than keeping a mule.  
 
The prices usually varied between 300 to 1200 drachmae.82 The average value 
on the above mentioned tables was just under 700 drachmae.83 Some horses 
may well have fetched higher prices.84 The most common colours of an 
Athenian cavalry horse are chestnut, bay, black, white and grey.85  
 
Xenophon saw the horse’s appearance as less important than its build and its 
character. A warhorse should be of the right size, have good feet, be strong and 
muscular and have a calm but courageous character. It should not be timid by 
nature for these horses cannot be used to harm the enemy and often throw their 
riders and put them in a very awkward situation.86  
Therefore the choice of horse is important to the horseman, especially when he 
is serving in the cavalry and his life depends on his horse. 
                                                
80 The horse of Xenophon which he sold at his Anabasis was bought back from its purchasers 
by his officers who knew he loved the animal dearly. They paid 50 darics for it. Horses were 
used for farming as we know from Ec 18.4; Hesiod, Erga kai Hemerai 816. 
81 A cavalry man earned 1 drachma a day from which he had to pay for armour and weapons. 
(CC 1.23). 
82 Isaeus 5.43 mentions 3 minae; Aristophanes, Nephelai 21 – 23: 12 minae. Lysias 7.10: 12 
minae. 
83 Kroll (1977) 89. 
84 Xenophon’s own favourite horse was bought back from Persian traders by his fellow officers 
for 12,5 minae. He had sold it, involuntarily, to buy provisions for his army during their march 
back to Greece. (Xen. Anabasis 7.8.6); Alexander the Great’s Bucephalus was purchased at a 
price of 13 talents (Plutarchus, Alexander 6.1-4), but this is a rather high price as it would mean 
780 minae.  
85 Kroll (1977) 86. 
86 PH 3.9. 
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‘Further, uniformity of speed is the essential condition for the 
execution of closed charges, and this obviously cannot be assured if 
big men on little horses and small men on big horses are 
indiscriminately mixed up in the same units. Horses and men have 
therefore been sorted out everywhere into three categories, light, 
medium and heavy, and in periods when war was practically chronic, 
suitable duties have been allotted to each. It is clear, on purely 
mechanical grounds, that the greater the velocity of motion at the 
moment of collision the greater will be the chances of success, and 
this greater speed will be on the side of the bigger horses as a 
consequence of their longer stride. On the other hand, these horses, 
by reason of their greater weight, are used up much more rapidly 
than small ones.’87 
 
That being said of the horse’s nature, we can see why a fearful horse will never 
excel on the battlefield and should therefore not be trained as a cavalry horse. 
Xenophon writes:  
 
‘one should beware of horses that are naturally shy. For timid horses give 
one no chance of using them to harm the enemy, and often throw their rider 
and put him in a very awkward situation.’88 
 
Thus, when buying a horse one should observe  
 
‘that a horse is sound in his feet, gentle and fairly speedy, has the will and 
the strength to stand work, and, above all, is obedient, and is a horse that 
                                                
87 Col. Frederic Natusch Maude C.B., Cavalry, Encyclopedia Britannica 11th ed. 1910, vol. 5, 
663. 
88 PH 3.9. 
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will, as a matter of course, give the least trouble and the greatest measure 
of safety to his rider in warfare. But those that want a lot of driving on 
account of their laziness, or a lot of coaxing and attention on account of 
their high spirit, make constant demands on the rider’s hands and rob him 
of confidence in moments of danger.’89  
 
Older breeds like the Pura Raza Espanola, Camargue and Arab horse usually 
measure 130 – 160 cm, are usually flatgaited and have a very compliant and 
docile character.90 The ancient war horse breeds might well have closely 
resembled today’s Iberian horses. Such horses are easy to mount and to sit on 
and stay on without stirrups or saddle. The works of Roman authors also 
include many passages on horses. To quote Virgil: 
 
“See from the first yon high-bred colt afield, 
His lofty step, his limbs' elastic tread: 
Dauntless he leads the herd, still first to try 
The threatening flood, or brave the unknown bridge, 
By no vain noise affrighted; lofty-necked, 
With clean-cut head, short belly, and stout back; 
His sprightly breast exuberant with brawn. 
Chestnut and grey are good; the worst-hued white 
And sorrel. Then lo! if arms are clashed afar, 
                                                
89 PH 3.12. 
90 On the docile character of Arabian horses: ‘The Bedouin never uses a bit or bridle of any sort, 
but instead, a halter with a fine chain passing round the nose. With this he controls his mare 
easily and effectually. He rides on a pad of cotton, fastened on the mare's back by a surcingle, 
and uses no stirrups. This pad is the most uncomfortable and insecure seat imaginable, but 
fortunately the animals are nearly always gentle and without vice. I have never seen either 
violent plunging, rearing, or indeed any serious attempt made to throw the rider.’ (Lady Anne 
Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates (part I) (orig pub in 1879) edited, with a preface and 
some account of the Arabs and their horses by W.S. Blunt in two volumes, Volume II (Frank 
Cass & CO. Ltd. 1968) see Chapter 28, on horses.) 
  36 
Bide still he cannot: ears stiffen and limbs quake; 
His nostrils snort and roll out wreaths of fire. 
Dense is his mane, that when uplifted falls 
On his right shoulder; betwixt either loin 
The spine runs double; his earth-dinting hoof 
Rings with the ponderous beat of solid horn.”91 
 
The best horse for battle is the one described by Virgil: a courageous horse, 
fierce to lead the herd, not cowering when hearing unknown noises or seeing 
unknown things; a horse that is rather aroused than shied by noises and battle 
cries.  
                                                
91 Vergil, Georgica 3.375 – 89. Translation: J. B. Greenough. Boston. Ginn & Co. 1900. On the 
characteristics of a good cavalry charger. 
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2.2. Military horsemanship 
 
Dom Duarte (1430) is the author of one of the oldest writings on knightly 
horsemanship. He addresses most problems a knight may encounter on the 
battlefield such as falling off, throwing a spear and so on.  
 
Xenophon was rediscovered during the Renaissance and dressage based on 
what people liked to call Xenophontean principles became an art practised at 
royal courts and riding schools. Xenophon’s On Horsemanship became one of 
the new standard works on horse training in Italy, France, Germany and 
England. His work was translated around 1550 AD by Grisone, a riding master 
in Naples who used it as a source for his own book on horse training. 
Unfortunately Grisone did not copy Xenophon’s advice to treat the horse 
gently. He advocated extreme punishment such as the use of live hedgehogs 
under the horse’s tail.  
 
Grisone’s most important pupil was Pignatelli who educated De Pluvinel who 
later became Maître d’Equitation in France and founder of the ‘Académie 
d’Equitation’. His most important pupil was De La Guernière, an equestrian 
master and founder of the academic art of riding. Dressage became a part of 
royal education, also for philosophical purposes. Training a horse was seen as 
getting to know oneself and as a noble task. To quote Podhajsky, a former 
director of the Spanish Riding School in Vienna from 1939 to 1965: 
 
‘Equestrian art, perhaps more than any other, is closely related to the 
wisdom of life. Many of the same principles may be applied as a line of 
conduct to follow. The horse teaches us self-control, constancy, and the 
ability to understand what goes on in the mind and the feelings of another 
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creature, qualities that are important throughout our lives. Moreover, from 
this relationship with his horse the rider will learn that only kindness and 
mutual understanding will bring about achievements of highest perfection. 
(…) To be successful the rider must be able to distinguish between cause 
and effect. The effect will be easy to see, but the cause will be recognised 
only through knowledge, which is supplied by theory.’92 
 
During the middle ages and the Renaissance and Baroque periods, cavalry was 
used as an addition to the infantry. Knights would engage in battle with knights 
in one-to-one combats, or attack infantry. In Western Europe, the knightly 
cavalry usually bore swords, lances and spears. Longbow men were used on the 
battlefield, but these bows were too long to be used on horseback. Knights 
would therefore have to be capable of riding their horses one handed.  
In those times, mass cavalry attacks were unusual on the battlefield. This type 
of warfare was only used by the Central Asian steppe peoples, who employed 
different approaches and methods in horse training, and used bows as 
weapons.93  
 
Developing from this sort of combat, cavalry could be used in the Renaissance 
period as a weapon against infantry. Therefore the art of the classical airs above 
the ground, like the levade, courbette and capriole could be performed on the 
battlefield. In the Renaissance and Baroque periods, the ‘airs above the ground’ 
were one of the training aims. These ‘airs’ were used on the battlefield to fight 
off infantry.  
                                                
92 A. Podhajsky, The Complete Training of Horse and Rider in the Principles of Classical 
Horsemanship (Doubleday & Company, USA 1967) 20 – 21.  
93 B. Karayev, ‘Impact Turkmen Mounted Archers on Modern Warfare’, Published at 
www.newscentralasia.com on July 18, 2004. 
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These ‘high school airs’ are practised to this day at the famous classical 
institutes such as the Spanish Riding School in Vienna, Austria, the Cadre Noir 
in Saumur, France, or the Real Escuela in Jerez de la Frontera, Spain. On 
Renaissance and Baroque paintings and drawings, horses are shown performing 
these ‘airs’ on the battle field.94 
 
During the 80 Years War, various paintings were made of Dutch stadtholders 
on Spanish horses, and after this war, the Dutch elite is shown on various 
paintings performing high school airs, the levade and mezair being preferred, 
together with movements like the piaffe or passage. This lasted until about the 
first half of the 19th Century, after which English horses came into fashion.95 It 
is the German horse trainer Steinbrecht who complains, in his book on German 
classical dressage Das Gymnasium des Pferdes, about the influence of English 
horses on the German cavalry horses. The English thoroughbred gained 
popularity because of its superb ability to canter and gallop, which are not 
qualities attributed to the Baroque riding horses.96 
 
In the meantime, the horse’s duty had changed in cavalry actions from facing 
other cavalry in close combat to large regiment combat formations in which 
speed and mobility of the unit were most important. In the Prussian army, 
                                                
94 R. de Leeuw, In het zadel – het Nederlands ruiterportret van 1550 – 1900 (‘s-Hertogenbosch, 
1980) (Catalogue of Exposition in 1980) which shows horses and riders from 1550 – 1900, 
almost all horses are shown in ‘high school airs’ like the Levade or Mezair. In the Hollandsche 
Rijschool in Amsterdam even ‘pillars’ were erected to train the horses. (Bakhuysen in 1750 
painted the ‘Interior of the Hollandsche Rijschool at the Schans in Amsterdam showing horses 
between the pillars or under their riders performing these exercises). 
95 De Leeuw (1980) 29.  
96 Baroque horses have a different build than the Thoroughbred horses. Thoroughbred horses 
have long striding gaits, baroque horses have short striding gaits and move upwards instead of 
forward. This type of horses is especially bred for high school movements such as the Airs 
above the ground, while the Thoroughbred horse is less capable of such features, but is faster.  
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horses were used to pull cannons while the rest of the cavalry followed. In the 
battles of the 19th and early 20th century, the British and Prussian cavalry 
merely fought their enemies through large frontal attacks supported by gun fire. 
In these battles the Spanish and other Baroque horses, like the Friesian, were of 
no use because of their short striding gaits. So, in Northern Europe, the English 
Thoroughbred became the leading horse breed together with sturdy German and 
Russian breeds which were able to move fast and pull a lot of weight. The 
English Thoroughbred horse originates from Eastern horse breeds, such as the 
Turkish and Barb horses.  
 
This had consequences for other breeds. In Spain and Portugal, Baroque riding 
horses for example were still used for shepherding and in the sport of 
bullfighting or in the Doma Clásica (classical dressage). The Lipizzaner became 
an endangered horse breed. Nowadays there are only an estimated 5000 left 
throughout the world. The Dutch Friesian horse, also a Baroque riding horse, 
became almost extinct in the 20th century. The Spanish Pura Raza Española and 
the Portugese Lusitano horse were only exported to other European countries 
from the 1980s and the best horses of this type are still held by the Spanish or 
Portuguese elite. 
 
During the 19th and 20th century, a basic training (or dressage training) 
evolved, which included the necessary exercises for training cavalry horses. 
Even ‘high school’ training was considered necessary for cavalry horses to 
improve their performance. As Robertson tells us: 
 
‘A graceful position, a fairly good seat, to use the saber and pistol (this 
excellently well, too) on horseback, to mount at a gallop, and one or two 
other accomplishments of a similar nature, and there our horsemanship 
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and knowledge of the horse end, the latter never passing zero during the 
whole time. On the frontier this is supplemented by such information as 
individual ambition or research, or accident, may supply.  
The refinements of equitation, however, the principles of the haute ecole, 
as it is called abroad, we neglect almost entirely. With such exercises as 
the "piaffe," "pirouette," "circling on the forehand," "changing of hand," 
the "volte," the different "passages," and many other exercises in the 
"setting-up" of horse and rider, we never bother ourselves. Yet they are 
considered the A B C of his profession by even the youngest cavalry 
"sub" abroad, and certainly no horseman calls himself really 
accomplished without being able to perform them.  
In no other way can he reach the end supposed to be desirable with every 
cavalryman, of communicating to his charger his every impulse, of 
making him obedient and ready to act instantly and according to his will 
in every emergency, in short, of making his steed and himself, as nearly 
as possible, one.’97  
 
Horse training was originally conceived to train horses for battle. Horses 
needed to be versatile and swift in order to be used in this way and to be 
extremely obedient to bit and to rider’s aids (hands, weight and legs). To 
explain, in modern terms: 
 
 ‘Many [dressage] exercises have been designed to cause the horse to 
bend either one or both hind legs. The ultimate goal is to get the horse to 
bend both hind legs the same amount at the same time. If the horse 
bends the hind legs evenly, the horse takes equal weight on each hind 
leg.  
                                                
97 Appendix A, lines 46 – 61. 
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Here, the aesthetic meets the practical. If the horse takes weight evenly 
on both hind legs, it will move in balance. As a result, the horse's 
soundness is preserved and the gaits are livelier. Because the forehand is 
lighter, the shoulder is freed and the front legs can stretch out. The 
extended trot is an impressive display of this. The horse seems to dance 
because the strides are light and effortless. The horse will also be able to 
stop or turn immediately upon the rider’s request, which was vital in 
combat situations.’98  
 
In equestrian terms, a horse is moving ‘downhill’ if a horse has more weight on 
its forehand. It is more difficult to make this horse stop or turn: it would be like 
trying stopping a lorry moving downhill. It is imbalanced and its impetus drives 
it forward. If however it places its hind legs more under its body, then, as a result 
of the Hankenbiegung, as it is called, the horse’s forehand is lifted a bit and it 
will be moving ‘uphill’. Now the weight is shifted that bit more to the hind 
quarters and the horse is carrying itself. The horse will be easier to stop or turn. 
The horse appears to be more balanced and ‘collected’. 
 
A number of exercises are required to supple the horse’s hind quarters in order 
to enable it to put weight on its haunches and to make it more versatile. Some of 
these exercises are shown in the appendices. The exercise in Appendix … is a 
Shoulder-in which is a side movement exercise, first ‘discovered’ by 
Gueriniere, although it might precede his time (17th Century). Other side 
movements are the traversale, renvers and travers: these were conceived to 
make the horse more manoeuvrable and eventually result in a canter pirouette 
(turn on the haunches), which is of course extremely valuable in combat. The 
                                                
98 Hodges, Cynthia M.A., Dressage: Classical Equitation op: 
http://www.angelfire.com/sports/dressage/pages/balance.html (Last visited: 25 March 2012). 
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side movements are naturally of great value as well because they make the 
horse move sideward, which may be quite useful, for example when one needs 
to evade enemy attacks. 
 
Xenophon also understood that the horse should never be trained through force 
or fear. This makes the horse fearful of its own rider and a horse that is trained 
through fear will let down his rider whenever it becomes unsure or afraid of 
something. It will in fact always equate the rider with fear and never dare to 
trust the rider. In such moments, the horse will not be inclined to stay with the 
rider and will want to escape.99 Xenophon’s approach therefore was not from an 
animal-loving perspective; it was, in actual fact, lifesaving.  
 
‘If a man wants to make a useful war-horse look more stately and showy 
when ridden, he must avoid pulling his mouth with the bit, and using the 
spur and whip, means by which most people imagine that they show off 
a horse. In point of fact the results they produce are the very opposite of 
what they intend. For by dragging the mouth up they blind their horses 
instead of letting them see ahead, and by spurring and whipping, flurry 
them so that they are startled and get into danger. That is the behaviour 
of horses that strongly object to being ridden and that behave in an ugly 
and unseemly fashion.’ 100 
                                                
99 PH 10.1 – 5.  
100 PH 10.7; Here Xenophon warns against what is unfortunately happening today in horse 
competitions. Dr Gerd Heuschmann observes: ‘According to the saying ‘You can’t make an 
omelette without breaking an egg’ many of today’s competitive riders engage in pulling, 
squeezing, jerking, and more. And, since the equestrian media frequently focuses on images of 
high performance competitors, it then appears that such riding is exemplary for all. This is not 
the case! (…) Competitive dressage as a sport has grown by leaps and bounds during the last 
decades. More and more riders – including many beginners – want to test their ability against 
their competitors, prove their skills and be rewarded. Unfortunately, however, some ardent 
devotees to the sport lack the necessary knowledge and skills. (…) The real task of a rider, 
which is to train a horse, has taken a back seat.  As a consequence, more and more horses 
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Drawing on Xenophon’s work, various exercises were conceived and passed on 
over time. Exercises which in fact better prepare the horse for its task to carry a 
rider and for it to understand how it must respond to certain aids and 
movements which are not natural to the horse but which are vital if the horse is 
to be used for cavalry purposes. The purpose at all times is to enhance the 
horse’s understanding so that it may be easier for the rider to guide the horse 
and to remain mounted. A collected horse is a horse on which one may sit with 
ease. Xenophon describes this by stating that a properly collected horse is 
essential in order for the horse to be capable of turning on the spot (strophein in 
Greek) without falling or throwing off the rider.  
 
‘But if you teach the horse to go with a slack bridle, to hold his neck up 
and to arch it towards the head, you will cause the horse to do the very 
things in which he himself delights and takes the greatest pleasure. (…) 
Whenever, therefore, you induce him to carry himself in the attitudes he 
naturally assumes when he is most anxious to display his beauty, you 
make him look as though he took pleasure in being ridden, and give him 
a noble, fierce, and attractive appearance. How we think that these 
effects may be produced we will now try to explain.’101 
 
In his work, On Horsemanship, Xenophon sets the basis for what in our time 
became known as ‘classical dressage’. Dressage that was conceived from the 
                                                                                                                             
develop health problems because they’re used incorrectly and are overstrained. The steadily 
rising number of equine veterinarians and hospitals are proof of this development. One pays a 
high price for the achievements gained in the show ring, at the horse’s expense.’ (G. 
Heuschmann, Tug of War Classical Versus Modern Dressage: Why Classical Training Works 
and How Incorrect Riding Negatively Affects Horses' Health (J.A. Allen, London 2007) 21 – 
23). 
101 PH 10.3-5. 
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necessity of preparing the horse for the battlefield and for what we now call 
military horsemanship. Training the horse in an established manner, without 
breaking the horse physically or in spirit, will make it possible for the horse to 
perform its task on the battlefield in close cooperation with the rider and with 
full confidence in its master. A fearful horse will not succeed in doing this and 
that is why a horse must be trained with respect, so that it continues to trust its 
rider. Only then will the horse look truly handsome, though this is of secondary 
importance. 
 
[6] For what a horse does under constraint, as Simon says, he does 
without understanding, and with no more grace than a dancer would show 
if he was whipped and goaded. Under such treatment horse and man alike 
will do much more that is ugly than graceful. No, a horse must make the 
most graceful and brilliant appearance in all respects of his own will with 
the help of aids. [7] Further, if you gallop him during a ride until he 
sweats freely, and as soon as he prances in fine style, quickly dismount 
and unbridle him, you may be sure that he will come willingly to the 
prance. [8]  
This is the attitude in which artists represent the horses on which gods 
and heroes ride, and men who manage such horses gracefully have a 
magnificent appearance. [9] Indeed a prancing horse is a thing so 
graceful, terrible and astonishing that it rivets the gaze of all beholders, 
young and old alike. At all events no one leaves him or is tired of gazing 
at him so long as he shows off his brilliance.102 
 
As stated above, in classical horsemanship, a horse is trained with respect for its 
nature based also on its temperament so that it may perform its work optimally 
                                                
102 PH 11. 6 – 9.  
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and with full confidence in its rider. This will require collection, which comes 
with training, not only in the ring but also on land and in jumping. Neither 
should the horse ever be broken by use of the spur, whip and bridle, because it 
will turn against the rider and endanger him or her. Xenophon can therefore be 
regarded as the founder of Classical Dressage, because of his emphasis on the 
key principles of collection and respect for the horse. Add to this classical 
training of the rider and horse also ground training and horse jumping training, 
about which Xenophon also writes in his books. He regards these methods of 
training in combination with dressage training as comprehensive training for 
rider and horse alike. It makes for a secure seat and a fearless rider, and a horse 
that will be competent on all kinds of surfaces and in every situation.  
 
When a horse is no longer being trained, it loses its manoeuvrability. If well-
trained previously, a horse might regain its agility quite easily but it will be 
slow to reach its former level of suppleness, if at all.  
 
2.4.  Natural horsemanship 
 
In the 19th Century, the Hungarian hussars were considered natural horsemen: 
‘as Hungarians, the hussars were born horsemen, therefore not too much effort 
was expended on their training; they remained natural horsemen.’103 These 
people never developed a theoretical or scientific approach to horse training.  
                                                
103 Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Aus meinem Leben: Aufzeichnungen des Prinzen 
Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen [From My Life: Chronicles of Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-
Ingelfingen], ed., Arved von Teichman und Logischen. (Berlin: Ernst Siegried Mittler und 
Sohn, 1897-1907, vol. 1) 257-9, 280-2. 
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Riders in the mountainous parts of Spain needed a swift horse capable of 
collection104 for their cattle herding tasks, bullfighting and mountain guerrilla 
warfare. They had to be capable of manoeuvring in enclosed spaces or on 
mountain rigs. Therefore Portugal and Spain produced a horse to which 
collection comes naturally.  
 
Riding with a certain degree of collection is typical for horsemen who have to 
operate in enclosed spaces. In spacious Britain most equestrians prefer 
eventing, hunting or racing instead of dressage. In the words of Seamus Hayes: 
 
'An Irish businessman who rides before breakfast to prepare himself for a 
day in the office, pulls on a pair of gum boots, rides out into the 
countryside on his not very highly schooled horse, and skylarks over a half 
a dozen fences. He returns, red in face and blissfully happy, to start the 
day's work. An Englishman would do much the same but his dress and his 
horse would be a bit smarter, and he would bear in mind the principles he 
had learned in Pony Club. A German, on the other hand, would ride in the 
indoor school under instruction from his riding master, carrying two 
dressage whips, one in each hand, to get the hocks well under. And when 
he has spent an hour achieving perfect obedience and accuracy he is 
absolutely prepared for his day's work.'105 
 
                                                
104 “Collection is necessary for work in the shortened tempo of the paces, and for the 
performance of short turns and smooth halts. The horse in collection must step with his hind 
legs well under his body, which can be recognised by the fact that the tracks of the hind feet 
come into or in front of those of the forefeet. This will make the horse arch his back correctly 
and carry his head higher, thus becoming shorter in his body. Collection requires an increased 
bend of the joints of the hind legs and furthers the physical training of the horse.” (Podhajsky 
(1967) 46) 
105 Irish horseman and showjumpertrainer Seamus Hayes in a lecture on horsemanship in the 
‘80s. 
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Nowadays Hungarian riders demonstrate their equestrian skills in shows on the 
pusztas. Their horsemanship equals the Mongolian method and bears an 
undeniable resemblance to the Scythian horsemanship described by sources in 
antiquity: archers able to fire their missiles at the gallop, mounted sword 
fighting and javelin throwing. In Antiquity, the Persians and Assyrians used 
their horses as a moving platform to fire missiles or to pursue, both of which 
skills are particularly needed on plains. These peoples used horses that were 
versatile and fast. What they needed most was a galloping horse.  
 
Some peoples are traditionally more horse-minded than others and are also 
more likely to become experts in riding and handling horses because of their 
upbringing.  
 
Aelian puts it like this:  
 
‘to control an Indian Horse, to check him when he leaps forward and 
would gallop away, has not, it seems, been given to every man, but 
only to those who have been brought up from childhood to manage 
horses.’106  
 
Likewise, the Numidians in Hannibal’s army rode their horses with a rein 
fastened unto a halter without a bit and they seemed to be able to almost 
effortlessly turn their horses, chase their enemies and throw the javelin in 
battle.107 This does not mean, however, that these people do not train their 
horses at all; to quote Aelian on Persian horse training:  
                                                
106 Aelian 13.9. 
107 Strabo 17.3.7 on the Maurusiani (Libyan people, also called Numidae) ‘Their horsemen fight 
mostly with a javelin, using bridles made of rush and riding bareback, but they also carry 
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‘In order that their Horses may not panic, the Persians accustom them to 
noises and the clang of bronze, and sound them so that in war they may 
never be afraid of the rattle of full armour and the clash of swords upon 
shields. And they throw dummy corpses stuffed with straw beneath their 
feet in order that they may get used to trampling on corpses in war and 
may not through terror at some unnerving occurrence be useless in 
encountering men-at-arms. Nor did this escape the notice of Homer, as 
he himself shows.  
At any rate we learn in our childhood from the Iliad (10.486) how the 
Thracian Rhesus and his companions with him were slain. This is the 
story we learn. The son of Tydeus slaughters the Thracians, while the 
son of Laertes draws the slain men away by the feet for fear lest the 
Thracian horses, being newcomers, get entangled among the dead bodies 
and panic, and through being unused to them may leap aside as though 
they were treading upon some terrifying objects. But once horses have 
learnt a thing, they will not forget what they have learnt, so clever are 
they at learning whatever is of any advantage.’108  
 
Generally such riders are less theoretically educated in their riding. They are not 
trying to gain a full control over their horse, rather they are training the horse to 
                                                                                                                             
daggers.’ (...) ‘The Libyans in general, dress alike and are similar in all other respects, using 
horses that are small but swift and so ready to obey that they are governed with a small rod. The 
horses wear collars made of wood (i.e. tree-wool) or hair to which the rein is fastened, though 
some even follow without being led, like dogs.’; This concurs with 19th century observations: 
‘The Bedouin never uses a bit or bridle of any sort, but instead, a halter with a fine chain 
passing round the nose. With this he controls his mare easily and effectually. He rides on a pad 
of cotton, fastened on the mare's back by a surcingle, and uses no stirrups. This pad is the most 
uncomfortable and insecure seat imaginable, but fortunately the animals are nearly always 
gentle and without vice. I have never seen either violent plunging, rearing, or indeed any serious 
attempt made to throw the rider.’ (Lady Anne Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates (part I) 
(orig pub in 1879) edited, with a preface and some account of the Arabs and their horses by 
W.S. Blunt in two volumes, Volume II (Frank Cass & CO. Ltd. 1968) Chapter 28, on horses.) 
108 Aelian 16.25. 
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suit their purpose; this tends to mean obedience in all three gaits, stopping and 
turning would be enough. These riders use horses that are agile and intelligent 
by nature. Only horses that are naturally prone to subtle aids like 
Thoroughbreds, Arabians and other hot bloods like the Akhal Teke from 
Turkmenistan will respond to these without training.  
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2.5.  Tack 
 
How to stay on a horse without saddle 
 
Xenophon time and again mentions the necessity of having a firm seat and he 
reveals the secret of how to stay on a horse in combat without stirrups or a 
saddle.109 In On Horsemanship he writes: 
 
‘Since it is necessary that the rider should have a firm seat when riding at 
top speed over all sorts of country, and should be able to use his 
weapons properly on horseback, the practice of horsemanship by hunting 
is to be recommended where the country is suitable and big game is to be 
found. Where these conditions are lacking, it is a good method of 
training for two riders to work together thus: one flies on his horse over 
all kinds of ground and retreats, reversing his spear so that it points 
backwards, while the other pursues, having buttons on his javelins and 
holding his spear in the same position, and when he gets within javelin 
shot, tries to hit the fugitive with the blunted weapons, and if he gets 
near enough to use his spear, strikes his captive with it.  
It is also a good plan, in case of a collision between them, for one to pull 
his adversary towards him and suddenly push him back again, since that 
is the way to dismount him. The right thing for the man who is being 
pulled is to urge his horse forward; by doing this the pulled is more 
likely to unhorse the puller than to be unhorsed himself.’110 
 
Dom Duarte tells us why a steady seat is so important and also how one 
can avoid being thrown off a horse, especially in combat situations. He 
                                                
109 Cyr 8.1.35.  
110 PH 8.10 – 11. 
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puts forward his thoughts and experiences on this subject in his book on 
knightly horsemanship: 
 
‘I said before that we can fall off the beast forward, backward or to the 
either side of the beast, a consequence of any action we take, like handling 
or throwing a spear, striking with a sword, or any similar which we do not 
master as we should. 
 
It is a fact that most of the men who fall from the beast during a battle, a 
joust, a collision with an obstacle or due to a wilful action from an 
opponent, are unable to avoid it due to lack of knowledge and will, and do 
not act as they should have; and most of them fall down because they could 
not get the proper help from their own bodies, legs, feet and hands. I am not 
saying all of them, because some suffer such violent collisions that it would 
have been impossible for them to stay mounted even if they were strong. 
(…) 
 
There are some who get so excited about doing specific actions (like 
handling and throwing a  spear) that, due to impatience and ignorance, they 
forget how they should behave to stay mounted, and fall off the beast. I 
have seen a few falling down for exactly that reason: they grasp the spear 
so strongly that they are unable to handle it for a long time and when they 
are physically forced to let it fall down to the ground, they also go down, 
keeping it company; others throw the spear with so much energy that they 
get unbalanced and follow it out of the saddle! Similar situations might 
happen when striking with a sword or doing any other thing; for lack of the 
necessary skills, many get unbalanced and fall down from the beast.’111 
 
                                                
111 Dom Duarte (1438, in translation of Preto 2005) 36 – 37. 
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Without stirrups, a rider consequently would not be at a disadvantage. If a horse 
is trained correctly, riding without saddle or stirrups becomes much easier, 
because of the ‘collection’. The lack of stirrups apparently never caused 
problems for people in Antiquity, and they consequently never invented them. 
For example, Ancient Germanic warriors considered riding with a saddle(cloth) 
lazy and unmanly. According to Caesar, they looked down on cavalry which 
rode on saddles or saddlecloths.112  
The Romans had solved the problem that not every horseman is capable of 
acquiring a good seat by inventing the horned saddle, which gives a rider a 
steady seat even if he is not a very good rider by nature. It even gives a rider a 
steady seat on a horse that is galloping and therefore not collected.  
 
A modern parallel to ancient cavalry training is to be found in the Spanish 
Riding School in Vienna. These riders still ride without stirrups at least once a 
week to make sure they will not lose their good seat and posture. Riding 
without stirrups is beneficial to seat and posture. It relaxes the leg muscles and 
the horse itself makes the rider feel his faults: whenever the rider tries to hang 
on with cramped muscles, he will fall off at the slightest move of the horse. 
When the rider relaxes and lets his legs hang down, he will effortlessly follow 
his horse. This is also known as ‘sticking to the saddle’. 
 
Finally, having no stirrups is not necessarily regarded as a ‘lack’. In combat 
situations, stirrups might even cause problems for a rider. If he falls off or is 
pulled or pushed off his horse, his foot might get caught in the stirrup. He then 
runs the risk of being dragged by his horse at a gallop.  A rider can also jump 
off quicker without stirrups.  
                                                
112 Caesar, De Bello Gallico 4.2. 
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Again the Spanish Riding School is our best parallel: here the horses are trained 
by Renaissance methods for an active role on the battlefield. The exercises are 
known as the ‘airs above the ground’. Traditionally these airs are performed by 
a rider who is mounted without stirrups. The stirrups are removed to prevent a 
rider from being caught in them if he falls off his horse or to prevent him from 
getting trapped under his horse if it should fall. Without stirrups, he can jump 
off quicker. Although the ‘haute-ecole’ theoretically originates from the 
training of battle-horses, the requirements on the battlefield were not always 
that sophisticated. 
 
Likewise, scholars tend to believe that mounting a horse without stirrups is 
difficult. In reality the process of mounting with stirrups is rather slow. Simply 
jumping on a horse is far quicker and it is one of the first abilities a rider had to 
master, because during an enemy raid there just was not enough time to get on a 
horse.113 As we have seen before, an average ancient horse measured 135 – 
155 cm,  so for a healthy adult it would hardly have been an effort to jump on 
his horse, even if these men were only 160 cm tall. Nowadays, in the sport 
called ‘vaulting’, or ‘voltige’ in Dutch, young girls and boys jump on cantering 
horses, using a special technique: they run along the horse in the same rhythm 
as its stride, then they propel themselves using the energy of the horse and 
finally jump on the horse.  
 
Bridles 
 
As said above, collection is necessary in order to guide the horse and for the 
rider to be properly seated. It will prove difficult to remain seated on an 
                                                
113 In the 19th Century, too, mounting a horse at the gallop was practised in the US and 
European armies (Appendix A lines 47-48). 
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uncollected horse. It is also important to prevent the horse from falling in 
difficult manoeuvres. The bit was invented as a refinement in the collection 
process.  
In Appendix G modern and ancient bridles are shown.  
A modern cavalry bridle is a combination of a snaffle and curb bit or a pelham 
bit, which combines the effect of the snaffle and curb. Usually the horse is 
ridden on the snaffle rein, but if the rider needs more control or needs to stop 
his horse, the curb rein is used. A military cavalry horse is ridden one handed. 
A cavalryman should be able to present and use his sabre on the horse and ride 
his horse with the other hand.114  
During the ages, the bridles changed. Throughout the Renaissance period, we 
see riders using a kandare (curb bit) and riding one handed. The horse is trained 
to perform the high school movements to the highest collection in order to 
enable participation in knightly combat (which was close combat).  
The 18th century saw a change in the role of the horse on the battlefield: the 
larger regiments needed to cover greater distances and were used for large 
frontal attacks on the enemy lines. The horses no longer needed to be able to 
turn on the spot and therefore collection was no longer considered necessary. 
The larger English and German horses found their way into the Western 
European armies. They were capable of large movements and speed but were 
harder to collect. With them came the Weymouth or double bridle, which 
consists of a bridoon and curb bit.  These bridles are used nowadays in dressage 
sport.  
 
Examples of this development are found in art paintings from the period prior to 
the 18th  century in which we observe the use of kandare bridles. After the 18th 
                                                
114 Maj. H.A.R. Kampen, Militair Ruiterbewijs, Defensie 2006, 8 – 9. 
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century the type of horses tends to change and the Weymouth bridle is 
introduced. The kandare disappears. 
In the Baroque period, horses were ridden on one bit only, but this practice was 
discontinued later on when not only was size regarded as important but also the 
ability of the horse to move forward. This gave rise to the double bridle, which 
benefitted both the movement and that collection.  
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2.6. Competitions and shows 
 
During Mediaeval and Renaissance times, knights used to engage in 
tournaments during peacetime in order to maintain their training and 
horsemanship. In modern times, something similar is done. What nowadays is 
called ‘Three-day-eventing’, used to be called ‘The Military’. Eventing receives 
its roots from the Military and in the first years of its existence this sport was 
aptly named ‘The Military’. Eventing was first introduced in 1912 at the 
Olympic Games in Stockholm, Sweden. The purpose of the sport was to test the 
precision, elegance and obedience of army horses on the parade ground, as well 
as the stamina and courage of the horse in battle. Another aim was to put to the 
test the horses’ fitness, versatily and obedience. At first only army officers on 
military chargers could compete in the sport but by 1924, civilians were 
allowed to compete at the Paris Olympics.115  
The military or three-day-eventing test includes:   
a dressage test ‘The test consists of a series of compulsory movements at 
walk, trot and canter gaits, within a rectangular arena 60 m. long and 20 m. 
wide. To perform a good Dressage test, the horse needs to be flexible and 
fluid. To keep the strong Eventing horses under the firm control required 
by the exacting Dressage movements involves great knowledge and 
understanding’;  
a cross country test: ‘The focus of the entire event is on the Cross-Country 
test, the objective of which is to prove the speed, endurance and jumping 
ability of the horse, while at the same time demonstrating the rider’s 
knowledge of pace and the use of his horse. This is the most difficult part 
                                                
115 http://www.hartpury.ac.uk/eventing/eventing (last visited 12 February 2012). 
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of the test consisting in a course, usually twice the distance of the 
steeplechase, comprising 30 to 40 Jumping efforts on natural solid 
obstacles, such as stone walls, woodpiles, water, ditches, etc. The aim is to 
jump all the fences within the limits of the time allowed;’  
and a jumping test: ‘to prove that the horses have retained their suppleness, 
energy and obedience in order to jump a course of 10 to 13 obstacles’.116 
These competitions and challenges enable both rider and horse to develop in a 
multifaceted manner and to respond more and more to each other’s needs. It 
allows for the rider to retain a good seat and for the horse to remain confident 
and ready to respond to unexpected situations.  
 
In the 19th Century, a US cavalry colonel also wanted to start up a competition 
in equestrian sports to motivate his cavalry men:  
 
   ‘(…)  to develop in our corps that love for equestrianism and mounted 
sport which alone can render it entirely worthy of outside admiration, or 
entitle us to be proud of it. (…) At all large posts, and especially 
Leavenworth, let officers aspire to have good horses; let their training be 
the pride and pastime of their owners. Let clubs for the promotion of 
steeple-coursing and the hunt, wherever the latter is practicable, be 
formed, and let skilful feats of horsemanship and a love for the saddle as 
a means of pleasure be encouraged(…)  In fact, a thorough knowledge of 
the horse should be considered essential from motives dictated by both 
duty and pleasure. Few officers have any idea how much amusement can 
be derived from work of this kind, or how much the dullest garrison at 
                                                
116 FEI (Federation Equestre Internationale) on 
http://www.fei.org/DISCIPLINES/EVENTING/ABOUT_EVENTING/Pages/What_Is_Eventin
g.aspx (last visited: 13 august 2009). 
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which there are half a dozen devotees of such sport can be enlivened by 
it.’117 
 
2.7. Summary on horsemanship 
 
We may now conclude that there are a number of decisive factors that 
determine the success of the cavalry on the battlefield.  
 
Horsemanship requires not only the ability to ride a horse, but also knowledge 
of the horse itself. Add to this the need for a trainer to be aware of the 
possibilities of the horse in terms of its character and its build, the need for a 
bridle that is most suited to both horse and rider, and exercises to prepare the 
horse and the rider for their task. Likewise, in the case of a cavalry horse, 
knowledge of how a cavalry detachment is best served on the battlefield. 
Horsemanship is therefore a craft which takes up a very significant amount of 
time.  
 
The following factors are all important aspects of horsemanship. Aspects which 
in fact are also regarded as important to the horse riding knowledge of today 
and for this reason I rely on examples from modern times. 
 
A rider not only needs to buy a good horse but the horse needs to be properly 
trained, without being subjected to pain or fear or to training that will break it 
physically. The horse after all represents an investment for the cavalry and the 
longer it can be of service, the better for the cavalry. A horse that has suffered 
                                                
117 See appendix A lines 314-317; 323-328; 335-340. 
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at the hands of people or its rider will be inclined not to work with them but 
rather against them. 
For this reason, the training of young horses is better left to the experts and not 
to any person regardless. 
A rider needs to use his weapons correctly and efficiently, to opt for the 
appropriate bridle and to have a steady seat in all sorts of terrain, and he needs 
to exercise regularly so as to keep both his horse and himself fit. It is a full-time 
job. 
 
Men who are not intrinsically motivated to keep up their equestrian skills have 
to be motivated by competitions and shows to perform with their horses. This is 
also a good way to train the cavalry during times of peace. In fact, shows and 
competitions can be a good way to estimate the performance of the cavalrymen 
and for determining their level of horsemanship. The purpose of military and 
classical horsemanship is at all times to improve the collection of the horse and 
therefore its rideability. Throughout the ages, the horse has continued to be 
given a greater role to play on the battlefield and had to become easier to ride 
and manoeuvre. Collection only waned in significance in the 19th century, when 
huge land armies were compelled to cover large distances, with horses being 
used merely for transport or for charging purposes.  
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Chapter 3. Greek Cavalry Warfare 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
First we need to determine the level of horsemanship of the Greek cavalry on 
the battlefield. I do this by taking a look at the cavalry battles and determining 
the various styles of horsemanship that were applied, which includes the use of 
the cavalry and tactics. It is also worth examining whether there was any 
development over the centuries in the use of Greek cavalry on the battlefield. 
The development of horsemanship is directly linked to the fielding of cavalry 
on the battlefield.  
 
The specific purpose of this chapter therefore is to draw a comparison between 
the various Greek and non-Greek cities or peoples so as to determine how they 
developed the cavalry and what their level of horsemanship was. In so doing, I 
hope to arrive at a conclusion regarding the influence they had on each other. I 
will be discussing the period from the Archaic period up to the Battle at 
Mantinea in 362 BC. 
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3.2.  Archaic period 
 
Some scholars argue that archaic cavalry existed only as mounted infantry that 
did not fight on horseback, but rather dismounted before battle: ‘Literary and 
iconographic evidence suggests that most horse-owners dismounted for combat 
and fought on foot throughout the Archaic period.’118 On archaic vase paintings 
cavalrymen often wear hoplite armour and are accompanied by squires who, so 
it is argued, hold the horses during battle. These squires themselves are most of 
the time mounted. Remarkably enough these squires are confined to archaic 
paintings only, and consequently may only have existed in the Archaic period, 
which would indicate that mounted hoplites in those times were not 
cavalrymen. 
Greek infantry apparently also used squires or servants, not only to serve their 
masters but also in combat. According to Herodotus, the Cypriot leader 
Onesilos (died 497 BC), when fighting the Persians (from whom he rebelled) 
was aided by a servant who was also his squire. Onesilos once asked his squire 
who would he prefer to kill: the Persian commander Artybius or his horse. The 
squire responded: ‘servants are supposed to attack servants,’ which meant that 
he, being a servant, should kill the horse.119  
                                                
118 H. van Wees, Greek Warfare – Myths and Realities (London 2004) 67. 
119 Her 5.111 – 112. Onesilos was the brother of king Gorgos (Gorgus) of the Greek city-state of 
Salamis on the island of Cyprus, which about 500 BC was a part of the Persian empire. When 
the Ionians rebelled from Persian rule, Onesilos used the occasion to capture the city of Salamis 
and usurp his brother’s throne; he was able to win every city on the island except for the 
Graeco-Phoenician city-state of Amathus, which stayed loyal to the Persians. In 497 BC, the 
Persians, with the help of the Phoenician navy, mounted an attack on Cyprus. Some of the 
Ionian colonies sent ships to assist Onesilos. In the ensuing battle, the Ionian fleet was able to 
defeat the Phoenician navy. Onesilos then led an army against the Persian general, Artybius. 
While Artybius was killed, the Persians won the battle during which Onesilos was killed too. As 
a result, the Ionian fleet retreated from Cyprus and five months later, the Persians regained 
control of Cyprus. Onesilos’ brother, Gorgus Chersides, was then reinstated by the Persians as 
king of Salamis. 
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Worley thinks that during the Messenian Wars in the 7th century BC Spartan 
and Messenian hippeis joined the fighting.120 In Sicily, archaeologists have 
discovered an archaic Greek saddlecloth.121 
There is some agreement on the existence of light and heavy cavalry in archaic 
Greece.122 It is my contention that the squires may also have served as light 
cavalry. When the ground was not suitable for cavalry action, the hoplite 
warrior could fight on foot and leave his horse with the squires or light cavalry.  
In my view, mounted cavalry must have existed in archaic Greece. In ‘The 
Shield of Heracles,’ Hesiod (8th century BC) describes a pre-Homeric battle 
between armies with chariots and mounted horsemen such as Perseus123. 
Greenhalgh makes reference to archaeological evidence which indicates that in 
the Mycenaean period, chariots and mounted horses functioned together.124 
Greek authors did not find fault with mounted horses in the Bronze Age. 
Pausanias writes: ‘The Thessalians too of Pharsalos dedicated an Achilles on 
horseback with Patroklos running beside his horse.’125  
In the classical period, however, writers speak of hippokomoi who took care of 
the horses in service of cavalrymen and who accompanied them on a march.126 
Xenophon refers to mounted grooms and he recommends their use in order to 
make a cavalry regiment appear larger by giving them imitation lances and a 
                                                
120 Worley (1994) 24 – 25. 
121 G. Szeliga, A Representation of an Archaic Greek Saddle-Cloth from Sicily in American 
Journal of Archaeology, Vol. 87, No. 4. (Oct., 1983), 545-547. 
122 Worley (1994) 48 and 58; Gaebel (2002) 57 shows examples of archaic vasepaintings on 
which light and heavy cavalry are shown. See also M. Schaefer, Zwischen Adelsethos und 
Demokratie, Archaeologische Quellen zu den Hippeis im archaischen und klassischen Athen 
(München 2002). 
123 Hesiod, Aspis Herakleous 216. 
124 Greenhalgh (1973) 45 – 47. 
125 Pausanias 10.13.5. 
126 Hell 2.4.6. 
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position in the cavalry ranks.127 If such cases, they could be riding substitute 
horses.  
Xenophon dismounted during the campaign through Persia when the terrain had 
become too difficult for his horse. From there, he went on foot.128 Apparently a 
servant led the horse until Xenophon could mount again, as later on, he is on 
horseback again.129 Some time later he was on foot once more, leading the 
rearguard, but when important events took place he again mounted his horse.130  
The Lydians, who were renowned horse riders, dismounted when it became 
clear that Cyrus the Great had camouflaged his camels as horses and put them 
to fight. Cyrus feared the Lydian cavalry and in this way tried to evade a 
cavalry battle. As he had expected, the Lydian horses smelled the camels and 
tried to run away. The Lydian cavalry could not attack and dismounted. 
According to Herodotus this was a brave thing to do.131  
Xenophon also writes in his Memorabilia: ‘And again, will you pay much 
attention to bringing down as many of the enemy as possible without 
dismounting?’132 Apparently, like their archaic predecessors, Greek cavalrymen 
from classical times did not fight consistently on horseback; at times they 
would dismount. Greek cavalry from all three periods, archaic, classical and 
Hellenistic, fought in both ways, on foot or on horseback.  
In the fourth century, the Lacedaimonian cavalry commander, Pasimachos, 
dismounted and tied his cavalry’s horses to trees, after having noticed that the 
allied Sicyonian infantry had come under pressure. He took their shields 
marked with S and went against the Argives with a voluntary force consisting 
                                                
127 CC 5.6. 
128 Xen. Anabasis 3.4.49. 
129 Xen. Anabasis 3.5.4. 
130 Xen. Anabasis 4.7.24. 
131 Her 1.80. 
132 Mem 3.3.7; 5.77. 
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of his horsemen. The Argives thought that these were Sicyonians and 
underestimated them. Of course the Argives lost, not being able to fight 
Spartans out in the open.133  
 
In the fourth century BC, Alexander the Great, who ruled from 336-323 BC, 
ordered his Hetairoi134 to grab their shields, mount and attack a hill; after 
having reached it, half of them were to dismount and continue fighting on foot. 
This also happened in emergencies as Xenophon describes in his Hellenica: ‘In 
fact, even the cavalry did guard duty by night, (...) keeping with them both their 
horses and their shields’.135 In this way, cavalrymen were deployable as cavalry 
as well as infantry.  
 
Iberian cavalrymen were used to first destroy the enemy cavalry and 
subsequently to dismount in order to finish off the enemy infantry. Diodorus 
Siculus regarded this way of fighting as ingenious: ‘[The Celtiberians], able as 
they are to fight in two styles, they first carry on the contest on horseback, and 
when they have defeated the enemy cavalry they dismount, and assuming the 
role of foot-soldiers they put up marvellous battles.’136  
 
Plutarch praises Philopoemen because he dismounted in order to help out the 
frontlines in battle. Plutarch writes: 
 
                                                
133 Hell 4.4.10. 
134 Arrian, Anabasis Alexandros 1.6.5; 3.1.4; 3.27.4.  
135 Hell 2.4.24. 
136 Diodorus Siculus 5.33.2 ‘The Celtiberians provide for war not only excellent cavalry’; 
Diodorus Siculus 5.33.5: ‘able as they are to fight in two styles, they first carry on the contest 
on horseback, and when they have defeated the cavalry they dismount and assuming the role of 
foot-soldiers they put up marvellous battles’. 
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Philopoemen was stationed among the Macedonian cavalry with his own 
fellow-citizens, and had as a support the Illyrians, a large body of good 
fighters, who closed up the line of battle.  They had been ordered to lie 
quietly in reserve until, from the other wing, a signal should be made by 
the king with a scarlet coat stretched upon a spear. But the Illyrians, at 
the command of their officers, tried to force back the Lacedaemonians, 
while the Achaeans, as they had been ordered to do, kept quietly waiting 
at their post. Therefore Eucleidas, the brother of Cleomenes, who 
noticed the gap thus made in the enemies' line, quickly sent round the 
most agile of his light-armed troops, with orders to attack the Illyrians in 
the rear and rout them, now that they had lost touch with the cavalry.  
 These orders were carried out, and the light-armed troops were driving 
the Illyrians before them in confusion, when Philopoemen perceived that 
it would be no great task to attack the light-armed troops, and that the 
occasion prompted this step. At first he pointed this out to the king's 
officers. Then, when they were not to be persuaded by him, but looked 
down upon him as a madman (since his reputation was not yet great 
enough to justify his being entrusted with so important a manoeuvre), he 
took matters into his own hands, formed his fellow-citizens into a 
wedge, and charged upon the enemy. At first the light-armed troops were 
thrown into confusion, then put to rout with great slaughter.  
 
And now Philopoemen, wishing to encourage still further the king's 
troops and bring them swiftly upon the enemy thus thrown into disorder, 
quitted his horse, and with grievous difficulty forced his way along on 
foot, in his horseman's breastplate and heavy equipment, towards ground 
that was irregular and full of water-courses and ravines. Here he had 
both his thighs pierced through by a thronged javelin. The wound was 
not fatal, though severe, and the head of the weapon came out on the 
other side. At first, then, he was held fast as by a fetter, and was 
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altogether helpless; for the fastening of the thong made it difficult to 
draw the weapon back through the wound.  
 
But since those about him hesitated to attempt this, and since, now that 
the battle was at its hottest, the ardour of his ambition made him 
impatient to join in the struggle, by moving his legs backward and 
forward he broke the shaft of the weapon in two in the middle, and then 
ordered each fragment to be drawn out separately. Thus set free, he drew 
his sword and made his way through the front ranks against the enemy, 
thereby greatly animating the combatants and inspiring them with a 
desire to emulate his valour. After his victory, therefore, Antigonus put 
the Macedonians to the question, and asked them why, without his 
orders, they had brought the cavalry into action. They defended 
themselves by saying that they had been forced against their will to 
attack the enemy, because a young man of Megalopolis had first led a 
charge against them. At this, Antigonus gave a laugh and said: "Well, 
then, that young man behaved like a great commander." 137 
 
In addition to this we should realise that when on the march, horse riding had to 
be relieved with walking. Riding a horse is quite exhausting; long marches must 
have been physically challenging to cavalrymen and horses alike. We know that 
Alexander the Great had at his disposal a marching horse and a fighting horse to 
spare the latter. In his Cavalry Commander Xenophon writes: ‘During a march 
the cavalry commander must always think ahead, in order that he may rest the 
horses’ backs and relieve the men by walking, giving moderate spells of 
alternate riding and marching.’138  
 
                                                
137 Plutarchus, Philopoimen 6.1 – 7. 
138 CC 4.1. 
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As so often with cavalry tactics, there is not much difference between ancient 
and modern warfare. Modern cavalry was also trained to fight on horseback as 
well as on foot. Colonel Maude explains why: 
 
“It follows therefore that cavalry reconnaissance duties will be strictly 
local and tactical, (…) and that on the whole that nation will be best served 
in war which has provided in peace a nucleus of mounted infantry capable 
of rapid expansion to fill the gap which history shows always to have 
existed between the infantry and the cavalry. Such troops need not be 
organized in large bodies, for their mission is to act by " slimness," not by 
violence. They must be the old " verlorene ilaufe " (anglice, "forlorn 
hope") of former days, men whose individual bravery and decision is of 
the highest order. But they can never become a "decision- compelling 
arm," though by their devotion they may well hope to obtain the grand 
opportunity for their cavalry, and share with them in harvesting the fruits 
of victory. 
 
The great cavalry encounters of forty to sixty squadrons on either side, 
which it has been shown must arise from the necessity of screening or 
preventing the formation of the all-important artillery lines, will take their 
form mainly from the topographical conditions of the district, and since on 
a front of 60 to 100 m. these may vary indefinitely, cavalry must be 
trained, as indeed it always has been, to fight either on foot or on 
horseback as occasion requires. In either case, thoroughness of preparation 
in horsemanship (which, be it observed, includes horsemastership) is the 
first essential”.139 
 
                                                
139 Col. Frederic Natusch Maude C.B., Cavalry, Encyclopedia Britannica 11th ed. 1910, vol. 5: 
569. 
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Likewise, Alois Podhajsky, a cavalry officer in the Austro-Hungarian Army 
during World War I and former director of the Spanish Riding School in Vienna 
(1939 – 1965) , writes that he was disappointed (as a cavalry officer during the 
war against Russia in 1914 - 1917) for not fighting on horseback but rather on 
foot:  
 
‘When I was sent to the Russian front I had to face the facts of life. Horses 
were used for short patrols and messenger rides only, and most of the 
cavalry had to fight on foot.’140 
 
Archaic and classical cavalry had a twofold use, depending on battlefield 
circumstances and numbers of horsemen available. The ability to fight on foot 
as well as on horseback was a distinctive feature of horsemanship. Being able to 
fight both on foot and on horseback increased the chance of victory and 
survival. Terrain is a major factor in the deployment of cavalry. As Dionysius 
explains:  
 
‘They fought on horseback where there was level ground favourable for 
cavalry manoeuvres and on foot where it was rough and inconvenient 
for horses.’141  
 
According to Plutarch, this is what Philopoemen did when he was defeated in 
battle: 
 
‘Then Philopoemen, fearing that he would be enveloped, and trying to 
spare his horsemen, withdrew over difficult ground (...) Even then no 
                                                
140 Podhajsky (1968, 3rd print 1997) 24. 
141 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia 2.13.3 – 4 and 2.64.3. 
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one ventured to come to close quarters with him, but he was pelted with 
missiles from a distance and forced upon rocky and precipitous places, 
so that he had difficulty in managing his horse and kept tearing him with 
the spur. His age, owing to his generous exercise, was not burdensome, 
and in no way impeded his escape; but at that time his body was 
enfeebled by sickness and worn out with a long journey, so that he was 
heavy and stiff, and at length his horse stumbled and threw him to the 
ground. His fall was a heavy one and his head was hurt, and he lay for a 
long time speechless, so that his enemies thought him dead and tried to 
turn his body over and strip it of its armour’.142 
 
The terrain often compelled Athenian and Spartan riders to dismount; they had 
to employ their cavalry in a different and more flexible manner than some of 
the peoples of the Near East had done. This diminished the need and motivation 
for thorough cavalry training. As a result they were no match for cavalries such 
as the Thessalian or Persian cavalries. The Greeks understood their 
shortcomings in cavalry warfare on level grounds and plains. Agesilaus, for 
example, knew that he needed better cavalry to meet the Persians on the Asian 
plains.143  
 
                                                
142 Plutarchus, Philopoimen 18. 
143 Ag 3.4.15. 
  71 
3.3. 5th century 
 
Before 490 BC, Greek wars had mainly been restricted to border warfare and 
petty regional skirmishes; great land wars thus far had not been numerous. As 
Thucydides observes:  
 
‘Wars by land there were none, none at least by which power was acquired; 
we have the usual border contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest for 
object we hear nothing among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject 
cities round a great state, no spontaneous combination of equals for 
confederate expeditions; what fighting there was consisted merely of local 
warfare between rival neighbours.’144  
 
Ober contends that raiding also was an important tactic in Greek warfare.145 
Raiding and border patrol were cavalry duties.  
 
Naucrary cavalry 
 
Most Greek poleis consequently did not need to employ a large cavalry 
regiment for border warfare; they usually employed small cavalry units, in 
Attica known as mobilized units called naucraries. These units functioned as 
border patrols, forage parties, scouts and messengers. They could also spy, 
chase or harass the enemy, or cut off his water or food supplies. These units 
usually did not engage in battle.146 According to Xenophon a small cavalry is 
                                                
144 Thuc 1.15.2. 
145 J. Ober (1985) 35. 
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more suitable to tasks such as raiding, spying or the conveying of messages. 
Being small in numbers, it can hardly function as an independent military force 
on the battlefield.147 This type of cavalry I would like to call a ‘naucrarian 
cavalry’.  
 
Battle cavalry 
 
When Greek poleis were planning to invade the territories of neighbouring 
cities, larger regiments of cavalry were hired, which could be committed to 
battle. Thessaly for example was known to be the most powerful Greek cavalry 
state.148 This sort of cavalry was highly trained and the riders serving in it were 
accustomed to fighting cavalry battles, mostly against other cavalry and over 
large distances. They were light-armed and resorted to the use of long distance 
missiles thrown by peltasts and archers. This sort of cavalry is known as battle 
cavalry. 
 
Alliances between cities existed mostly for support in times of war. Poleis that 
were supported merely by Naucrarian cavalry had to form alliances with poleis 
that owned large regiments of battle cavalry, most of which were states with 
large pastures on which they could breed their herds.149 Another option was to 
annexe or colonise such a state or breeding area. Athens colonised Chalkis, part 
of Euboia, and planted tenant farmers on the lands of the Chalcidians, also 
known as ‘Horse-breeders’. Athens, of course, did not have an abundant area of 
land suitable for horse breeding.150 By colonising Euboia, particularly Chalkis, 
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Athens could obtain a regular supply of young cavalry horses. Herodotus 
writes: 
 
When this force then had been ingloriously scattered, the Athenians first 
marched against the Chalcidians to punish them. The Boeotians came to 
the Euripus to help the Chalcidians and as soon as the Athenians saw 
these allies, they resolved to attack the Boeotians before the Chalcidians. 
When they met the Boeotians in battle, they won a great victory, slaying 
very many and taking seven hundred of them prisoner. On that same day 
the Athenians crossed to Euboea where they met the Chalcidians too in 
battle, and after overcoming them as well, they left four thousand tenant 
farmers on the lands of the horse-breeders. Horse-breeders is the name we 
see given to the men of substance among the Chalcidians. They fettered 
as many of these as they took alive and kept them imprisoned with the 
captive Boeotians. In time, however, they set them free, each for an 
assessed ransom of two minae.151 
 
Simon names Thessaly as the most powerful cavalry state in Greece. Thessaly 
has large pastures and is relatively flat. Thessalians were especially renowned 
as peltasts who use javelins in combat. The Thessalians could easily field 1,000 
horsemen, as in the battle at Phaleron, 514 BC, where Thessalian cavalry fought 
the Spartans. The Athenians had hired this Thessalian cavalry. On the plain of 
Phaleron the Thessalian king Cineas led one thousand Thessalian horsemen 
against the Spartans who were trying to attack Athens. Herodotus writes:  
 
‘They [the Spartans] sent these men by sea on shipboard. Anchimolius 
put in at Phalerum and disembarked his army there. The sons of 
Pisistratus, however, had received word of the plan already, and sent to 
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ask help from the Thessalians with whom they had an alliance. The 
Thessalians, at their entreaty, joined together and sent their own king, 
Cineas of Conium, with a thousand horsemen. When the Pisistratidae got 
these allies, they devised the following plan. 
First they laid waste the plain of Phalerum so that all that land could be 
ridden over and then launched their cavalry against the enemy's army. 
Then the horsemen charged and slew Anchimolius and many more of the 
Lacedaemonians, and drove those that survived to their ships. 
Accordingly, the first Lacedaemonian army drew off, and Anchimolius' 
tomb is at Alopecae in Attica, near to the Heracleum in Cynosarges.’152 
 
The disembarking Spartans were surprised by the amount of cavalry. Some time 
later on the Spartans did not travel by sea, but attacked over land from the 
Northwest. The outcome of this battle was rather different and the Thessalian 
horsemen took flight to Thessaly. In his Histories, Herodotus writes: 
 
‘After this the Lacedaemonians sent out a greater army to attack Athens, 
appointing as its general their king Cleomenes son of Anaxandrides. This 
army they sent not by sea but by land. When they broke into Attica, the 
Thessalian horsemen were the first to meet them. They were routed after 
only a short time, and more than forty men were slain. Those who were 
left alive made off for Thessaly by the nearest way they could.’153 
 
Their cavalry was known for its discipline and large numbers. Pausanias writes 
that the Phocians were greatly terrified by the army of the Thessalians, 
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especially by the number of their cavalry and the discipline of both mounts and 
riders.154 These troops may have been trained to the highest degree.155  
 
According to Strabo, Thessalian horsemanship was equal to that of the 
Medes.156 This is an interesting remark, because the Medes were a Scythian 
people and, according to Xenophon, the Medes were the originators of Persian 
horsemanship.157 The Mede style of horsemanship relied much on large 
numbers and distances.158 It was suitable for fighting battles on horseback, but 
not for fighting against closed infantry lines. 159 In his Hellenica, Xenophon 
states that the Thessalian army would usually form a hollow square of infantry 
with cavalry placed in front and at the rear. But they would wheel their horses 
and flee when they encountered hoplites.160  
 
In classical times, Sparta had six morai of cavalry.161 We do not know exactly 
how many horsemen a mora contained or whether a mora was part of an 
infantry squadron.  A number for the entire cavalry mentioned 120, so a mora 
would have consisted of 20 horsemen.162 Lazenby also suggested a number of 
300 or 100 horsemen.163 These horsemen could have formed the royal guard, 
and would have been comparable to a Naucrarian cavalry. According to 
Herodotus, five of the oldest horsemen left service each year.164  
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Thebes requested its allies to supply a maximum of four squadrons of 
cavalrymen per polis, each consisting of 50 horsemen.165 These squadrons were 
used for border patrol.166 
After the Battle at Marathon, Athens and Sparta had requested Gelon, tyrant of 
Syracuse, to supply infantry and cavalry. He also had archers and dragoons at 
his disposal. Syracuse and Sicily had cavalry that was capable of meeting the 
Persians in combat. Gelon had also clashed regularly with Carthage and had 
established a number of trading posts in Spain. However, he refused. Sicily had 
been partially Greek from 750 BC onwards and it maintained Iberian trading 
contacts.167 
 
Athens kept up its policy of raising about 96 horsemen from its Naucraries.168 
This lasted until about 483 BC, seven years after the Battle at Marathon. 
Around 483 BC this number was increased to 300.169 According to Bugh and 
others, the Athenian cavalry consisted of 300 men between 483 and 450 BC 
when Pericles increased its number to 1,000.170 Therefore the Persian Wars are 
often interpreted as a turning point in Athenian cavalry history. The so-called 
rise of the Athenian cavalry is said to have happened after this period.171  
Around 500 BC, Athens was still a naucrarian state.172 Attica was unsuitable for 
horse combat because in the event of defeat one had to retreat through narrow 
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passes which could easily be defended by a small number of men.173 Iphicrates 
of Athens had formed his riders in a line over a large area because of their 
numbers but when they were forced to retreat they were impeded due to the 
difficult terrain and this cost him 20 riders.174 Compare Xenophon's comment in 
the Cavalry Commander: 
 
‘If you charge a superior force, you must remember never to leave behind you ground 
difficult for horses.’175 
 
Traditionally, the Athenian class of Hippeis consisted of men whose estates 
could produce 300 medimnoi or who could keep horses. There was therefore an 
age-old connection between the elite and the keeping of horses. Hippeis were 
regarded as nobility. Some of the nobility also kept racehorses. Being able to 
support a four-horse chariot was the ultimate symbol of wealth. Miltiades was 
an important Athenian and a member of a family which could afford a four-
horse chariot.176 
 
Persian Wars 
 
In 499 BC, the Persian empire was expanding towards the Greek mainland. The 
Ionian poleis in Asia Minor had revolted against the Persian King Darius and 
sought assistance from Athens and Sparta. King Darius wanted to punish 
Athens and Sparta for aiding the Ionian states. The Greek poleis were suddenly 
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aroused by a threatening invasion of their homeland. These poleis had only 
small cavalry squadrons of the Naucrarian kind available to them. These were 
not accustomed to fighting cavalry battles. The Persian army had a large battle 
cavalry regiment which partly consisted of mounted archers. These were light-
armed.  
 
Their first encounter was at the Battle at Marathon. After the Persian army had 
conquered Eretria, they deployed their army including the cavalry on the 
Marathon plain. They believed their cavalry would have the largest space to 
manoeuvre on this plain. Herodotus wrote:  
 
‘After subduing Eretria, the Persians waited a few days and then sailed 
away to the land of Attica, pressing ahead in expectation of doing to the 
Athenians exactly what they had done to the Eretrians. Marathon was the 
place in Attica most suitable for riding horses and closest to Eretria, so 
Hippias son of Pisistratus led them there.’177  
 
As said before, Attica itself was not suitable for cavalry battles, because in the 
event of defeat there was no escape route since it was enclosed by small 
mountain passes where only a few men would be needed to finish off the 
cavalry.178 According to Herodotus, the Persians were rather surprised to find 
that the Greeks did not field cavalry together with their infantry. Their surprise 
however, as it turned out, would soon turn to despair.  
The Persians apparently were not aware of the ground conditions at Marathon. 
Pausanias writes:  
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‘There is at Marathon a lake which for the most part is marshy. Into this 
ignorance of the roads made the foreigners fall in their flight, and it is said 
that this accident was the cause of their great losses.’179  
 
Elsewhere, this author writes:  
 
‘At the end of the painting are those who fought at Marathon; the 
Boeotians of Plataea and the Attic contingent are coming to blows with the 
foreigners. In this place neither side has the better, but the center of the 
fighting shows the foreigners in flight and pushing one another into the 
morass, while at the end of the painting are the Phoenician ships, and the 
Greeks killing the foreigners who are scrambling into them.’180  
 
After the Persians had been defeated at Marathon and had returned home, 
Xerxes mobilised an enormous cavalry.181 Athens and Sparta knew they could 
not cope with the Persian cavalry themselves and they appealed to Gelon, tyrant 
of Syracuse, for help. He refused to help them, according to Herodotus, either 
because he felt that Sparta and Athens had not helped him in a previous war or 
because he was threatened by the Carthaginians who wanted to take over Sicily, 
and he needed to concentrate his armed forces.182 
The Thebans and their Boeotian allies were aiding the Persians with their 
cavalry.183 At Plataeae, for example, they protected fleeing hoplites from their 
enemies and they fought off any pursuers. The Theban horsemen defeated 
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Megaraeans and Phleiasians  by killing 600 men at the first encounter.184 The 
Thessalians also aided the Persian army.  
 
The Persian army was a difficult opponent because of its mounted archers. 
According to Herodotus, it was extremely difficult to get at these riders who 
were light-armed, and were rapidly moving bowmen.185 Furthermore, the 
Persians made good use of their cavalry, cutting off Greek infantry divisions 
from water supplies and preventing them from foraging.186 They could fire 
arrows from long distances and from horseback. They were a fast-moving 
target, were difficult to hit, and they could execute swift charges on infantry 
lines.187 Sparta and Athens and their allies apparently did not have cavalry 
capable of counteracting this or of fighting cavalry battles for that matter. They 
did have horsemen, but these were used as messengers and raiders, and were 
not trained in cavalry combat.188  
 
In close encounters, however, the Persian cavalry could be defeated. At 
Plataeae, the Persians and Spartans clashed. The Persian cavalry regiments 
attacked one by one, but the Spartan hoplites did not give way. The Persian 
cavalry commander Masistios was thrown from his horse and Persian 
cavalrymen tried to protect their leader, but were not successful in doing so.189 
In this battle the Persians were no longer able to use their bows, but had to fight 
hand to hand. Now they in their turn showed themselves to be inexperienced, 
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lacking tactical insight, and were extremely vulnerable against hoplite lines 
because they were fighting without armour. 190 
 
Another example of how the Persian cavalry might not be capable of facing the 
hoplite lines is the encounter of Phocean hoplites against the Persian cavalry. 
This happened when Mardonius, the Persian general, was in Boiotia to lead the 
Thebans and other Boeotians against Athens in the summer of 479 BC, some 
months before the Battle at Plataea. All Boeotians came willingly to his aid, but  
the Phocians did so reluctantly out of necessity. Mardonius bade them to take 
their station on the plain by themselves. When they did so, the Persian cavalry 
showed up, encircled them and the Phocians thought the Persians would shoot 
them with their javelins.  
 
But when the horsemen had encircled the Phocians, they rode at them as 
if to slay them, and drew their bows to shoot; it is likely too that some 
did in fact shoot. The Phocians opposed them in every possible way, 
drawing in together and closing their ranks to the best of their power. At 
this the horsemen wheeled about and rode back and away. 191 
 
Herodotus believes this to mean that the Persians did not actually intend to 
attack the Phoceans and were merely testing them, but I believe that the Persian 
cavalry was unwilling to attack hoplites. Herodotus thought likewise:  
 
Now I cannot with exactness say whether they came at the Thessalians' 
desire to slay the Phocians, but when they saw the men preparing to 
defend themselves, they feared lest they themselves should suffer some 
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hurt, and so rode away (for such was Mardonius' command),—or if 
Mardonius wanted to test the Phocians' mettle.192 
 
The Persians preferred to fight in small groups or individually.193 The Greek 
army used battle formations, while the Persians sought to fight from long 
distances with arrows and javelins.194 The Athenians and Spartans fought 
mainly in close combat, with their hoplites battling against one another. The 
Athenian horsemen and their allies simply may not have had the training or 
experience to fight the Persian cavalry in cavalry battle formation but, as 
Gaebel rightly remarks: ‘The Persians never did overcome the fundamental 
disparity between their infantry and that of the Greeks.’ 195  
 
During the Persian Wars, the Athenian cavalry was a naucrarian cavalry and 
therefore did not perform battle tasks. Boeotian and Thessalian cavalry were 
battle cavalries and chose to aid the Persian side. This proved to be a helpful 
addition to the Persian cavalry which was in fact a long-distance cavalry 
accustomed to fighting with mounted archers and not used to fighting in close 
combat.  
After the Persian Wars, the number of Athenian cavalrymen was increased. But 
a larger cavalry regiment is not always a tactical improvement, as Xenophon 
knew all too well: 
 
“Then again it is obvious that in point of endurance and speed the advantage is 
much more likely to rest with a small than with a large force. I do not mean 
that mere paucity of numbers will increase the men's powers of endurance and 
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add to their speed; but it is easier to find few men than many who will take 
proper care of their horses and will practise the art of horsemanship 
intelligently on their own account.” 196 
 
A large cavalry is hard to manage. Xenophon continues: 
 
“But should he guard whatever lies outside the walls with a force that will be 
just sufficient to keep an eye on the enemy and to remove into safety from as 
great a distance as possible property that needs saving,—and a large force is 
not necessary for this: a small force can keep a look-out as well as a large one, 
and when it comes to guarding and removing the property of friends, men who 
have no confidence in themselves or their horses will meet the case, because 
Fear, it seems, is a [7] formidable member of a guard—well, it may perhaps be 
a sound plan to draw on these men for his guards. But if he imagines that the 
number remaining over and above the guard constitutes an army, he will find 
it too small; for it will be utterly inadequate to risk a conflict in the open. Let 
him use these men as raiders, and he will probably have a force quite sufficient 
for this purpose. [8] His business, it seems to me, is to watch for any blunder 
on the enemy's part without showing himself, keeping men constantly on the 
alert and ready to strike. [9] It happens that, the greater is the number of 
soldiers, the more they are apt to blunder. Either they scatter deliberately in 
search of provisions, or they are so careless of order on the march that some 
get too far ahead, while others lag too far behind.”197 
 
The only way for a large cavalry regiment to have success is for its 
horsemanship to be improved, as may be learned also from modern history: 
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‘For the generation preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution, Frederick 
the Great's army, and especially his cavalry, had become the model for all 
Europe, but the mainspring of the excellence of his squadrons revolution was 
everywhere overlooked. Seydlitz had manoeuvred great masses of horsemen, 
therefore every one else must have great masses also; but no nation grasped 
the secret, the unconditional obedience of the horse to its rider, on which his 
success had depended.’198  
 
Therefore increasing the cavalry numbers is not the only way to improve your 
cavalry. The level of horsemanship should increase accordingly.  
 
Cavalry of the Athenian Empire 
 
Athens was the leading city in its naval Empire and needed more cavalrymen to 
defend it. They still had naucrarian cavalry, which would be sent out in small 
units together with infantry. There are but few sources concerning cavalry 
deployment during the 60 years between the Persian Wars and the 
Peloponnesian Wars. According to Thucydides, the Greek poleis were well-
trained in the school of war because during these 60 years, the balance between 
war and peace was a fragile one: 
“So that the whole period from the Median war to this, with some 
peaceful intervals, was spent by each power in war, either with its 
rival, or with its own revolted allies, and consequently afforded them 
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constant practice in military matters, and that experience which is 
learnt in the school of danger.’199  
Thus Classical Greek cavalry actions still encompassed raids, attack and 
flight, and reconnaissance. Only the Thessalian, Macedonian or Boeotian 
cavalry were akin to battle cavalries. But this was about to change. The 
Athenians and Spartans were aided by cavalry regiments in their battles but 
were beginning to learn how to fight battles on horseback as well. In the first 
part of the Peloponnesian war, the years 431 – 415 BC, some cavalry 
skirmishes occurred. I will give a short overview below. 
 
The Athenians sent in a fleet carrying infantry and horses to the north to 
subdue rebellious Potidaia in a first attack in 433 BC. The Potidaeans 
received help from the Macedonian king Perdiccas and from the 
Corinthians, who both sent aid, including some cavalry. Macedonia sent 600 
riders. This allied cavalry, however, were of little use to the Potidaeans in 
battle actions.200 During their first invasion of Attica in 431 BC, the Spartans 
defeated the Athenian cavalry at the Rheitoi.201 Afterwards, Pericles 
regularly dispatched cavalry to prevent patrolling and plundering enemies 
from coming too close to the Athenian city walls.  
On another occasion in 431, a cavalry battle raged at the Greek town of Phrygia 
between the Athenian and Thessalian cavalry and their Boeotian mounted 
opponents. The Boeotians were assisted by their hoplites and subsequently 
defeated the Athenians and Thessalians: 
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There was a trifling affair at Phrygia between a squadron of the Athenian 
horse with the Thessalians and the Boeotian cavalry; in which the former 
had rather the best of it, until the heavy infantry advanced to the support 
of the Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians were routed and 
lost a few men, whose bodies, however, were recovered the same day 
without a truce. 202  
 
In 430 BC, the Athenians began to use horse transport ships for the first time. In 
429 the Athenians dispatched 200 cavalrymen and some 2,000 hoplites against 
Chalcis. The Chalcidian horsemen attacked with spears wherever they could, 
put to flight the Athenian cavalrymen and pursued them.203  
Shortly thereafter, in the summer of 428, Athenian horsemen attacked 
Lacedaemonian raiders who were spoiling Attica during the third 
Lacedaemonian invasion of Attica.204  
In 425, after taking part in a small raid against Sicily, the Athenian fleet sailed 
to Corinth. The Athenian horsetransport ships carried 200 cavalrymen with their 
horses. They beached in the vicinity of the small town of Solygia. Here the 
Athenians had the benefit of cavalry as their opponents had none. They defeated 
the Corinthians here and went on to Crommyon, here they first devestated the 
land and finally disconnected the Peloponnesian peninsula from the Greek 
mainland by building a wall at Methana, between Epidaurus and Troezen.205  
 
After this strategical feat, the Athenians went on to occupy the island of 
Cythera in the summer of 424. Cythera lies opposite to the southeast tip of the 
Peloponnese giving it high strategical importance. The Spartans feared more 
                                                
202 Thuc 2.22.2. 
203 Thuc 2.79. 
204 Thuc 3.1.  
205 Thuc  4.42-44. 
  87 
Athenian landraids after this move and decided to put small contingents of 
hoplites at various towns across the Peloponnese. They even fielded an 
extraordinary number of 400 cavalry and archers.206 
In 424 BC, the Boeotian cavalry numbered 600 horsemen and these attacked the 
Athenian light-armed troops.207 Hippocrates left 300 horsemen at Delium to 
defend the city but also to attack the Boeotian cavalry if the occasion arose. The 
Boeotians had 1,000 horsemen, so they were the dominant force. The Athenians 
had cavalry on both flanks and had to charge uphill. The Thebans were on the 
hill and charged downhill. On the left flank, the Athenians defeated the 
Boeotians, who were in fact Thespians but on the right, the Theban cavalry was 
winning the battle.  
The battle was won by Pagondas, the Theban general, when he sent two 
squadrons of cavalry around the hill. When these appeared, the Athenian 
hoplites panicked and fled. The Theban cavalry followed in pursuit and killed 
them.208 Boiotia was an ally of the Spartans at that time and had itself clearly 
specialized in cavalry. In 424 also a battle between Boeotia with their Spartan 
allies and Athens ensued at Megara, in which 600 cavalrymen of Boeotia fought 
against the Athenian cavalry. The latter won.209  
 
During these first years of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenian cavalry seems 
to have operated as a naucrary cavalry, depending on the Athenian fleet for 
their transport and speed, supporting their hoplites on the battlefield and seems 
to have been victorious only if their enemies did not have cavalry. The Boeotian 
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cavalry was stronger and more capable of fighting battles. The Thebans won 
their battles against Athenian cavalry with ease. 
 
The Sicilian Expedition 
 
Between 415 – 413 BC, the Athenians embarked on their infamous Expedition 
to Syracuse. Sicily was part of Magna Graecia, but it had Iberian trade posts, for 
example. Long before the Persian Wars, the Syracusans had been involved in a 
longstanding conflict with the neighbouring Carthaginians.210 Gelon, tyrant of 
Syracuse, was heavily involved in a war with Hamilcar of Carthage, who was 
trying to invade Sicily with an army of Carthaginians, Lybians, Iberians and 
some island tribes.211 Syracuse had many trading posts and settlers on the 
Iberian peninsula.212 The Athenians even tried to ally themselves with the 
Carthaginians and the Etruscans before they undertook this expedition.213 The 
Syracusan army was aided by the Spartans and the Corinthians (given that 
Syracusan Greeks were of Dorian and Corinthian origin) and their allies of the 
Boeotian league, which sent 300 hoplites to Sicily in 413 BC.214 
 
Athens must have had a thorough knowledge of the military situation in Sicily. 
After the Battle at Marathon, Athens and Sparta had sent emissaries to Gelon, 
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Cantabria which is nowadays called Terraco is on the border between Iberia and Celtica (3.4.8). 
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requesting him to provide them with infantry and cavalry.215 They knew, 
therefore, that Syracuse and its Sicilian and Celtiberian allies had cavalry which 
was capable of fighting the Persians.  
 
Alcibiades believed that the Sicilian infantry would not be able to fight against 
the Athenian hoplites, but saw the Sicilian cavalry as a great danger.216 
Therefore it is rather surprising that the Athenians did send cavalrymen but not 
horses along with these men.217 They would appear to have underestimated the 
necessity of training their cavalry or for that matter the level of horsemanship 
that was required. The horses had to be bought in Sicily, therefore they made 
themselves dependent on the goodwill of Sicilian horse traders and their 
willingness to sell good-quality horses. Eventually, after a number of defeats, 
Athens agreed to send horses with their cavalry.218  
The Sicilian cavalry was a difficult enemy for the Athenians, since it harassed 
the Athenian cavalry during foraging and scouting.219 Worse still, the Athenians 
had no military response to the Sicilian cavalry when it attacked both their 
cavalry and their heavy infantry.220 The Sicilians employed a different method 
of cavalry warfare: they attacked heavy infantry lines and threw javelins at the 
hoplites.  
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As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks, and brought back 
to their place any of the troops that he saw straggling out of the line; 
while Demosthenes did as much for his part of the army, addressing 
them in words very similar. [2] The army marched in a hollow square, 
the division under Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes following, 
the heavy infantry being outside and the baggage-carriers and the bulk 
of the army in the middle. [3] When they arrived at the ford of the river 
Anapus they there found drawn up a body of the Syracusans and allies, 
and routing these, made good their passage and pushed on, harassed by 
the charges of the Syracusan horse and by the missiles of their light 
troops. [4] On that day they advanced about four miles and a half, 
halting for the night upon a certain hill. On the next they started early 
and got on about two miles further, and descended into a place in the 
plain and there encamped, in order to procure some eatables from the 
houses, as the place was inhabited, and to carry on with them water 
from thence, as for many furlongs in front, in the direction in which 
they were going, it was not plentiful. [5] The Syracusans meanwhile 
went on and fortified the pass in front, where there was a steep hill with 
a rocky ravine on each side of it, called the Acraean cliff. [6] The next 
day the Athenians advancing found themselves impeded by the missiles 
and charges of the horse and darters, both very numerous, of the 
Syracusans and allies; and after fighting for a long while, at length 
retired to the same camp, where they had no longer provisions as before, 
it being impossible to leave their position by reason of the cavalry.221 
 
This appears similar to actions by the Numidian cavalry in the Second Punic 
War. The Numidians were known for their speed and their method of harassing 
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their enemies by attack and flight. The Numidians were known for their speed 
in this mode of combat in which they again and again try to break into the 
closed enemy battle lines.222 To quote Appian: ‘The Numidians practice 
themselves in throwing the javelin and attack and flight.’223 Lazenby calls this 
the peculiar Numidian way of fighting.224 It is likely that the Sicilian cavalry 
had more or less adopted this Numidian mode of combat as they had been 
enemies of the Carthaginians for so long. Later, in the Peloponnesian War, they 
adopt the same tactics:  
But the horsemen sent by Dionysius, few though they were, scattering 
themselves here and there, would ride along the enemy's line, charge upon 
them and throw javelins at them, and when the enemy began to move 
forth against them, would retreat, and then turn round and throw their 
javelins again. And while pursuing these tactics they would dismount 
from their horses and rest. But if anyone charged upon them while they 
were dismounted, they would leap easily upon their horses and retreat. On 
the other hand, if any pursued them far from the Theban army, they would 
press upon these men when they were retiring, and by throwing javelins 
work havoc with them, and thus they compelled the entire army, 
according to their own will, either to advance or to fall back.225  
                                                
222 C. Sallustius Crispus, De Bello Iugurthino 52: ‘plerosque [Numidae] velocitas (…) tutata 
sunt.’ Ibidem, 59: ‘quibus illi freti non, uti equestri proelio solet, sequi, dein cedere, sed 
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The Athenian cavalry was not capable of fighting the Sicilian cavalry.226 The 
Athenian cavalrymen were still performing Naucrarian tasks, hindered by the 
Sicilian cavalry. And the Athenian infantry was pursued by the Sicilian cavalry 
and was unable to stand their ground against the attack and flight tactics.  
 
To the Athenians, this was an unexpected type of cavalry warfare. The 
Athenians eventually found a solution to this problem. They attacked with their 
heavy infantry and their cavalry and were able to win a small victory against 
the Syracusan cavalry:  
 
Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to them from Egesta, and 
about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others; and thus, with the 
two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they had got horses from 
the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides others that they bought, they now 
mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry in all. [2] After posting a garrison 
in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca, where they sate down and quickly 
built the Circle or centre of their wall of circumvallation. The Syracusans, 
appalled at the rapidity with which the work advanced, determined to go 
out against them and give battle and interrupt it; [3] and the two armies 
were already in battle array, when the Syracusan generals observed that 
their troops found such difficulty in getting into line, and were in such 
disorder, that they led them back into the town, except part of the cavalry. 
                                                
226 It should be noted that Sicilian hamippoi also known as hippodromoi are referred to by 
Herodotus: “This is what they said, and Gelon, speaking very vehemently, said in response to 
this: “(..) I am ready to send to your aid two hundred triremes, twenty thousand men-at-arms, 
two thousand horsemen, two thousand archers, two thousand slingers, and two thousand light-
armed men to run with horsemen. I also pledge to furnish provisions for the whole Greek army 
until we have made an end of the war. All this, however, I promise on one condition, that I 
shall be general and leader of the Greeks against the foreigner. On no other condition will I 
come myself or send others.” (Her 7.158.4-5) It is remarkable that Gelon already had hamippoi 
troops at his disposal during the Persian Wars and that these apparently were not deployed 
during the Sicilian Expedition against Athenian cavalry. Could it be that Herodotus is mistaken 
about these hamippoi of Gelon? 
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These remained and hindered the Athenians from carrying stones or 
dispersing to any great distance, [4] until a tribe of the Athenian heavy 
infantry, with all the cavalry, charged and routed the Syracusan horse 
with some loss; after which they set up a trophy for the cavalry action. 227 
 
The Athenians managed to secure a small victory by deploying both their 
infantry and their cavalry at the same time. But in the end Athens was defeated.  
 
After the Sicilian Expedition Athenian forces were weakened and the end of the 
Athenian Empire seemed at hand. During the years 411 – 404 BC Athens 
nevertheless recovered and fought several naval battles against Sparta. In 411 
they fought at Syme and again in 410 at Cyzicus. In 405 Lysander, the Spartan 
general set sail  for the Hellespont, supplier of Athenian grain. The Athenian 
fleet had no other option than to follow him. Subsequently, Lysander won a 
decisive victory at the ensuing Battle of Aeguspotami. In 404 BC Athens 
surrendered, suffering from starvation and disease. 
Thebes and Corinth requested the devestation of Athens, but Sparta refused. 
Sparta put Athens under oligarchic regime, by installing the ‘Thirty Tyrants’. 
This regime was overthrown in 403 BC by Thrasybulus and democracy was 
restored.228  
 
After the Peloponnesian war cavalry was to become increasingly important on 
the battlefields in the Greek and Eurasian mainland.  
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3.4. Hegemony of Sparta and the rise of Thebes 
 
Around 401 BC, Spartan hoplites and a number of cavalry attempted to come to 
the aid of Cyrus the Younger in taking control over Persia from his brother 
Artaxerxes. Cyrus had managed to secure their help as a result of his own 
support for Sparta during the Peloponnesian War against Athens. Cyrus died on 
the battlefield of Cynaxa however and the Spartans and other Greeks were 
forced to make their way back to Greece through enemy territory. Xenophon 
participated in this campaign about which, he writes, the Syracusan 
Themistogenes wrote a report.229  
After this, the Ionic cities feared that they would be destroyed by Tissaphernes 
as a reprisal for their support for Cyrus and they sought the aid of Sparta. Sparta 
sent Thibron at the head of an army comprising Helots and Peloponnesians. 
Thibron requested Athens to supply 300 riders. The Athenians then dispatched 
people who had supported the regime of the Thirty. Thibron made sure to avoid 
any confrontation with Persian cavalry.230  
The next commander after Thibron was Dercylidas, also called ‘Sisyphus’ who 
succeeded in assuaging the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus and 
agreeing a truce with them on condition that the Greek cities in Ionia retained 
their independence from the Persian king. The Spartans at that time were also 
still at war with Elis .231 
 
One day in 396 BC a Syracusan called Herodas, who visited Phoenicia with a 
friend, noticed Phoenician war ships lying at anchor in a Phoenician port. He 
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heard that there were to be threehundred of them. He assumed that the Persian 
king and Tissaphernes were preparing an attack on Greece.232 It was decided in 
Sparta, on the advice of Lysander, to send an expedition headed by Agesilaus. 
The Greeks were believed to be better at sea than the Persians, and the land 
army that had been sent to Cyrus had returned safely in the meantime. He was 
provided with 30 Spartiatae, two thousand emancipated Helots and six thousand 
of the allies to make the expedition.233 At first, Tissaphernes and Agesilaus 
agreed a truce, but Agesilaus knew Tissaphernes was deceiving him. The 
Persian king therefore prepared for war. In his Hellenica, Xenophon writes: 
 
Now Tissaphernes, both because Agesilaus had no cavalry (and Caria 
was unsuited for cavalry), and because he believed that he was angry 
with him on account of his treachery, made up his mind that he was 
really going to march against his own residence in Caria, and 
accordingly sent all his infantry across into that province, and as for 
his cavalry, he led it round into the plain of the Maeander, thinking 
that he was strong enough to trample the Greeks under foot with his 
horsemen before they should reach the regions which were unfit for 
cavalry. Agesilaus, however, instead of proceeding against Caria, 
straightway turned in the opposite direction and marched towards 
Phrygia, and he picked up and led along with him the contingents 
which met him on the march, subdued the cities, and, since he fell 
upon them unexpectedly, obtained great quantities of booty.234 
 
At this point, Xenophon writes that Agesilaus did not yet have access to 
cavalry and the Persians tried to defeat him before he reached terrain that was 
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not suitable for cavalry, namely, Caria. But Agesilaus was too clever for them. 
When it came to battle, Agesilaus by chance met the horsemen of Pharnabazus. 
Here we find an inconsistency, as he now refers to Greek cavalry, which he 
said Agesilaus did not have. Xenophon again: 
 
‘And by chance the horsemen of Pharnabazus, under the command of 
Rhathines and Bagaeus, his bastard brother, just about equal to the 
Greek cavalry in number, had been sent out by Pharnabazus and 
likewise rode to the top of this same hill. And when the two squadrons 
saw one another, not so much as four plethra apart, at first both halted, 
the Greek horsemen being drawn up four deep like a phalanx, and the 
barbarians with a front of not more than twelve, but many men deep. 
Then, however, the barbarians charged.  
When they came to a hand-to-hand encounter, all of the Greeks who 
struck anyone broke their spears, while the barbarians, being armed 
with javelins of cornel-wood, speedily killed twelve men and two 
horses. Thereupon the Greeks were turned to flight. But when 
Agesilaus came to the rescue with the hoplites, the barbarians 
withdrew again and one of them was killed.’235 
 
Now, according to Xenophon, Agesilaus realised that 
 
unless he obtained an adequate cavalry force, he would not be able to 
campaign in the plains, he resolved that this must be provided, so that 
he might not have to carry on a skulking warfare.236 
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There is an inconsistency here as Agesilaus then proceeded to put his (up to this 
moment non-existent) cavalry into battle against the enemy cavalry, seeing that 
their infantry had not yet arrived.  
 
Then Agesilaus, aware that the infantry of the enemy was not yet at hand, 
while on his side none of the arms which had been made ready was 
missing, deemed it a fit time to join battle if he could. Therefore, after 
offering sacrifice, he at once led his phalanx against the opposing line of 
horsemen, ordering the first ten year-classes of the hoplites to run to close 
quarters with the enemy, and bidding the peltasts lead the way at a 
double-quick. He also sent word to his cavalry to attack, in the assurance 
that he and the whole army were following them. [24] Now the Persians 
met the attack of the cavalry; but when the whole formidable array 
together was upon them, they gave way, and some of them were struck 
down at once in crossing the river, while the rest fled on. And the Greeks, 
pursuing them, captured their camp as well. Then the peltasts, as was 
natural, betook themselves to plundering; but Agesilaus enclosed all 
alike, friends as well as foes, within the circle of his camp. And not only 
was much other property captured, which fetched more than seventy 
talents, but it was at this time that the camels also were captured which 
Agesilaus brought back with him to Greece.237 
 
Agesilaus was then asked to come to the aid of Lacedaemonia, as Corinth and 
Athens were threatening Sparta and its allies. He travelled via Thessaly and 
there gave battle to the mighty Thessalian cavalry.  
 
And Agesilaus, passing through Macedonia, arrived in Thessaly. Then the 
Larisaeans, Crannonians, Scotussaeans, and Pharsalians, who were allies 
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of the Boeotians, and in fact all the Thessalians except those of them who 
chanced at that time to be exiles, followed after him and kept molesting 
him. [4] And for a time he led the army in a hollow square, with one half 
of the horsemen in front and the other half at the rear; but when the 
Thessalians, by charging upon those who were behind, kept interfering 
with his progress, he sent along to the rear the vanguard of horsemen also, 
except those about his own person. [5] Now when the two forces had 
formed in line of battle against one another, the Thessalians, thinking that 
it was not expedient to engage as cavalry in a battle with hoplites, turned 
round and slowly retired. [6] And the Greeks very cautiously followed 
them. Agesilaus, however, perceiving the mistakes which each side was 
making, sent the very stalwart horsemen who were about his person and 
ordered them not only to give word to the others to pursue with all speed, 
but to do likewise themselves, and not to give the Thessalians a chance to 
face round again. [7] And when the Thessalians saw them rushing upon 
them unexpectedly, some of them fled, others turned about, and others, in 
trying to do this, were captured while their horses were turned half round. 
[8] But Polycharmus the Pharsalian, who was the commander of the 
cavalry, turned round and fell fighting, together with those about him. 
When this happened, there followed a headlong flight on the part of the 
Thessalians, so that some of them were killed and others were captured. 
At all events they did not stop until they had arrived at Mount 
Narthacium. 238  
 
According to Xenophon, Agesilaus deployed his army in the formation of a 
hollow square239, with his cavalry in front and at the rear. This seems to be a 
new formation, invented by Agesilaus.240 
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When the Thessalian cavalry attacked the rear, he sent all of his cavalry there. 
He also placed his hoplites in battle formation and the Thessalian cavalry then 
decided to retreat, as they had no wish to fight hoplites. Agesilaus now used his 
cavalry to make sure that the Thessalians did not return and in doing so, some 
of his horsemen actually came into combat with Thessalian cavalry. Agesilaus 
was very happy with his victory over the Thessalians, who prided themselves 
upon their horsemanship.241 
 
Agesilaus used his cavalry against other cavalry, but always made sure his 
cavalry was supported by heavy infantry. But Agesilaus was not the only 
commander to use cavalry in a tactical way. When he left Persia for Greece, 
because of the summons of Sparta at the start of the Corinthian War (395 – 387 
BC) on several occasions he encountered the Boiotians who were always a 
bitter enemy, as in the battle at Coronea in 394 BC, where the Thebans thought 
of themselves as undefeated: 
 
[4] But since it proved too hard a task to break the Theban front, they were 
forced to do what at the outset they were loth to do. They opened their ranks 
and let the enemy pass through, and then, when these had got clear, and were 
already marching in looser array, the Spartans followed on the run and smote 
them on the flanks. They could not, however, put them to rout, but the Thebans 
withdrew to Mount Helicon, greatly elated over the battle, in which, as they 
reasoned, their own contingent had been undefeated.242  
 
Xenophon tells us how Agesilaus defeated the Thebans: 
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Agesilaus and his army crashed against the Thebans front to front; and setting 
shields against shields they shoved, fought, killed, and were killed. Finally, 
some of the Thebans broke through and reached Mount Helicon, but many 
were killed while making their way thither. [20] Now when the victory had 
fallen to Agesilaus and he himself had been carried, wounded, to the 
phalanx.243 
 
Plutarch, however, again tells a different story. According to him, the day after 
the battle Agesilaus made a truce with the Thebans and regarded himself the 
victor.244 After this, the Thebans tried to make peace with Sparta and sent 
envoys to Agesilaus in 390 BC.  
 
Xenophon writes that Agesilaus had more or less pacified the Thebans in 379 
BC: 
 
And now that success had to such an extent attended the efforts of the 
Lacedaemonians that the Thebans and the rest of the Boeotians were 
completely in their power, the Corinthians had become absolutely 
faithful, the Argives had been humbled for the reason that their plea of 
the sacred months was no longer of any help to them, and the Athenians 
were left destitute of allies, while on the other hand those among the 
allies of the Lacedaemonians who had been unfriendly to them had been 
chastised, it seemed that they had at length established their empire 
most excellently and securely.245 
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3.5. The Agesilaus and Epaminondas question 
 
If there really was a peace, it should not come surprisingly that the Spartans 
were not happy with Agesilaus going into Boeotia to fight the Thebans in 378. 
As they were apparently anxious to ‘train their enemies’ by doing so, in the 
words of Plutarch: 
 
But after Sphodrias was acquitted, and the Athenians, on learning of it, 
were inclined to go to war, Agesilaüs was very harshly criticized. It was 
thought that, to gratify an absurd and childish desire, he had opposed the 
course of justice in a trial, and made the city accessory to great crimes 
against the Greeks. [2] Besides, when he saw that his colleague 
Cleombrotus was little inclined to make war upon the Thebans, he waived 
the exemption by law which he had formerly claimed in the matter of the 
expedition, and presently led an incursion into Boeotia himself, where he 
inflicted damage upon the Thebans, and in his turn met with reverses, so 
that one day when he was wounded, Antalcidas said to him: ‘Indeed, this is 
a fine tuition-fee which thou art getting from the Thebans, for teaching 
them how to fight when they did not wish to do it, and did not even know 
how.’ [3] For the Thebans are said to have been really more warlike at this 
time than ever before, owing to the many expeditions which the 
Lacedaemonians made against them, by which they were virtually schooled 
in arms. And Lycurgus of old, in one of his three so-called ‘rhetras,’ 
forbade his people to make frequent expeditions against the same foes, in 
order that those foes might not learn how to make war.246 
 
Xenophon says that Agesilaus was asked by the Spartans themselves to do this, 
because they would rather have him as a leader: 
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[35] The Lacedaemonians on their side called out the ban against the 
Thebans, and believing that Agesilaus would lead them with more 
judgment than Cleombrotus, requested him to act as commander of the 
army. And he, saying that he would offer no objection to whatever the state 
thought best, made his preparations for the campaign.247 
 
The next passage is an example of how Agesilaus used hoplites together with 
cavalry in order to fight off the Theban cavalry, as Xenophon relates of a battle 
near the Cithaeron in 378 BC: 
 
But when Agesilaus turned about and came to the rescue with the 
hoplites, his horsemen charged against the enemy's horsemen and the 
first ten year-classes of the hoplites ran along with them to the attack. 
The Theban horsemen, however, acted like men who had drunk a little 
at midday; for although they awaited the oncoming enemy in order to 
throw their spears, they threw before they were within range. Still, 
though they turned about at so great a distance, twelve of them were 
killed.248 
 
Xenophon sums up these battles in Agesilaus as follows: 
[22] It was in the same spirit that he subsequently made an expedition 
against Thebes,249 to relieve the Lacedaemonians in that city when their 
opponents had taken to murdering them. Finding the city protected on all 
sides by a trench and stockade, he crossed the Pass of Cynoscephalae, and 
laid waste the country up to the city walls, offering battle to the Thebans 
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both on the plain and on the hills, if they chose to fight. In the following 
year he made another expedition against Thebes, and, after crossing the 
stockade and trenches at Scolus, laid waste the rest of Boeotia. [23]  
Up to this time he and his city enjoyed unbroken success; and though the 
following years brought a series of troubles, it cannot be said that they 
were incurred under the leadership of Agesilaus. 250 
Xenophon certainly tries to justify Agesilaus’ actions in Boeotia and does not 
seem to want to give the Thebans their due. Agesilaus fell ill in 377 BC after 
another ruse into Theban territory. It would appear that during the years after 
he fell ill, the Lacedaemonian cavalry underwent a decline which manifested 
itself in the Battle at Leuctra in 371 BC, according to Xenophon:  
 
In the second place, since the space between the armies was a plain, the 
Lacedaemonians posted their horsemen in front of their phalanx, and the 
Thebans in like manner posted theirs over against them. Now the 
cavalry of the Thebans was in good training as a result of the war with 
the Orchomenians and the war with the Thespians, while the cavalry of 
the Lacedaemonians was exceedingly poor at that time. [11] For the 
richest men kept the horses, and it was only when the ban was called out 
that the appointed trooper presented himself; then he would get his 
horse and such arms as were given him, and take the field on the 
moment's notice. As for the men, on the other hand, it was those who 
were least strong of body and least ambitious who were mounted on the 
horses.251 
(…) Now when Cleombrotus began to lead his army against the enemy, 
in the first place, before the troops under him so much as perceived that 
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he was advancing, the horsemen had already joined battle and those of 
the Lacedaemonians had speedily been worsted; then in their flight they 
had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of the 
Thebans were now charging upon them. Nevertheless, the fact that 
Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in the battle may be 
known from this clear indication: they would not have been able to take 
him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were fighting in 
front of him been holding the advantage at that time. 
[14] But when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-
companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, 
then the royal bodyguard, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the 
others fell back under the pressure of the Theban mass, while those who 
were on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the 
right wing was being pushed back, gave way. Yet despite the fact that 
many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the 
trench which chanced to be in front of their camp they grounded their 
arms at the spot from which they had set forth. The camp, to be sure, 
was not on ground which was altogether level, but rather on the slope of 
a hill. After the disaster some of the Lacedaemonians, thinking it 
unendurable, said that they ought to prevent the enemy from setting up 
their trophy and to try to recover the bodies of the dead, not by means of 
a truce, but by fighting. 252 
 
But are we to believe Xenophon and his story of the Spartan cavalry? 
Xenophon was not entirely honest in his account of this battle and failed to 
mention Epaminondas. Plutarch was more to the point: 
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In the battle, while Epaminondas was drawing his phalanx obliquely 
towards the left, in order that the right wing of the Spartans might be 
separated as far as possible from the rest of the Greeks, and that he might 
thrust back Cleombrotus by a fierce charge in column with all his men-at-
arms, the enemy understood what he was doing and began to change their 
formation; [2] they were opening up their right wing and making an 
encircling movement, in order to surround Epaminondas and envelop him 
with their numbers. But at this point Pelopidas darted forth from his 
position, and with his band of three hundred on the run, came up before 
Cleombrotus had either extended his wing or brought it back again into its 
old position and closed up his line of battle, so that the Lacedaemonians 
were not standing in array, but moving confusedly about among each other 
when his onset reached them. [3] And yet the Spartans, who were of all 
men past masters in the art of war, trained and accustomed themselves to 
nothing so much as not to straggle or get into confusion upon a change of 
formation, but to take anyone without exception as neighbour in rank or in 
file, and wheresoever danger actually threatened, to seize that point and 
form in close array and fight as well as ever. [4] At this time, however, 
since the phalanx of Epaminondas bore down upon them alone and 
neglected the rest of their force, and since Pelopidas engaged them with 
incredible speed and boldness, their courage and skill were so confounded 
that there was a flight and slaughter of the Spartans such as had never 
before been seen. Therefore, although Epaminondas was boeotarch, 
Pelopidas, who was not boeotarch, and commanded only a small portion of 
the whole force, won as much glory for the success of that victory as he 
did.253 
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In the battle at Tegyra (375 BC), which Xenophon, convenient for his own 
cause, does not mention at all, the Boeotians probably for the first time fought 
with the cavalry in dense formation in front of their infantry. 
 
The Theban force was heavily outnumbered by the Spartans opposite 
them. The Sacred Band numbered some 300 hoplites, while the Spartan 
garrison consisted of two companies, meaning that the Spartan force 
contained between 1,000 and 1,800 hoplites. Plutarch reports that one 
Theban soldier, upon seeing the enemy force, said to Pelopidas "We are 
fallen into our enemies' hands," to which Pelopidas replied "And why not 
they into ours?" Pelopidas then ordered the Theban cavalry to charge 
while the infantry formed up into an abnormally dense formation. When 
the two phalanxes came together, the compact Theban formation broke 
through the Spartan line at the point of contact, then turned to attack the 
vulnerable flanks of the Spartans to either side. The Spartan force broke 
and fled, although the Theban pursuit was limited by the proximity of 
Orchomenus.254  
 
And Plutarch tells us even more on this specific battle: 
 
During this time the Spartans met with many reverses both by land and sea, 
the greatest of which was at Tegyra, where for the first time they were 
overpowered by the Thebans in a pitched battle.255 
 
Xenophon seems to be on the defense regarding his friend Agesilaus. And there 
is more. After this first defeat in 375 BC many cities in Greece sent embassies 
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to Sparta, one of the embassadors was a Theban named Epaminondas, a man of 
culture and philosophy: 
 
This man, seeing the rest all cringing before Agesilaüs, alone had the 
courage of his convictions, and made a speech, not in behalf of Thebes, his 
native city, but of all Greece in common, declaring that war made Sparta 
great at the expense of the sufferings of all the other states, and urging that 
peace be made on terms of equality and justice, for it would endure only 
when all parties to it were made equal.256 
 
Plutarch tells us that 
 
Agesilaus, accordingly, seeing that the Greeks all listened to Epaminondas 
with the greatest attention and admiration, asked him whether he considered 
it justice and equality that the cities of Boeotia should be independent of 
Thebes. Then when Epaminondas promptly and boldly asked him in reply 
whether he too thought it justice for the cities of Laconia to be independent 
of Sparta, Agesilaus sprang from his seat and wrathfully bade him say 
plainly whether he intended to make the cities of Boeotia independent. [2] 
And when Epaminondas answered again in the same way by asking 
whether he intended to make the cities of Laconia independent, Agesilaus 
became violent and was glad of the pretext for at once erasing the name of 
the Thebans from the treaty of peace and declaring war upon them.257 
 
Xenophon tells a completely different story as he does not mention 
Epaminondas and he says the Thebans had signed as Thebans, but on the next 
day wished to substitute the name of Boeotians for Thebans. He says that 
                                                
256 Plut. Ag. 27.4. 
257 Plut. Ag. 28.1-2. 
  108 
Agesilaus refused to permit this as it would have recognized the supremacy of 
Thebes in Boeotia.258  
 
Plutarch also tells us that the ensuing battle at Leuctra was apparently more an 
action of anger than calculation: 
 
At this time Cleombrotus was in Phocis with an army. The ephors therefore 
immediately sent him orders to lead his forces against Thebes. They also 
sent round a summons for an assembly of their allies, who were without 
zeal for the war and thought it a great burden, but were not yet bold enough 
to oppose or disobey the Lacedaemonians. [4] And although many baleful 
signs appeared, as I have written in my Life of Epaminondas,259 and though 
Prothouüs the Laconian made opposition to the expedition, Agesilaüs 
would not give in, but brought the war to pass. He thought that since all 
Hellas was on their side, and the Thebans had been excluded from the 
treaty, it was a favourable time for the Spartans to take vengeance on them. 
[5] But the time chosen for it proves that this expedition was made from 
anger more than from careful calculation. For the treaty of peace was made 
at Lacedaemon on the fourteenth of the month Scirophorion, and on the 
fifth of Hecatombaeon the Lacedaemonians were defeated at Leuctra,—an 
interval of twenty days. In that battle a thousand Lacedaemonians fell, 
besides Cleombrotus the king, and around him the mightiest of the 
Spartans.260 
 
After this battle at Leuctra in 371 BC in which Thebes again defeated Sparta, 
the Athenians were becoming more and more nervous about a Boeotian 
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domination. Athens wanted to ally itself with Sparta. Athens regarded itself as 
a leader at sea, and Sparta as a leader on land.261  
 
In 370 BC Agesilaus freed the polis of Mantinea of the Thebans, but he 
carefully avoided any military confrontations with them.262 In the same year 
though, Epaminondas invaded Laconia and tried to conquer Sparta itself. 
Agesilaus met with not only contempt by the Boeotians, but also with criticism 
of his own people. And  
 
He was also distressed at the thought of what his fame would be, because he 
had taken command of the city when she was greatest and most powerful, 
and now saw her reputation lowered, and her proud boast made empty, 
which boast he himself also had often made, saying that no Spartan woman 
had ever seen the smoke of an enemy's fires.263 
 
After three months of ravaging the Lacedaemonian country, Epaminondas 
withdrew his forces. Three reasons are mentioned by Xenophon:  
 
As for the enemy in Lacedaemon, many Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans had 
already departed, inasmuch as they lived just across the border, some of 
them leading and others carrying what they had taken as plunder. On the1 
other hand, the Thebans and the rest were desirous of departing from the 
country, partly for the very reason that they saw their army growing daily 
smaller, and partly because provisions were scantier, the supply having 
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been in part used up or stolen away, in part wasted or burned up; besides, it 
was winter, so that by this time all alike wanted to withdraw.264 
 
But according to Plutarch there was another, maybe more compelling 
reason why the Thebans suddenly left Lacedaemon: 
 
Theopompus says that when the Theban chief magistrates had already 
determined to take their army back, Phrixus, a Spartan, came to them, 
bringing ten talents from Agesilaüs to pay for their withdrawal, so that they 
were only doing what they had long ago decided to do, and had their 
expenses paid by their enemies besides.265 
 
After these events, Agesilaus declined military service on account of his age 
and his son Archidamus took his place. Archidamus conquered the Arcadians in 
the Tearless Battle.266  
 
But when Messene was built by Epaminondas, and its former citizens 
flocked into it from all quarters, the Spartans had not the courage to contest 
the issue nor the ability to hinder it, but cherished the deepest resentment 
against Agesilaus, because a country which was not of less extent than their 
own, which stood first among Hellenic lands for its fertility, the possession 
and fruits of which they had enjoyed for so long a time, had been lost by 
them during his reign. [2] For this reason, too, Agesilaus would not accept 
the peace which was proffered by the Thebans. He was not willing to give 
up to them formally the country which was actually in their power, and 
persisted in his opposition. As a consequence, he not only did not recover 
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Messenia, but almost lost Sparta besides, after being outgeneralled. [3] For 
when the Mantineans changed their allegiance [in 369 BC] and revolted 
from Thebes, and called in the Lacedaemonians to help them, 
Epaminondas, learning that Agesilaus had marched out from Sparta with his 
forces and was approaching, set out by night from Tegea, without the 
knowledge of the Mantineans, and led his army against Sparta itself. He 
passed by Agesilaus, and came within a little of suddenly seizing the city in 
a defenceless state.267 
 
Xenophon does not mention that Agesilaus nearly lost Sparta, but goes on 
speaking of the forging of an alliance between Sparta and Athens on the basis 
of equality.268  
 
In 362 BC, the Theban general Epaminondas decided to fight at Mantinea, 
deploying cavalry ahead of its infantry in a dense formation again. He formed 
them as a phalanx, six deep and with a square column formation which was to 
push its way through the Athenian lines. He also had cavalry on the wings to 
incite fear, that these would fall on the army after the centre had given way. He 
succeeded in his plans, but he was wounded during the battle as he fought in the 
front line and died shortly afterwards.269  
 
The Thebans had lost their hope of hegemony after his death because he had 
forced them to agree to a peace treaty with Sparta and Athens. They still clinged 
to his advocacy of this treaty at the embassy before the battle at Leuctra. 
Epaminondas then foretold that all Greek cities would be weakened by an 
ongoing war between them. He was right because all poleis were weakened by 
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the outcome of this battle and after  362 BC, Greece was to remain in a state of 
confusion.270  
 
But Agesilaus could not give in to peace, which was held against him by the 
Spartans and his reputation would soon diminish, as Plutarch tells us: 
 
After the battle and the death of Epaminondas, when the Greeks concluded 
peace among themselves, Agesilaüs and his partisans tried to exclude the 
Messenians from the oath of ratification, on the ground that they had no 
city. [3] And when all the rest admitted the Messenians and accepted their 
oaths, the Lacedaemonians held aloof from the peace, and they alone 
remained at war in the hope of recovering Messenia. Agesilaüs was 
therefore deemed a headstrong and stubborn man, and insatiable of war, 
since he did all in his power to undermine and postpone the general peace, 
and again since his lack of resources compelled him to lay burdens on his 
friends in the city and to take loans and contributions from them. [4] And 
yet it was his duty to put an end to their evils, now that opportunity offered, 
and not, after having lost Sparta's whole empire, vast as it was, with its 
cities and its supremacy on land and sea, then to carry on a petty struggle 
for the goods and revenues of Messene.271 
 
Eventually Agesilaus died in 360 BC in Egypt, serving as a mercenary.  
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3.6. Xenophon and the Threat of Thebes 
After the battle at Mantinea, Xenophon still regarded Thebes as the major 
enemy, despite the fact that peace reigned at that moment between Thebes and 
Athens. For instance, in his Cavalry Commander, he wrote: 
‘The Athenian cavalry commander, however, should excel greatly both in 
the observance of his duty to the gods and in the qualities of a warrior, 
seeing that he has on his borders rivals in the shape of cavalry as numerous 
as his and large forces of infantry. [2] And if he attempts to invade the 
enemy's country without the other armed forces of the state, he will have to 
take his chance with the cavalry only against both arms. Or if the enemy 
invades Athenian territory, in the first place, he will certainly not fail to 
bring with him other cavalry besides his own and infantry in addition, 
whose numbers he reckons to be more than a match for all the Athenians 
put together. [3] Now provided that the whole of the city's levies turn out 
against such a host in defence of their country, the prospects are good. For 
our cavalrymen, God helping, will be the better, if proper care is taken of 
them, and our heavy infantry will not be inferior in numbers, and I may 
add, they will be in as good condition and will show the keener spirit, if 
only, with God's help, they are trained on the right lines. And, remember, 
the Athenians are quite as proud of their ancestry as the Boeotians. [4] But 
if the city falls back on her navy, and is content to keep her walls intact, as 
in the days when the Lacedaemonians invaded us with all the Greeks to 
help them, and if she expects her cavalry to protect all that lies outside the 
walls, and to take its chance unaided against her foes,—why then, I 
suppose, we need first the strong arm of the gods to aid us, and in the 
second place it is essential that our cavalry commander should be masterly. 
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For much sagacity is called for in coping with a greatly superior force, and 
abundance of courage when the call comes.’272 
In the final sentences of this passage Xenophon warns that the Athenians will 
need to put a good commander in charge of their cavalry, otherwise they will not 
be capable of fighting a superior force. With his reference to a superior force, he 
clearly meant the city of Thebes. Xenophon, like many other Athenians and 
Spartans, such as Agesilaus, had a fierce hatred for Thebes and witnessed with 
dismay the rise of the Boeotian League after the defeat of Sparta at Leuctra. He 
tried to warn the Athenians to take heed of the Boeotians: 
‘The Athenian cavalry commander, however, should excel greatly both in 
the observance of his duty to the gods and in the qualities of a warrior, 
seeing that he has on his borders rivals in the shape of cavalry as numerous 
as his and large forces of infantry. And if he attempts to invade the 
enemy’s country without the other armed forces of the state, he will have to 
take his chance with the cavalry only against both arms. Or if the enemy 
invades Athenian territory, in the first place, he will certainly not fail to 
bring with him other cavalry besides his own and infantry in addition, 
whose numbers he reckons to be more than a match for all the Athenians 
put together. (…) And remember, the Athenians are quite as proud of their 
ancestry as the Boeotians.’273  
If we accept this to be the case, his reference to which metoikoi should be 
serving in the Athenian cavalry would be all the more clear:  
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I fancy, too, that infantry attached to the cavalry will be most effective if it 
consists of persons who are very bitter against the enemy.274  
Despite his fiery hate for Thebes it is interesting to note that Xenophon could 
not but be in awe of Epaminondas’ military insight. He certainly had learned 
from Epaminondas, who he even accorded some praise in his Hellenica: 
 
‘[19] Now the fact that Epaminondas himself entertained such thoughts, 
seems to me to be in no wise remarkable, — for such thoughts are natural 
to ambitious men; but that he had brought his army to such a point that the 
troops flinched from no toil, whether by night or by day, and shrank from 
no peril, and although the provisions they had were scanty, were 
nevertheless willing to be obedient, this seems to me to be more 
remarkable. [20] For at the time when he gave them the last order to make 
ready, saying that there would be a battle, the horsemen eagerly whitened 
their helmets at his command, the hoplites of the Arcadians painted clubs 
upon their shields, as though they were Thebans, and all alike sharpened 
their spears and daggers and burnished their shields. [21] But when he had 
led them forth, thus made ready, it is worth while again to note what he 
did.275 
Xenophon analysed these Theban cavalry tactics and referred to it in his 
Cavalry Commander. His purpose in so doing was to inform the Athenians 
who, he hoped, would be attentive to his warnings and recommendations and 
pay heed to them in defending their state in the event of war.  
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The Square Formation 
 
Where as Agesilaus used a hollow square formation for marching276, with 
cavalry in front and at the rear, Xenophon recommended the use of a (full) 
square formation when marching or fielding the cavalry: 
 ‘When your men are well trained in all these points, they must, of course, 
understand some plan of formation, that in which they will show to greatest 
advantage in the sacred processions and at manoeuvres, fight, if need be, 
with the greatest courage, and move along roads and cross rivers with 
perfect ease in unbroken order.  
(…) To use an illustration, steel has most power to cut through steel when 
its edge is keen and its back reliable. (…)You must be very careful to 
appoint a competent man as leader in the rear. For if he is a good man, his 
cheers will always hearten the ranks in front of him in case it becomes 
necessary to charge; or, should the moment come to retreat, his prudent 
leadership will, in all probability, do much for the safety of his regiment.   
An even number of file-leaders has this advantage over an odd, that it is 
possible to divide the regiment into a larger number of equal parts.277 
Xenophon explained why he preferred this technique: 
The reasons why I like this formation are these. In the first place, all the 
men in the front rank are officers; and the obligation to distinguish 
themselves appeals more strongly to men when they are officers than when 
they are privates. Secondly, when anything has to be done, the word of 
                                                
276 Hell 3.4.20 in the battle at Sardis in 395 BC and also at Coronea in 394 BC against Thessaly. 
See for example: Ag  2.2. 
277 CC 2.1; 2.3; 2.5. 
  117 
command is much more effective if it is passed to officers rather than to 
privates.  
Let us assume that this formation has been adopted: every file-leader must 
know his position in the line of march by word passed along by the colonel, 
just as every colonel is informed by the commander of his proper place in 
the charge. For when these instructions are given there will be much better 
order than if the men hamper one another like a crowd leaving the theatre.  
And in the event of a frontal attack, the men in the van are far more willing 
to fight when they know that this is their station; so is the rear-rank in the 
event of a surprise attack in the rear, when the men there understand that it 
is disgraceful to leave their post. But if no order is kept there is confusion 
whenever the roads are narrow or rivers are being crossed; and when an 
action is fought no one voluntarily takes his post in the fighting line.278 
This formation was used by Epaminondas at Leuctra in 371 BC. 
 
[10] In the second place, since the space between the armies was a 
plain, the Lacedaemonians posted their horsemen in front of their 
phalanx, and the Thebans in like manner posted theirs over against 
them. 
(…) the horsemen had already joined battle and those of the 
Lacedaemonians had speedily been worsted; then in their flight they 
had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of 
the Thebans were now charging upon them.279 
 
Although Xenophon implies that the Thebans imitated the Spartans by doing so, 
as maybe clear by now, the opposite is more likely to have happened. 
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Attack and Flight 
 
Xenophon makes no reference to the exact Boeotian cavalry tactics in his 
account of the Battle at Leuctra in 371 BC. Plutarch on the other hand does 
speak about these Boeotian tactics, as he was a Boeotian himself his might be a 
plausible story: 
 
for they were not pitched battles, nor was the fighting in open and 
regular array, but it was by making well-timed sallies, and by either 
retreating before the enemy or by pursuing and coming to close 
quarters with them that the Thebans won their successes.280 
 
Although in his Hellenica he hardly mentions the Boeotian tactics, in his 
Cavalry Commander Xenophon explains that the cavalry should move in 
formation to keep order and that men in formation with some of their superiors 
behind them will be more willing to fight in the event of a frontal attack. He 
then writes that the cavalry should also be capable of ‘attack and flight’ tactics: 
 
Suppose now that the cavalry are busy in the no-man's-land that 
separates two battle lines drawn up face to face or two strategic 
positions, wheeling, pursuing and retreating. After such manoeuvres 
both sides usually start off at a slow pace, but gallop at full speed in 
the unoccupied ground. But if a commander first feints in this manner, 
and then after wheeling, pursues and retreats at the gallop he will be 
able to inflict the greatest loss on the enemy, and will probably come 
through with the least harm, by pursuing at the gallop so long as he is 
near his own defence, and retreating at the gallop from the enemy's 
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defences. If, moreover, he can secretly leave behind him four or five of 
the best horses and men in each division, they will be at a great 
advantage in falling on the enemy as he is turning to renew the 
charge.281 
 
In this last paragraph, Xenophon suggests that cavalry should line itself up in 
the no-man’s-land between infantry battle lines with an as large as possible 
front. In this no-man’s-land, the cavalry should take strategic positions and 
harass the opposing side while wheeling, pursuing and retreating. This 
harassing tactic will become more effective if the commander keeps four or five 
of his best horses and riders hidden behind the infantry, so that the enemy will 
be surprised at his next attack.282 The infantry should then appear from behind 
the cavalry to surprise the enemy.283 Before this section, he writes that he would 
rather have a small regiment of cavalry than a large one.284 
 
Xenophon admits that ‘our cavalrymen are not accustomed to these 
movements’ and these are ‘novel feats of skill’.285 Referring to the above 
‘attack and flight’ tactic, he says: ‘I think that these manoeuvres would look 
more like war and would have the charm of novelty’.286 In fact these were 
Boeotian tactics, and Xenophon had hoped that Athens could employ Boeotian 
tactics in order to defeat Thebes.  
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Hamippoi 
 
In the Battle at Leuctra (371 BC),  Xenophon saw how Epaminondas deployed 
his cavalry and hamippoi and was victorious against the Spartans. The Spartans 
tried to fight the Thebans with their own cavalry tactics by using hamippoi 
themselves, according to Xenophon: 
 
In the second place, since the space between the armies was a plain, the 
Lacedaemonians posted their horsemen in front of their phalanx, and the 
Thebans in like manner posted theirs over against them. Now the 
cavalry of the Thebans was in good training as a result of the war with 
the Orchomenians and the war with the Thespians, while the cavalry of 
the Lacedaemonians was exceedingly poor at that time. [11] For the 
richest men kept the horses, and it was only when the ban was called out 
that the appointed trooper presented himself; then he would get his 
horse and such arms as were given him, and take the field on the 
moment's notice. As for the men, on the other hand, it was those who 
were least strong of body and least ambitious who were mounted on the 
horses.287 
 
[31] And the horsemen of the Lacedaemonians, seemingly very few in 
number, were formed in line against them. Meanwhile the 
Lacedaemonians had set an ambush of the younger hoplites, about three 
hundred in number, in the house of the Tyndaridae, and at the same 
moment these men rushed forth and their horsemen charged. The 
enemy, however, did not await their attack, but gave way. And on 
seeing this, many of the foot-soldiers also took to flight. But when the 
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pursuers stopped and the army of the Thebans stood firm, the enemy 
encamped again.288  
 
According to Xenophon, Agesilaus has used this technique in another battle 
against the Thebans289  and made an attempt to fight the Thebans using their 
own tactics against them: 
 
But when Agesilaus turned about and came to the rescue with the 
hoplites, his horsemen charged against the enemy's horsemen and the 
first ten year-classes of the hoplites ran along with them to the attack. 
The Theban horsemen, however, acted like men who had drunk a little 
at midday; for although they awaited the oncoming enemy in order to 
throw their spears, they threw before they were within range. Still, 
though they turned about at so great a distance, twelve of them were 
killed.290 
 
 In the Cavalry Commander he referres a number of times to the cavalry 
formation called hamippous pezous. 291 A Boeotian tactic, where a heavily 
armed infantry worked in close cooperation with the cavalry on the battlefield. 
A cavalry attacking a line of battle in an attempt to break the lines is followed 
by the hamippoi, who either charge simultaneously with the cavalry or follow 
close behind.292 He refers only here to hamippoi, whereas elsewhere he uses the 
term pezoi.293  
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“infantry attached to cavalry will be most effective if it consists of 
persons who are very bitter against the enemy”294   
 
He keeps extolling the virtues of the  hamippoi: 
 
“Another duty of a cavalry commander is to demonstrate to the city the 
weakness of cavalry destitute of infantry as compared with cavalry that 
has infantry attached to it. Further, having got his infantry, a cavalry 
commander should make use of it. A mounted man being much higher 
than a man on foot, infantry may be hidden away not only among the 
cavalry but in the rear as well.” 295   
 
Apparently, Xenophon wanted the Athenians to employ a Boeotian tactic and 
advised them to do so. In recommending this tactic, it seems he made it look 
like it had been devised by Agesilaus. The Spartans only used cavalry for the 
first time at the end of the Peloponnesian War296 and according to Thucydides, 
hamippoi had already been used by the Thebans in 419 BC. Hamippoi were 
first used in the Peloponnesian War by the Boeotian cavalry. These Boeotian 
hamippoi were dispatched against Athens in 419/418 BC, as Thucydides 
explained: 
 
The Tegeans and the other Arcadian allies of Lacedaemon joined in the 
expedition. The allies from the rest of Peloponnese and from outside 
mustered at Phlius; the Boeotians with five thousand heavy infantry and 
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as many light troops, and five hundred horse and the same number of 
Hamippoi.297 
 
It may well be that the heavy infantry which came to the aid of the Boeotian 
cavalry and so defeated the Athenian and Thessalian cavalry were also 
Hamippoi.298 But Thucydides was not clear on this. This is the first time that 
Hamippoi are mentioned. It is possible that the Boeotians devised this type of 
cavalry in order to be capable of fighting the Thessalian cavalry which, 
according to Simon,299 was the most powerful cavalry in Greece, though 
unwilling to fight hoplites in battle formation.300 In the above passages from 
Xenophon, this would seem to be the first time that the Hamippoi are 
mentioned. 
Mantinea, 362 BC 
Xenophon continues to make much reference in his Cavalry Commander to the 
tactics used by Epaminondas in the battle at Mantinea. As we have previously 
seen, he had a deep admiration for Epaminondas, despite his hate of Thebes. I 
will outline below the various phases of the battle which Xenophon described, 
and cite Xenophon’s advice in that regard. 
Epaminondas excelled in the art of concealment and deception: 
 [21] But when he had led them forth, thus made ready, it is worth while 
again to note what he did. In the first place, as was natural, he formed 
them in line of battle. And by doing this he seemed to make it clear that 
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he was preparing for an engagement; but when his army had been drawn 
up as he wished it to be, he did not advance by the shortest route 
towards the enemy, but led the way towards the mountains which lie to 
the westward and over against Tegea, so that he gave the enemy the 
impression that he would not join battle on that day.301  
 
Xenophon likewise advised on concealment and deception: 
 
[11] And on thinking over the successes gained in war you will find that 
most of them, and these the greatest, have been won with the aid of 
deception. For these reasons either you should not essay to command, or 
you should pray to heaven that your equipment may include this 
qualification, and you should contrive on your own part to possess it.302 
 
[15] Another ruse that proves highly effective at times is to feign excess 
of caution and reluctance to take risks. For this pretence often lures the 
enemy into making a more fatal blunder through want of caution. Or 
once come to be thought venturesome, and you can give the enemy 
trouble by merely sitting still and pretending that you are on the point of 
doing something.303  
 
In using these tactics, Epaminondas was capable of luring the enemy into a 
‘relaxation of their readiness’ and then would fall upon them unexpectedly, 
when they were dismounted and much more vulnerable to attack: 
 
[22] For as soon as he had arrived at the mountain, and when his battle line 
had been extended to its full length, he grounded arms at the foot of the 
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heights, so that he seemed like one who was encamping. And by so doing 
he caused among most of the enemy a relaxation of their mental readiness 
for fighting, and likewise a relaxation of their readiness as regards their 
array for battle. It was not until he had moved along successive companies 
to the wing where he was stationed, and had wheeled them into line thus 
strengthening the mass formation of this wing, that he gave the order to 
take up arms and led the advance; and his troops followed. Now as soon as 
the enemy saw them unexpectedly approaching, no one among them was 
able to keep quiet, but some began running to their posts, others forming 
into line, others bridling horses, and others putting on breast-plates, while 
all were like men who were about to suffer, rather than to inflict, harm.304 
 
Xenophon likewise advised on not having the entire cavalry dismount 
when the enemy was nearby: 
 
 ‘but when it is uncertain whether you will encounter an enemy on your 
way to any place, you must give the regiments a rest in turn. For it would 
be a bad job if all the men were dismounted when the enemy is close at 
hand.’305 
According to Xenophon, Epaminondas used his cavalry in front of his 
infantry, while leaving behind the less effective part of the army. He 
recognised how small victories or setbacks in battle had a psychological 
effect on his own army and on that of the enemy: 
[23] Meanwhile Epaminondas led forward his army prow on, like a 
trireme, believing that if he could strike and cut through anywhere, he 
would destroy the entire army of his adversaries. For he was preparing to 
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make the contest with the strongest part of his force, and the weakest part 
he had stationed far back, knowing that if defeated it would cause 
discouragement to the troops who were with him and give courage to the 
enemy.306  
Xenophon advised likewise:  
[10] I want to add a word of warning against another error. Some men, 
when they suppose themselves to be stronger than the enemy whom they 
are going to attack, take an utterly inadequate force with them.  
The consequence is that they are apt to incur the loss they expected to 
inflict. Or, when they know themselves to be weaker than the enemy, they 
use all their available strength in the attack. 
[11] The right procedure, in my opinion, is just the opposite: when the 
commander expects to win, he should not hesitate to use the whole of his 
strength: for an overwhelming victory never yet was followed by remorse. 
[12] But when he tries conclusions with a much stronger force, knowing 
beforehand that he is bound to retreat when he has done his best, I hold that 
it is far better in such a case to throw a small part of his strength into the 
attack than the whole of it; only horses and men alike should be his very 
best. For such a force will be able to achieve something and to retreat with 
less risk.307 
Epaminondas himself therefore led his force in a battle formation with his 
cavalry ahead of his infantry to cut through the enemy lines, whereas the 
Athenians merely had fielded their cavalry without any infantry support: 
                                                
306 Hell 7.5.23. 
307 CC 8.10 – 12. 
  127 
Again, while the enemy had formed their horsemen like a phalanx of 
hoplites, — six deep and without intermingled foot soldiers, 308 
Epaminondas made good use of his cavalry and hamippoi in a battle formation: 
[24] Epaminondas on the other hand had made a strong column of his 
cavalry, also, and had mingled foot soldiers among them, believing that 
when he cut through the enemy's cavalry, he would have defeated the entire 
opposing army; for it is very hard to find men who will stand firm when 
they see any of their own side in flight.309  
Although the battle at Mantinea is renowned for what seems to have been the 
first deployment of a wedge formation, this is not described by Xenophon in 
both his Hellenica or his Cavalry Commander. Nor is it described by Diodorus 
Siculus in his account of this battle or by any other author.310  
 
Xenophon does say that Epaminondas led his army ‘prow on like a trireme’, 
using the adiective ‘!"#$%&ƒ&!"’. This can be translated as ‘head on’ or 
‘frontally’311. Xenophon applies this term to wheeling of the Spartan lochoi in 
parallel columns to the right to meet an attack on the line of march.312 
Epaminondas led his cavalry and infantry force in a deepened phalanx forward 
which wanted to use as a wedge to split up the enemy formation, which is 
described by the word ¶µ'!(!".313  
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Epaminondas believed that he could cut through the ranks of the enemy cavalry 
in a frontal attack of his cavalry in a battle formation, supported by his infantry 
which was intermingled with his cavalry.314 He might have used his cavalry in a 
dense phalanx to push its way through enemy lines, either cavalry or infantry, 
followed immediately after first impact by hoplites.315 
 
In the Cavaly Commander Xenophon mentions this ‘cutting through steel’ 
ability of the square formation if it is rightly put in line with the best men who 
are ‘bent on winning fame by some brilliant deed’.  
 
I hold that within these you should, to begin with, appoint file-leaders after 
consulting each of the colonels, choosing sturdy men, who are bent on 
winning fame by some brilliant deed. These should form the front rank. [3] 
Next you should choose an equal number of the oldest and most sensible to 
form the rear rank. To use an illustration, steel has most power to cut 
through steel when its edge is keen and its back reliable.316 
 
So this ‘cutting through steel’ remark can clearly make a reference to Boeotian 
cavalry tactics. 
Furthermore, Epaminondas understood the impact of psychological warfare: 
And in order to prevent the Athenians on the left wing from coming to the 
aid of those who were posted next to them, he stationed both horsemen and 
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hoplites upon some hills over against them, desiring to create in them the 
fear that if they proceeded to give aid, these troops would fall upon them 
from behind. 
Xenophon also makes mention of the psychological impact: 
 
‘Create a scare among the enemy when your own position is precarious, so 
that he may not attack.’317  
 
and he suggests concealing the best horsemen to fall upon the enemy when 
they least expect it: 
 
If, moreover, he can secretly leave behind him four or five of the best 
horses and men in each division, they will be at a great advantage in falling 
on the enemy as he is turning to renew the charge.318 
Xenophon again made reference to similar tactics: 
[17] Should it happen at any time that the cavalry forces engaged are about 
equal, I think it would be a good plan to split each regiment into two 
divisions, putting one under the command of the colonel, and the other 
under the best man available.  
[18] The latter would follow in the rear of the colonel's division for a time; 
but presently, when the adversary is near, he would wheel on receiving the 
order and charge. This plan, I think, would make the blow delivered by the 
regiment more stunning and more difficult to parry. 
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[19] Both divisions should have an infantry contingent; and if the infantry, 
hidden away behind the cavalry, came out suddenly and went for the 
enemy, I think they would prove an important factor in making the victory 
more decisive; for I have noticed that a surprise cheers men up if it is 
pleasant, but stuns them if it is alarming. 
[20] Anyone will recognise the truth of this who reflects that, however 
great their advantage in numbers, men are dazed when they fall into an 
ambuscade, and that two hostile armies confronting each other are scared 
out of their wits for the first few days.319 
He described the end of the battle at Mantinea as follows: 
 
Thus, then, he [Epaminondas] made his attack, and he was not disappointed 
of his hope; for by gaining the mastery at the point where he struck, he 
caused the entire army of his adversaries to flee. [25] When, however, he 
had himself fallen, those who were left proved unable to take full 
advantage thereafter even of the victory; but although the opposing phalanx 
had fled before them, their hoplites did not kill a single man or advance 
beyond the spot where the collision had taken place; and although the 
cavalry also had fled before them, their cavalry in like manner did not 
pursue and kill either horsemen or hoplites, but slipped back timorously, 
like beaten men, through the lines of the flying enemy. Furthermore, while 
the intermingled footmen and the peltasts, who had shared in the victory of 
the cavalry, did make their way like victors to the region of the enemy's left 
wing, most of them were there slain by the Athenians.320  
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Xenophon described here how the hamippoi and the cavalry were victorious 
and that the Athenians had to retreat en masse. But the Boeotian army failed to 
consolidate the victory because after Epaminondas had fallen, they did not 
manage to deploy their cavalry and hamippoi to their full advantage and were 
thus cut to ribbons by the Athenians. This was a sign for Xenophon that the 
Athenians could in fact defeat the Thebans with Epaminondas now out of the 
picture. Thebes had been posing no real threat at this stage, as he concluded in 
his Hellenica: 
 
neither was found to be any better off, as regards either additional territory, 
or city, or sway, than before the battle took place; but there was even more 
confusion and disorder in Greece after the battle than before.321 
 
After all these references in the works of Xenophon to Epaminondas, he would 
appear to have been the model for Cavalry Commander. This would also seem 
plausible given that Epaminondas after Agesilaus was the first to actually 
employ cavalry tactics on the battlefield. Xenophon wrote books about 
everyone he admired in military history, for example Hiero, Cyrus, Agesilaus 
and, it would appear, Epaminondas too. All books were meant as doctrines and 
though he preferred not to mention Epaminondas by name, he does express his 
admiration for him in that last chapter of the Hellenica.322 
 
It is nevertheless noteworthy that Xenophon ascribes certain points on cavalry 
tactics and training to Agesilaus, while ascribing other salient points to Cyrus. 
He even includes the exact same passage in the Cavalry Commander and in his 
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account of the life of Agesilaus, and there are several parallel passages to be 
found in all his works. He has clearly chosen these two as his prime examples. 
Perhaps he learned from his Persian friends how they trained and prepared their 
cavalry and learned other things from Agesilaus. Xenophon and Agesilaus 
certainly shared their hatred of Thebes and were not prone to give in to the 
Boeotians.  
 
It is not clear to me however whether the Spartan army actually deployed the 
cavalry in front of the infantry as Xenophon has described. At times he seems to 
be ascribing the creation of the hamippoi to Agesilaus, but that could not be the 
case because in 419 BC, the hamippoi had already been fielded against the 
Boeotians in the Peloponnesos, according to Thucydides.  
As we have seen above, the Spartans themselves claimed that Epaminondas 
learned his tactics from Agesilaus following a battle which Agesilaus had 
fought in Boeotia, a matter which Xenophon does not in fact refer to in 
Hellenica. This might have to do with Xenophon’s own particular perspective.  
 
Agesilaus probably brought the tactics of the Thebans to Xenophon’s attention. 
He had gained a lot of experience following his encounters with the Thebans on 
the battlefield. He had fought at Mantinea and was a personal friend of 
Xenophon. In his works, Xenophon makes little reference to the Boeotian 
tactics, preferring to ascribe these tactics to Agesilaus or the Spartans, though 
not with complete success. In his Hellenica, he completely ignores the Battle at 
Tegyra and makes every effort to cite Sparta as the precursor of cavalry attacks 
and the Thebans as their imitators.  
It is clear that Xenophon sensed his opportunity with the confusion that reigned 
in Greece following the battle at Mantinea. In the following excerpt from his 
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Ways and Means, we find exactly the same conclusion that he arrived at in 
Hellenica: 
 
 ‘now, owing to the confusion prevalent in Greece, an opportunity has 
fallen to the state to win back the Greeks without trouble, without danger 
and without expense.’323 
 
The Hellenica was written in any event after the Battle at Mantinea. In both 
books he called on Athens to take action to regain control over Greece: 
And now, owing to the confusion prevalent in Greece, an opportunity, I 
think, has fallen to the state to win back the Greeks without trouble, 
without danger, and without expense. For she has it in her power to try 
to reconcile the warring states, she has it in her power to compose the 
factions contending in their midst. [9] And were it apparent that you are 
striving to make the Delphic shrine independent, as it used to be, not by 
joining in war, but by sending embassies up and down Greece, I for my 
part should not be in the least surprised if you found the Greeks all of 
one mind, banded together by oath and united in alliance against any 
that attempted to seize the shrine in the event of the Phocians 
abandoning it. [10] Were you to show also that you are striving for 
peace in every land and on every sea, I do think that, next to the safety 
of their own country, all men would put the safety of Athens first in 
their prayers. [11]  
If, on the other hand, any one supposes that financially war is more 
profitable to the state than peace, I really do not know how the truth of 
this can be tested better than by considering once more what has been 
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the experience of our state in the past. [12] He will find that in old days 
a very great amount of money was paid into the treasury in time of 
peace, and that the whole of it was spent in time of war; he will 
conclude on consideration that in our own time the effect of the late war 
on our revenues was that many of them ceased, while those that came in 
were exhausted by the multitude of expenses; whereas the cessation of 
war by sea has been followed by a rise in the revenues, and has allowed 
the citizens to devote them to any purpose they choose. [13]  
But some one may ask me, Do you mean to say that, even if she is 
wronged, the state should remain at peace with the offender? No, 
certainly not; but I do say that our vengeance would follow far more 
swiftly on our enemies if we provoked nobody by wrong-doing; for then 
they would look in vain for an ally. 6.  
Well now, surely, if none of these proposals is impossible or even 
difficult, if by carrying them into effect we shall be regarded with more 
affection by the Greeks, shall live in greater security, and be more 
glorious; if the people will be maintained in comfort and the rich no 
more burdened with the expenses of war; if with a large surplus in hand 
we shall celebrate our festivals with even more splendour than at 
present, shall restore the temples, and repair the walls and docks, and 
shall give back to priests, councillors, magistrates, knights their ancient 
privileges; surely, I say, our proper course is to proceed with this 
scheme forthwith, that already in our generation we may come to see 
our city secure and prosperous. [2]  
Furthermore, if you decide to go forward with the plan, I should advise 
you to send to Dodona and Delphi, and inquire of the gods whether such 
a design is fraught with weal for the state both now and in days to come. 
[3] And should they consent to it, then I would say that we ought to ask 
them further, which of the gods we must propitiate in order that we may 
prosper in our handiwork. Then, when we have offered an acceptable 
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sacrifice to the gods named in their reply, it behoves us to begin the 
work. For with heaven to help us in what we do, it is likely that our 
undertakings will go forward continually to the greater weal of the 
state.324 
 
Some passages from Ways and Means are exactly the same as in Cavalry 
Commander. Xenophon himself clearly states that Ways and Means was written 
in the period after Hegesileos, which is the Ionian variant of the Doric name of 
Agesilaus325 and after ‘the late war’.326  
This would mean that the Cavalry Commander was also authored after the 
Battle at Mantinea. The date given to Xenophon’s Cavalry Commander tends to 
be around 365 BC327 but I think that the actual date was after 362 BC, because 
of all these repeated references to the power vacuum which had arisen after the 
Battle at Mantinea in both Cavalry Commander, Ways and Means and On 
Horsemanship. 
 
If we wish to see these works as ‘mirrors of princes’ as they are sometimes 
called, then it is more than likely that it was Xenophon’s intention to write the 
passages on horsemanship and cavalry as political and military advice. His 
Cavalry Commander and On Horsemanship were clearly meant to be read in 
that way by the Athenians. Various pronouncements of his regarding the 
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preparations for war and the training of the cavalry in particular, as stated 
earlier, are to be found not only in his specific manuals but also in Ways and 
Means and in Economics and Memorabilia.  
 
It is my contention, based on salient aspects of cavalry tactics employed by 
Epaminondas at Mantinea, that the Cavalry Commander in fact is a political 
and military advice particularly where cavalry matters are concerned and that 
Xenophon penned this treatise in a manner that would enable the Athenians to 
make use of it to improve their own cavalry. In all of his books, he refers to 
Boeotia as ‘the offender’, which of course is true given that Sparta and Athens 
were allies at that time. 
 
Do you mean to say that, even if she is wronged, the state should 
remain at peace with the offender? 328 
 
To this end, he could not mention Epaminondas, though he has referred to 
significant historical figures of the time such as Agesilaus, Cyrus and Socrates. 
His own voice was quite clear in Ways and Means, where he provided his own 
view of Athens and was forthright in his recommendations. Accordingly, also 
the references made to Epaminondas and his tactics in the battles at Tegyra, 
Leuctra and Mantinea seem to have been incorporated in the Cavalry 
Commander. In order to be able to fight the Boeotian cavalry in the future, he 
wanted the Athenians to improve their horsemanship and to embrace the 
Boeotian way of deploying cavalry and infantry. To achieve this goal, he wrote 
his On Horsemanship and On The Cavalry Commander. 
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3.7. Conclusions on Greek cavalry warfare 
 
We have seen that the Greek cavalry was used as a border patrol in the first 
instance and for purposes of conveying messages, keeping an eye on the enemy, 
foraging and pursuit. The Greek poleis had created naucraries, which called for 
a small number of riders and a relatively low or limited level of horsemanship.  
 
The exception to this is Thessaly. Where necessary, a city such as Athens could 
form an alliance with Thessaly and in so doing, secure access to a large number 
of trained riders capable of fighting other cavalry or of mounting a surprise 
attack against the infantry. This cavalry however did not want to engage in 
battle against hoplites in battle formation. 
 
Athens and Sparta were well aware of their low level of horsemanship on the 
battlefield and in the Persian War, sought to draw on Sicily, which had an 
impressive cavalry. However this did not happen due to problems with 
Carthage and difficult internal Greek relations.  
 
The Athenian cavalry was still naucrarian at the time of the Persian War, and 
therefore had no tasks on the battlefield as they lacked the necessary 
horsemanship. The Thessalian and Boeotian cavalry opted to side with the 
Persians. Not a strange choice, given that the style of  horsemanship used by the 
Thessalians was similar to that of the Persians.  
 
The  Persian cavalry was a long-distance cavalry, accustomed to fighting with 
bow and arrow and unaccustomed to close combat. They were no match 
therefore against the Athenian and Spartan hoplites. The Thessalian and 
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Boeotian cavalry did manage to have some success against the Athenians and 
Spartans, but these were small victories. In long-range combat, it did not prove 
as necessary to refine tactics or for horses to receive optimum training, 
particularly when arrows were being fired from the horses at some distance.  
 
After the Persian Wars, Athens saw an increase in its number of riders. 
According to Aristoteles, the number was increased to 1,200 in the first 17 
years after Salamis. During the period 479 – 431 BC, the number of riders 
remained at about 1,000. But it would appear that the Athenians and other 
Greeks still thoroughly underestimated the use of cavalry as a fighting force. 
There is some reference to skirmishes between riders in the first 15 years of the 
Peloponnesian War. These would appear to take the form of naucrarian assaults, 
with the coast being skimmed by ships and the occasional fight where riders 
and infantry were deployed in alternate fashion. It was the Boeotian cavalry 
which dominated the battlefield. 
 
The old way of fighting would appear to have remained the norm. Riders were 
still being deployed as naucrary cavalry and shipped in as a small company in 
support of hoplites when the need arose. In fact, Athens made the classical error 
of deciding to increase the size of the cavalry without making provision for the 
requisite level of horsemanship. 
 
During the Peloponnesian War, horse transport ships were used for the first 
time, though not for conveying large numbers of riders and horses, not even 
when they sailed to Sicily to wage war. At first, they were merely used for 
transporting riders, and not horses. This proved to be an enormous 
underestimation of the level of horsemanship that was required. The Athenians 
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consequently were no match for the Sicilian riders, except for on one occasion 
when they worked in unison with the infantry.  
In Sicily, however, there was more to contend with than the mere 
underestimation on the part of the Athenians. Unlike the Persian and Thessalian 
cavalry, the Sicilians carried out attacks on closed hoplite lines, based on 
experience from Iberia, the Celtiberians and the North African Carthaginians. 
The Sicilians had their own unique methods of attacking hoplites, riding to and 
fro into them and simultaneously throwing spears, a manner of combat used 
also by the Numidian cavalry and described by Strabo as Iberian. This indeed 
was a departure from the traditional style of horsemanship and in 413 BC, the 
Athenians were forced to return home, having achieved nothing. 
 
After the Peloponnesian Wars, we begin to see more and more use of riders in 
combat. Cavalry was now being fielded more frequently as units fighting other 
cavalry and no longer served merely as message bearers and foragers. The 
Greek cavalry therefore was obliged to continue developing its horsemanship, 
since the mode of combat had changed from border patrols to expansion-wars. 
We see an increase in the number of cavalry battles, with war now being waged 
more frequently on the mainland rather than on sea.  
 
The Spartan Agesilaus, according to Xenophon, was the first Greek who 
recruited his cavalry from people who were horse-minded and who preferred to 
fight on horses. He had come to this conclusion during his campaign in Asia 
Minor when during a confrontation with the Persian cavalry he discovered that 
his own cavalry was not good enough and that the weaponry used left much to 
be desired. According to Xenophon, Agesilaus now used his cavalry on the 
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battlefield as part of the tactics and intermingled his cavalry with the heavy 
infantry so as to increase the surprise effect.  
 
The Theban general, Epaminondas, made use of hamippoi in the Battle at 
Tegyra in 375, Leuctra in 371 and at Mantinea in 362 BC, deploying them in a 
dense formation of a deepened phalanx in the middle of the battleground. He 
placed other cavalry along the flanks with the intention of cutting through the 
Spartan and Athenian army and then deployed the cavalry in an outflanking 
movement to close them in. The hamippoi, hoplites fighting with cavalry in a 
dense formation, represented an added value in tactical terms when used 
skilfully on the battlefield as cavalry did not want to fight hoplites in battle 
formation. Epaminondas may justifiably be regarded as the first general who 
made successful use of cavalry formations on the battlefield. He was capable of 
exploiting cavalry tactics in a manner that left the hoplites of Sparta and Athens 
at a total disadvantage.  
 
Xenophon therefore wrote his treatise On Horsemanship to inform his fellow 
Athenians about his own experiences with horsemanship and wanted to confer 
the practices that he thought of as most useful to the Athenian cavalry. In this 
book he did not only use Boiotian, but also Persian and maybe even Celtiberian 
practices. 
 
In his works, Xenophon dealt with many of the leading contemporary strategists 
(he devoted a book to each Agesilaus, Hieron and Cyrus), and he discussed the 
tactics of Epaminondas of Thebes, whom he held in awe, as I have explained 
above. The tactics employed by Epaminondas and the use of his cavalry 
inspired Xenophon to write his Cavalry Commander, though he did not want to 
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refer to Epaminondas by name. The book was intended after all to inspire 
Athenians to action and to adopt Boeotian tactics, which they were not eager to 
do. 
 
Xenophon saw the opportunity for urging the Athenians to seize power once 
more in the power vacuum that arose after the Battle at Mantinea in 362 BC. He 
tried in many ways to show them that this was within their grasp. In Ways and 
Means, he set out a plan on how this might be achieved. One aspect of this 
concerned the revitalisation of the cavalry of Athens, once a mighty force in the 
5th century. But they did not only need to revive the cavalry, they needed to 
adapt to changed battlefield conditions as well.  
The cavalry had not fared well after the Oligarchy of the Thirty. The Athenian 
cavalry was not being well trained at this stage and was no longer proving to be 
much of a force on the battlefield. In his Cavalry Commander and On 
Horsemanship, Xenophon set out to deal with these issues. He wanted to see the 
Athenians achieving hegemony once more.  
 
It was not to be. Philippus of Macedonia learned some of his tactics from 
Epaminondas and was fortunate to make use of these several years later, when 
he used his Macedonian phalanx and cavalry to fill the power vacuum that had 
arisen in Greece.  
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Chapter 4.  Xenophon on Athenian Cavalry  
4.1. Introduction 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Sparta and Athens were having 
difficulty keeping up with the developments in the area of warfare. Initially, 
after the Peloponnesian War, Sparta had the hegemony due to Agesilaus and his 
tactical use of the cavalry, as Xenophon saw it. But this hegemony soon began 
to wane, as did Spartan horsemanship. The Athenian cavalry was not as good 
on the battlefield as it may had been before either. As a result of this, Athens 
and Sparta were defeated by Thebes at Leuctra in 371 BC and Mantinea in 362 
BC.  
 
Xenophon advised Athens to put more emphasis on the use of cavalry:   
 
 ‘It is clear, however, that no troops will be able to inflict loss on a much 
stronger army with impunity, unless they are so superior in the practical 
application of horsemanship to war that they show like experts 
contending with amateurs.’329 
Xenophon recognised that despite its best intentions, Athens could not for some 
reason get to grips with this combat unit: 
‘If one took the same pains with our cavalry, they too would greatly excel 
others in arms and horses and discipline and readiness to face the enemy, if 
they thought that they would win glory and honour by it?’ 330 
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He wrote two manuals on this subject, his first being On Horsemanship and the 
second On the Cavalry Commander. These books cannot be separated. As he 
himself explains at the end of On Horsemanship: 
‘These notes, instructions and exercises which we have here set down are 
intended only for the private person. What it belongs to a cavalry leader to 
know and to do has been set forth in another book.’331 
4.2. Xenophon on the current Athenian situation 
 
Various recommendations from Xenophon come across as ad hoc measures and 
arguments for the Athenians to improve their current situation. Xenophon for 
example proposes a short-term plan for strengthening the Athenian cavalry by 
having the metoikoi admitted to cavalry service, preferably metoikoi who had a 
bitter hatred towards the enemy, Thebes.   
Xenophon believed that the funding for the horses of these metoikoi could be 
secured from the money citizens would be willing to pay if they didn’t have to 
serve in the cavalry themselves. In his view, even citizens in active service 
would be happy to pay.332 This meant that the Hippeis would pay for the horses 
of these cavalrymen, but would not be part of the cavalry themselves. 
Xenophon put the desired number of resident aliens in the Athenian cavalry at 
200 out of 1,000.333 He wrote: 
 
‘If, moreover, we granted the resident aliens the right to serve in the 
cavalry and various other privileges which it is proper to grant them, I think 
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that we should find their loyalty increase and at the same time should add 
to the strength and greatness of the state.’334  
Xenophon also advised on a change of horsemanship which consequently would 
require rigorous training for the cavalry. There were a number of problems, 
however. Xenophon was writing at a time when the Athenian cavalry lacked the 
status it had in the 5th century, when it was a focal point on the agenda of 
Athenian leaders and a showpiece, as evidenced by the Parthenon frieze and by 
his own writing: 
‘instruction and practice in horsemanship have died out because there are 
no occasions on which they may give an exhibition and win distinction for 
skill’.335 
In Athens, the cavalry was regarded as a safer unit than the infantry, a 
worthwhile option for people who were not keen on warfare.336 Lysias even 
alludes to cowardice where people show a preference for serving in the cavalry 
rather than in the infantry.337 Cavalrymen were sometimes berated by their own 
infantry because they had hardly fought in a battle or had come out of it 
unscathed. Remaining on one’s horse or riding off when the infantry was in 
trouble was regarded as cowardice. A comic resonance of this is to be found in 
the play Hippeis by Aristophanes, where a slave called Nicias offers a solution to 
a difficult situation by stating ‘let us bolt at top speed’.338 
The following passage about the Spartan cavalry seems to indicate that it was 
not in optimal shape, as was the Athenian one: 
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‘Now the cavalry of the Thebans was in good training as a result of the 
war with the Orchomenians and the war with the Thespians, while the 
cavalry of the Lacedaemonians was exceedingly poor at that time. For the 
richest men kept the horses, and it was only when the ban was called out 
that the appointed trooper presented himself; then he would get his horse 
and such arms as were given him, and take the field on the moment's 
notice. As for the men, on the other hand, it was those who were least 
strong of body and least ambitious who were mounted on the horses.’339  
 
It was necessary to inspire the Athenians in ways that were of a financial rather 
than a military nature, and based on a competitive spirit, as Xenophon realised. 
Since the Athenians were not inclined by nature to put military matters above 
their business interests, the Athenian cavalry was not trained on a regular basis. 
Not all cavalrymen trained or fed their horses well, and they only exercised and 
practised when they were compelled to do so.340 Xenophon remarked: 
 
 ‘it is perhaps too much trouble to have them out frequently when there is 
no war going on (...) it is useful to remind them that the state supports an 
expenditure of nearly forty talents a year in order that she may not have to 
look about for cavalry in the event of war, but may have it ready for 
immediate use. For with this thought in their minds the men are likely to 
take more pains with their horsemanship, so that when war breaks out they 
may not have to fight untrained for the state, for glory and for life.’341  
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Athens paid an annual sum to maintain the cavalry and in order to have the 
cavalry ready on demand.342 However, cavalrymen were not motivated to train 
themselves regularly, as we have seen. Xenophon put this in more explicit 
terms: 
 
‘It is clear, however, that no troops will be able to inflict loss on a 
much stronger army with impunity, unless they are so superior in the 
practical application of horsemanship to war that they show like 
experts contending with amateurs.  This superiority can be attained 
first and foremost if your marauding bands are so thoroughly drilled 
in riding that they can stand the hard work of a campaign. For both 
horses and men that are carelessly trained in this respect will 
naturally be like women struggling with men.’343  
 
Xenophon remarked that the city of Athens had failed to acknowledge the 
importance of military training:        
 
        ‘military training is not publicly recognised by the state’.344 
 
A regiment entering into combat against cavalry and hoplites would require 
rigorous training, as shown earlier. The horses had to be trained to react to the 
lightest aids and be capable of fighting together as a united force. The riders 
had to keep up their training and be prepared to fight while mounted. If the 
training was insufficient, it would render the cavalry relatively ineffective. As 
Xenophon observed about untrained charioteers: 
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‘Such untrained men do indeed charge, but before they penetrate the 
enemy’s lines some of them are unintentionally thrown out, some of them 
jump out on purpose and so the teams without drivers often create more 
havoc on their own side than on the enemy’s’345  
 
When we read cavalry instead of chariotry here, this remark could also apply 
equally to the Athenian or other Greek cavalry.  
Xenophon wanted to engage the Athenian spirit by promoting the use of 
competitions. Athenian citizens were very keen on competitions and liked to 
excel. Both of the following passages are remarkably similar in this respect: 
 
‘but at all events as to practice in the various warlike exercises, it seems to 
me, father, that by announcing contests in each one and offering prizes you 
would secure practice in them, so that you would have everything prepared 
for use, whenever you might need it. ‘quite right, my son,’ said he, ‘for if 
you do that you may be sure that you will see your companies performing 
their proper parts like trained sets of dancers’  
 
and this when spring was just coming on, he gathered his whole army at 
Ephesos, and desiring to train the army, he offered prizes both to the 
heavy-armed divisions, for the division which should be in the best 
physical condition, and to the cavalry divisions, for which should show the 
best horsemanship (…)  There upon one might have seen all the gymnasia 
full of men exercising, the hippodrome full of riders.’ 346 
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Xenophon made reference to several occasions, mainly religious festivals, 
during which the cavalry would parade in battle formation for the people’s 
benefit: ‘the processions during the festivals (...) [and] the reviews in the 
Academy, in the Lyceum, at Phalerum, and in the Hippodrome.’347  
 
He described the cavalry manoeuvres as follows: 
 
As for the processions, I think they would be most acceptable both to the 
gods and to the spectators if they included a gala ride in the market 
place. The starting point would be the Herms; and the cavalry would ride 
round saluting the gods at their shrines and statues. So at the Great 
Dionysia the dance of the choruses forms part of the homage offered to 
the Twelve and to other gods. 
When the circuit is completed and the cavalcade is again near the Herms, 
the next thing to do, I think, is to gallop at top speed by regiments as far 
as the Eleusinium. will add a word on the position in which the lances 
should be held to prevent crossing. Every man should point his lance 
between his horse's ears, if the weapons are to look fearsome, stand out 
distinctly, and at the same time to convey the impression of numbers. 
The gallop finished and the goal reached, the right plan is to ride back to 
the temples by the same route, but at a slow pace: thus every effect that 
can be obtained from a horse with a man on his back will be included in 
the display, to the satisfaction of gods and men alike. (…) 
During the parade at the Lyceum, before the javelin-throwing, the right 
way is to ride in two divisions in line of battle, each division consisting 
of five regiments with its commander at the head and the colonels; and 
the line should be so extended that the whole breadth of the course will 
be covered. As soon as they reach the highest point looking down on the 
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Theatre opposite, I think it would clearly be useful if you displayed your 
men's ability to gallop downhill in fairly large companies. (…) 
The formation that would add most to the beauty of the exercises at the 
inspections has already been explained. Provided his horse is strong 
enough, the leader should ride round with the file that is on the outside 
every time. He will be galloping all the time himself, and the file whose 
turn it is to be on the outside with him will also be galloping. Thus the 
eyes of the Council will always be on the galloping file, and the horses 
will get a breathing space, resting by turns. 
When the Hippodrome is the scene of the display, the right plan would 
be that the men should first be drawn up on a front broad enough to fill 
the Hippodrome with horses and drive out the people standing there. 
 
In the sham fight when the regiments pursue and fly from one another at 
the gallop in two squadrons of five regiments, each side led by its 
commander, the regiments should ride through one another. How 
formidable they will look when they charge front to front; how imposing 
when, after sweeping across the Hippodrome, they stand facing one 
another again; how splendid, when the trumpet sounds and they charge 
once more at a quicker pace! After the halt, the trumpet should sound 
once more, and they should charge yet a third time at top speed; and 
when they have crossed, they should all range themselves in battle line 
preparatory to being dismissed, and ride up to the Council, just as you 
are accustomed to do.’348 
 
This corresponds with Xenophon’s view that cavalrymen should parade 
themselves and their horses in public, thus demonstrating that their horses were 
well-trained and capable of participating in combat on the battlefield. As we 
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have seen, parades represent more than just showing off. Contests and races 
would also prove effective in canalising competition and in forcing the 
participants to train their horses well. It would help to establish a given level of 
horsemanship without having to go to war to train the men. To quote 
Xenophon: 
 
“[26] And if you could offer prizes to the regiments for skill in all the 
feats that the public expects the cavalry to perform at the spectacles, I 
think this would appeal strongly to the spirit of emulation in every 
Athenian. For evidence of this I may refer to the choruses, in which many 
labours and heavy expenses are the price paid for trifling rewards. Only 
you must find judges whose suffrage will shed lustre on a victory.”349  
 
It would provide a means for maintaining and probably even improving the 
overall performance of the cavalry. Shows and competitions may also have 
been useful for practising battle and parade manoeuvres and exercises during 
times of peace. Referring to the Spartan infantry, Lazenby remarks that parade 
ground manoeuvres and shows improved morale and battle potential.350 
Xenophon advised the use of performances to motivate officers: at these shows 
they should at least be able to throw the javelin, and avoid falling off; to 
achieve this , they would need plenty of exercise. He is probably correct in 
observing that ‘this (these shows) would appeal strongly to the spirit of 
emulation in every Athenian.’ 351 
 
As Xenophon observed:  
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‘they will welcome the opportunity of showing off their skill: but you must 
see that they are not short of practice, or the enemy will compel them to do it 
against their will.’352 
 
4.3. Leadership 
 
Another problem that Xenophon recognised had to do with the Athenian 
democracy. Xenophon attributed the degeneration of the cavalry to 
inexperienced cavalry commanders who lacked horsemanship and good 
leadership qualities.353 Presumably a large number of Hippeis in the cavalry 
traditionally had an equestrian background and were experienced horsemen. 
Nonetheless, from the 5th century onwards, a hipparch was usually not chosen 
from their number but tended to be a political appointee. 
 
Writing on the Greek cavalry, Polybius stated that some hipparchs treated the 
office as a stepping stone to that of strategos and as a result would not step up 
to their task as a leader. They would canvass the soldiers to secure their future 
support. These men, he argued, do mischief to the cavalry: 
 
For, as for most of the others who are appointed to this office, some of 
them owing to their own incapacity in horse exercise do not even dare to 
give any proper orders to the men they have under them, while others who 
treat this office as a step to that of strategus, canvass the soldiers and 
secure their future support, never rebuking a man who deserves it, which is 
the way to safeguard public interests, but screening all faults and by 
conferring a small favour doing infinite harm to those who trust them. And 
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if at any time some commanders are personally efficient and are also 
anxious to keep their hands off public money, they manage by their 
unhappy ambition to do more harm to the infantry than the negligent ones, 
and they do still more mischief to the cavalry.’354  
 
Cleon is a good example of this. He was said to ‘have treated the horsemen 
badly’ and he was called by Aristophanes a ‘taraxippostraton’ in his Knights.355 
Cleon was caught accepting a bribe and apparently the ‘thousand good and 
noble young horsemen of Athens hated and attacked one outside their 
number’.356 
 
Many Hippeis were promoted to other military positions after only a short 
period in the cavalry. For example, Philoktemon became a trierarch after just a 
few years of cavalry service. Shaefer believes that cavalrymen regularly quit the 
cavalry force because they became too old for service.357 I would like to argue 
that one of the main reasons why these cavalrymen quitted was because they 
had found someone else to take their place. As we have seen before, many 
cavalrymen were quite happy to leave the cavalry. Another reason why these 
cavalrymen were relatively young when leaving had to do with the fact that 
they were in the cavalry to make a political or military career for themselves.  
In this context, Aristotle observes: 
 
‘After this revolution the administration of the state became more and more 
lax, in consequence of the eager rivalry of candidates for popular favour. 
During this period the moderate party, as it happened, had no real chief, 
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their leader being Cimon son of Miltiades, who was a comparatively young 
man, and had been late in entering public life; and at the same time the 
general populace suffered great losses by war. The soldiers for active 
service were selected at that time from the roll of citizens, and as the 
generals were men of no military experience, who owed their position 
solely to their family standing, it continually happened that some two or 
three thousand of the troops perished on an expedition; and in this way the 
best men alike of the lower and the upper classes were exhausted.358 
 
In Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Nicomachides regards it as ‘typical of the 
Athenians’ to choose generals that are inexperienced and not interested in 
warfare, but only in career- and ‘money-making’: 
 
“Isn't it like the Athenians?” replied he [Nikomachides]; “they haven't 
chosen me after all the hard work I have done, since I was called up, in the 
command of company or regiment, though I have been so often wounded 
in action” (and here he uncovered and showed his scars); “yet they have 
chosen Antisthenes, who has never served in a marching regiment nor 
distinguished himself in the cavalry and understands nothing but money-
making.”359 
 
It is evident from Cavalry Commander that the Hipparch was dependent on the 
Council for advising the cavalry. The Hipparch could even be restricted in his 
tasks if he did not have the right spokesmen in the Boule. The Council could 
even work against the Hipparch.360 The efficiency of the Athenian cavalry thus 
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depended for a large part on the cavalry commander and his social network. Or, 
as Xenophon writes:  
 
I am aware that the cavalry has exhibited other novel feats of skill in days 
when the cavalry commanders had sufficient influence to get their wishes 
carried out.’361  
 
And there was another problem: because of their democratic system the 
Athenians were not inclined to accept each other’s leadership, and the Boule 
could be obstructive at times, according to Xenophon. It was more a question of 
who you knew rather than ‘knowing your trade’. The many changes in the 
leadership of the state made it impossible to establish a ‘standing army’, which 
meant that people could not be trained in basic skills and were lacking a ‘hippic 
type of mentality’.  
 
Xenophon clearly wrote his books on cavalry and horse training for the 
Athenian public, who in his view still needed to be convinced of the benefits of 
training the cavalry. He wrote about the importance of discipline and the 
obeying of orders as a prerequisite for a properly  functioning cavalry.362 
This ran contrary to the Athenian character; as we have seen, the Athenians did 
not easily accept peer leadership and had become accustomed to treating every 
authority with suspicion. Xenophon was aware of this too and for this reason he 
made further reference to  ‘the spirit of emulation’ present in every Athenian, 
when he referred to the juries in the song contests.363 
 
                                                
361 CC 3.5. 
362 CC 1.24. 
363 CC 1.26.  
  155 
The lack of leadership in the Athenian cavalry may have been due to an 
Athenian trait, which in Polybius’ view made it almost impossible to govern 
Athens.  Polybius observes: 
 
For the Athenian populace always more or less resembles a ship without a 
commander. In such a ship when fear of the billows or the danger of a 
storm induces the mariners to be sensible and attend to the orders of the 
skipper, they do their duty admirably. But when they grow over-confident 
and begin to entertain contempt for their superiors and to quarrel with each 
other, as they are no longer all of the same way of thinking, then with 
some of them determined to continue the voyage, and others putting 
pressure on the skipper to anchor, with some letting out the sheets and 
others preventing them and ordering the sails to be taken it, not only does 
the spectacle strike anyone who watches it as disgraceful owing to their 
disagreement and contention, but the position of affairs is a source of 
actual danger to the rest of those on board; so that often after escaping 
from the perils of the widest seas and fiercest storms they are shipwrecked 
in harbour and when close to the shore.364 
 
If such politicians were inexperienced in the art of warfare and specifically in 
the art of cavalry warfare, they would have had difficulty in exerting their 
authority.  
 
Xenophon attached great importance to this, and in his Memorabilia he explains 
how, in the words of Socrates, an average candidate seeking a hipparch position 
should proceed in order to be appointed. This might be tantamount to saying 
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that a person put in charge by the Athenians did not necessarily know what he 
was doing: 
“Come then, tell us first how you propose to improve the horses.” 
“Oh, but I don't think that is my business. Every man must look after his 
own horse.”  
“Then if some of your men appear on parade with their horses ailing or 
suffering from bad feet or sore legs, others with underfed animals that can't 
go the pace, others with restive brutes that won't keep in line, others with 
such bad kickers that it is impossible to line them up at all, what will you 
be able to make of your cavalry? How will you be able to do the state any 
good with a command like that?” 
“I am much obliged to you,” he replied, “and I will try to look after the 
horses carefully.”  
“Won't you also try to improve the men?” said Socrates. 
“I will.” 
“Then will you first train them to mount better?” 
“Oh yes, I must, so that if anyone is thrown he may have a better chance of 
saving himself.”  
“Further, when there is some danger before you, will you order them to 
draw the enemy into the sandy ground where your manoeuvres are held, or 
will you try to carry out your training in the kind of country that the enemy 
occupy?” 
  157 
“Oh yes, that is the better way.”  
“And again, will you pay much attention to bringing down as many of the 
enemy as possible without dismounting?” 
“Oh yes, that too is the better way.” 
“Have you thought of fostering a keen spirit among the men and hatred of 
the enemy, so as to make them more gallant in action?” 
“Well, at any rate, I will try to do so now.”  
“And have you considered how to make the men obey you? Because 
without that horses and men, however good and gallant, are of no use.” 
“True, but what is the best way of encouraging them to obey, Socrates?”   
“Well, I suppose you know that under all conditions human beings are 
most willing to obey those whom they believe to be the best. Thus in 
sickness they most readily obey the doctor, on board ship the pilot, on a 
farm the farmer, whom they think to be most skilled in his business.” 
“Yes, certainly.” 
“Then it is likely that in horsemanship too, one who clearly knows best 
what ought to be done will most easily gain the obedience of the others.”  
“If then, Socrates, I am plainly the best horseman among them, will that 
suffice to gain their obedience?” 
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“Yes, if you also show them that it will be safer and more honourable for 
them to obey you.”365 
It is noteworthy, how much emphasis Xenophon puts on ‘bringing down the 
enemy while being mounted’. The Athenian cavalry needed to learn how to 
fight hoplites while being mounted. In the passage above, Xenophon expresses 
views on leadership in the cavalry, which he has expressed also in the Cavalry 
Commander: 
 
“but only a good cavalry commander can find men who will show 
intelligence, reliability and courage in wheeling to charge the enemy. [22] 
For the commander must be capable both by his words and action of 
making the men under him realize that it is good to obey, to back up their 
leader, and to charge home; of firing them with a desire to win 
commendation; and of enabling them to carry out their intentions with 
persistence.”366 
 
A capable commander stands a good chance of succeeding, as Plutarch knew or 
found in his sources:  
 
‘Philopoemen, however, did not yield or give way to them. He went round 
to the different cities and roused the spirit of ambition in each young man 
individually, punished those who needed compulsion, introduced drills, 
parades, and competitive contests in places where there would be large 
bodies of spectators and thus in a short time inspired them all with an 
astonishing vigour and zeal, and, what is of the greatest importance in 
tactics, rendered them agile and swift in wheeling and deploying by 
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squadrons, and in wheeling and turning by single trooper, making the 
dexterity shown by the whole mass in its evolutions to be like that of a 
single person moved by an impulse from within. 367 
 
Xenophon writes that a cavalry commander should encourage his officers and 
should at all times have the confidence of his men by showing them that he is a 
capable leader. He should have his riders exercise on all kinds of terrain in 
order to practice a firm seat and he should organise sham fights on a regular 
basis.368 Acquiring a high level of horsemanship is therefore even more 
important for a commander than for a regular horseman.  
 
4.4. Aristocracy and the cavalry 
 
It took a lot of time and money to train and to maintain a horse, particularly if 
this was not done well between times of war. For this reason, tournaments and 
parades were traditionally important for the cavalry, as it helped to maintain and 
perhaps improve its level of expertise. Keeping a horse may have been cheaper 
if people could do it themselves but it was a time-consuming exercise and in 
this period, the average working man needed his time to earn money. Therefore 
if he had no estate on which to keep his horse, the horse had to be stabled 
elsewhere at considerable expense and had to be fed on grain which was more 
expensive than grass. 
 
The aristocracy therefore became the designated class for maintaining horses 
because they had the land. When that changed, however, the less fortunate 
members of  the economic class of the hippeis, i.e. those with no land, more 
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than likely had to have their horses stabled at some expense with people who 
had land. I suspect that most of them would have regarded this as a waste of 
money, particularly when the horse had to be trained by others. After all one 
cannot leave a horse idle for months on end and then suddenly recommence 
training: 
War was raging, so the cavalryman was able to feed his horse with 
barley and give him good hay to eat, treating the horse as his noble 
companion in battle. Then the war came to an end and a time of 
peace ensued. The soldier was no longer given wages by the state so 
his horse now had to work all the time carrying heavy logs down out 
of the woods into the city. In addition, his owner hired the horse out 
to other people to carry their loads as well. All the while, the horse 
had as his food only the worst sort of chaff, and the harness he wore 
on his back was no longer that of a warhorse. Some time later, the 
clash of battle resounded once again around the city walls, and the 
trumpet summoned every man to dust off his shield, sharpen his 
sword, and ready his horse. The horse's owner put the bridle back on 
his steed, but when he led the horse out to be mounted, the horse 
collapsed and fell to his knees, having lost all his former strength. 
'Go join the infantry!' the horse told his owner. 'You have transferred 
me from the horse regiment to the donkeys; do you really think you 
can just change me back again?'369 
So there has always been a link between the aristocracy (rural aristocracy) and 
horsemanship. There is a connection between aristocratic ideals and 
horsemanship. Traditionally, states other than Athens excelled in cavalry: 
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‘[Alexander] is also said to have recalled that Xenophon and his Ten 
Thousand, though they were not to be compared to themselves in 
number and other qualities, with no cavalry, Thessalian, Boeotian, 
Peloponnesian, Macedonian or Thracian, nor such other horse as 
they now had in their own ranks (...)’.370  
 
In classical Athens, things were a bit different. The Athenian class of Hippeis 
consisted of men whose estates could produce 300 medimnoi of grain or who 
could keep horses. At the end of the 5th century, it was not even necessary for a 
hippeus to own land.371 From Lysias we know that many hoplites and 
cavalrymen did not in fact own land.372  
 
This originally aristocratic class of Hippeis or horsemen had become an 
economically defined class. The rural aristocracy and horses were no longer 
interlinked.373 In the 4th century, according to Aristotle, it was more probable 
that the main difference between the pentakosiomedimnoi and the Hippeis was 
that they could produce a certain amount of grain instead of keeping a horse.374 
To an Athenian, the horse was a means of transport and status and it did not 
generate an economical return for its owner. But breeding and keeping horses 
could generate profit, if done with expertise: famous horse breeders could sell 
off their horses for a lot of money and people would import horses if they were 
                                                
370 Arrianus, Anabasis Alexandros 2.7.8. 
371 Spence (1993) 181. 
372 Lysias 34.4. 
373 Bugh (1988) 151-2: loss of those Athenian families bred in the tradition of horsemanship and 
cavalry service. 
374 Ath. Const. 7.4. 
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better than home-bred stock.375 A breeder with little expertise would of course 
suffer losses.376  
 
After the Oligarchy of the Thirty, the Athenian cavalry became associated with 
Spartan interests and preferences and for this reason was not regarded as a 
prized unit in which to serve. Originally, rider were selected by income 
categories. At the beginning of the 4th century, after the Oligarchy of the Thirty, 
a review took place to determine which Hippeus could serve in the Hippeis. 
They were scrutinized, not for their class, but for what merits they had done for 
the city of Athens. 377  
 
So in the end, the Athenian cavalry force no longer consisted exclusively of true 
Hippeis, rather it became an amalgam of the old elite Hippeis and people who 
shunned infantry duty and who probably were not very motivated to train their 
horses well. In all probability, some of the cavalrymen were paid to serve by 
Hippeis who did not want to serve themselves and these men may well have 
been very patriotic and highly motivated.378 Perhaps these were ‘true’ horsemen 
who were not Hippeis by income. It is quite likely that with the enlargement of 
the cavalry by Pericles in the 5th century, men were permitted to the Hippeis 
class who did not belong to the old nobility but who were interested in serving 
in the cavalry. In his Hipparchikos, Xenophon writes (as does Aristotle) that the 
Hippeis had to be assessed on a regular basis to see if they qualified for the 
                                                
375 Schaefer (2001) 18. 
376 Ec 3.7.  
377 Lysias 14 and 15. See also Lysias 26.8 (‘on the scrutiny of Evandros’) also Const. Ath. 49. 
Alcibiades did not pass the scrutiny on account of his oligarchic sympathies, even though he 
was an excellent horseman. 
378 Lysias 15.14. 
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annual income due to Hippeis.379 This development in Athenian society may 
well have been aided by the katastasis and sitos grants, i.e. allowances paid to 
cavalrymen to buy a horse and fodder.380 Apparently, these new Hippeis could 
not always afford their horses. 
 
It was not always clear who were and who were not serving in the cavalry381 
and some could even enter cavalry service without passing the usual scrutiny. 
Not every hippeus was serving in his city’s cavalry unit.382 In Lysias 15.14, the 
defendant pays 30 drachmae a person to two patriotic fellow countrymen, 
offering them the opportunity to serve in the cavalry instead of himself. In the 
3rd century BC, another example shows that Greek cavalry did not always 
consist of the socio-economic class of Hippeis. On the Achaean cavalry, 
Plutarch writes as follows: 
 
‘that they [the Achaeans] shirked most campaigns themselves, and sent 
others out in their places; (...) and that their commanders always 
overlooked these things because the knights had the greatest power and 
influence among the Achaeans and the chief voice in the assignment of 
rewards and punishments’.383 
 
The Athenian cavalry in the meantime consisted no longer of the elite citizens 
but rather of  foreigners, if we are to believe Xenophon: 
 
                                                
379 A similar situation had developed in Sparta. The number of Spartiatae had diminished and 
other classes like perioikoi, mothakes and even helotes could serve in their army, according to 
Lazenby (1985) 17 – 24. 
380 Bugh (1988) 75. 
381 Lysias 15.6. 
382 Bugh (1988) 24 – 27 and Spence (1993) 182. 
383 Plutarchus, Philopoimen 7. 
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‘The state itself would gain if the citizens served in the ranks together, and 
no longer found themselves in the same company with Lydians, Phrygians, 
Syrians and barbarians of all sorts, of whom a large part of our alien 
population consists. In addition to the advantage of dispensing with the 
services of these men, it would be an ornament to the state that the 
Athenians should be thought to rely on themselves rather than on the help 
of foreigners in fighting their battles.’384  
  
This may have had consequences for the aristocracy and its preferences for the 
cavalry. Particularly when the old aristocracy were often prohibited from 
serving in the cavalry after the Oligarchy of the Thirty because of their 
suspected pro-Spartan stance. But there was a side-effect. In a society where 
perhaps the horse was no longer regarded an aristocratic status symbol, the old 
aristocratic standards of horsemanship had become diluted, with training no 
longer being regarded as that important. This would have negative 
consequences for the cavalry, because the cavalrymen no longer served under 
people who prided themselves in their horsemanship but rather under people 
who wanted to further their career.385 
 
Aristotle tells us that in the first 17 years after the Persian Wars, Athens had a 
cavalry of 1,200 men386 and that in the period after 460 BC, Athens became 
more democratic under Pericles. People were paid a salary at that time to serve 
in the cavalry and they got used to that.387 According to Aristotle, things 
                                                
384 Xenophon,  Poroi 2.3 – 4. 
385 See also Bugh (1988) 143 – 150 on the decline of the Athenian cavalry; 129: ‘the restored 
democracy immediately attacked the financlal foundations of the cavalry’. 
386 Ath. Const. 24-25. 
387 Ath. Const. 27.2. 
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worsened after Pericles and leadership came into the hands of men who were 
audacious and sought popularity.388  
 
In his Economics, Xenophon described the life of a nobleman as it should be 
according to his own values: a landowner who conducts his business well and 
owns a horse which he trains on a daily basis to serve his country during 
wartime.389 Xenophon apparently wanted the old values of the equestrian 
nobility to be revived. He speaks of profit, honour and fame which accompany 
good horsemanship. It would appear that Xenophon wanted to apply his 
aristocratic values to the Athenian cavalry. Values which, as stated earlier, were 
probably more suited to an oligarchic, monarchical or tyrannical state rather 
than to a democracy. One might conclude consequently that in Xenophon’s 
view, the cavalry would not necessarily benefit by a democratic system.390   
 
4.5. Xenophon on training the Athenian cavalry 
 
Xenophon wanted the Athenian cavalry to improve, not necessarily in numbers, 
but in skill. He recognised that mastering ‘collection’ was a prerequisite for the 
Athenian cavalry. In his work, he described a few horse training exercises and 
made reference to the following: the ring; the ‘manage’; and the ‘hippasia’. The 
last word indicates a location as well as a training programme.391 
 
 
                                                
388 Ath. Const. 28.4. 
389 Ec 11.14-18. 
390 See Bugh (1988) 119: ‘The disaster of the Sicilian Expedition and the occupation of Decelea 
by the Spartans from 413 – 404 BC only confirmed to many upperclass Athenians that 
democracy was the cause of Athens’ woes’. 
391 PH 7.19. 
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The  !"#$%&'($)'*+,'!-($(%,& 
 
Xenophon speaks of galloping along the straight as fast as possible, then at the 
end, turning the horse as sharply as possible. 
 
‘We recommend the manage rather than the complete ring, for thus the 
horse will turn more willingly when he has gone some distance in a 
straight course, and one can practise the career and the turn at the same 
time. It is necessary to collect him at the turns; for it is neither easy for 
the horse nor safe to turn short when going fast, especially if the ground 
is uneven or slippery. In collecting him the rider must slant the horse as 
little as possible with the bit, and slant his own body as little as possible; 
else he may be sure that a trifling cause will be enough to bring him and 
his horse down.  
As soon as the horse faces the straight after turning, push him along at 
once. For of course, in war too, turns are made with a view to pursuit or 
retreat. It is well, therefore, to practise increasing the pace after 
turning. So soon as the horse appears to have been exercised enough, it 
is well to let him rest a certain time, and then suddenly to put him to his 
top speed again, of course away from, not towards, other horses, and to 
pull him up again in the midst of his career as short as possible, and then 
  167 
to turn and start him again from the stand. For it is obvious that a time 
will come when it will be necessary to do one or the other.’392 
 
The Greek text reads ‘strophein’. 393 This means turning the horse with a rein or 
‘neck reining’ as it is called today. The term ‘strophein’ is usually translated as 
‘to wheel’, but I would like to suggest referring to this as ‘making a pirouette-
turn’.  
 
In Pollux’s Onomastikon we read: 
 
‘One should make turns or half-voltes, in Greek )*µ%Æ, and pirouette-
turns, called Í%!+#&!,Æ394 and +#&!,Æ. In these +#&Ò,*- one should 
not spur his horse, but rein it, which is also called ‘to collect’ (…). One 
should also not make the horse turn with one rein while sitting sideways, 
because in that case both could easily come to fall.’395 
 
In the following passage, Xenophon speaks of ‘strophein’, by which he 
undoubtedly means making a pirouette-turn, in this context: 
 
‘If at any time when an enemy's camp lies in front there is a cavalry 
skirmish, and one side presses the pursuit right up to the enemy's line of 
battle, but then retreats hastily to its own main body, it is well to know in 
that case that so long as you are by your friends, it is proper and safe to 
be among the first to wheel and make for the enemy at full speed; but 
                                                
392 PH 7.14 – 18; see also: CC 3.14: ‘To avoid being thrown the riders should throw the body 
back in charging, and collect their horses when wheeling, to keep them from falling. In the 
straight, however, they should gallop.’ 
393 PH 7.14 and 15.  
394 Also Í%!+#&Ò,*.  are the turns at high speed made at the +#Æ(*. on the racetrack.  
395 Pollux, Onomastikon 204. 
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when you come near the enemy to keep your horse well in hand. For in 
this way you have the best chance of injuring the enemy without coming 
to harm yourself.’396 
 
These procedures were important to previously mentioned cavalry tactics such 
as the square formation, chase and flight, and the use of hamippoi, which were 
all advocated for by Xenophon as we have seen in the previous chapter. A 
prerequisite for these manoeuvres is mastering collection.397 
 
 Because he saw the benefits of mastering collection, Xenophon tried to 
convince the Athenians that collection is not only important for performance 
purposes, but that it is also desirable because it looks good, which would appeal 
to the Athenians who were more inclined to the arts and making a good 
appearance than to actual warfare. 
 
Xenophon wanted the Athenians to buy a horse that has a strong body so that it 
will be capable of collection. The horse that is most suitable in this respect will 
have the characteristics referred to below: 
But in case anyone wants to own a horse suitable for parade, with a high 
and showy action, such qualities are by no means to be found in every 
horse: but it is essential that he should have plenty of spirit and a strong 
body. [2] Many suppose that an animal that has supple legs will also be 
capable of rearing his body. That, however, is not the case: rather it is the 
horse with supple, short, strong loins that will be able to extend his hind-
                                                
396 PH 8.12. 
397 Collection has been explained in Chapter 2. 
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legs well under the forelegs. By “loins” we do not mean the parts about the 
tail, but those between the flanks and haunches about the belly. 398 
To quote Xenophon on more characteristics of a horse that can be well 
collected: 
 
‘His neck should not hang downwards from the chest like a boar's, but stand 
straight up to the crest, like a cock's; but it should be flexible at the bend; and 
the head should be bony, with a small cheek. Thus the neck will protect the 
rider, and the eye see what lies before the feet. Besides, a horse of such a 
mould will have least power of running away, be he never so high-spirited, 
for horses do not arch the neck and head, but stretch them out when they try 
to run away. 
 
Xenophon was right: this type of horse is more capable and powerful in his 
galloping. This build, therefore, is typical for racehorses.399 
 
You should notice, too, whether both jaws are soft or hard, or only one; for 
horses with unequal jaws are generally unequally sensitive in the mouth. 
 
(…)The broader and shorter the loins, the more easily the horse lifts his fore 
quarters and the more easily he brings up his hind quarters.  
 
(…) The haunches must be broad and fleshy, that they may be in right 
proportion to the flanks and chest, and if they are firm all over, they will be 
lighter for running and will make the horse speedier. If the gap that separates 
the hams under the tail is broad, he will also extend his hind legs well apart 
under his belly; and by doing that he will be more fiery and stronger when he 
                                                
398 PH 8.12  
399 See Appendix J for more explanation and photos. 
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throws himself on his haunches400 and when he is ridden, and will make the 
best of himself in all ways. One can infer this from the action of a man: for 
when he wants to lift anything from the ground, a man invariably tries to lift 
it with his legs apart rather than close together. 
(…) 
He who applies these tests to a colt's shape is sure, in my opinion, to get a 
beast with good feet, strong, muscular, of the right look and the right size. If 
some change as they grow, still we may confidently rely on these tests, for it 
is far commoner for an ugly colt to make a useful horse than for a colt like 
this to turn out ugly.’401 
 
This must have made an impression on those Athenians who regarded the 
exterior image in the spirit of imitatio and aemulatio as important, though not 
so much in the military arena. Of course the most impressive collection is the 
one that is not forced: 
[3] Now, if when he is planting his hind-legs under him you pull him up 
with the bit, he bends the hind-legs on the hocks and raises the fore-part of 
his body, so that anyone facing him can see the belly and the sheath. When 
he does that you must give him the bit that he may appear to the onlookers 
to be doing willingly the finest things that a horse can do. [4] Some, 
however, teach these accomplishments by striking him under the hocks 
with a rod, others by telling a man to run alongside and hit him with a stick 
under the gaskins.  
[5] We, however, consider that the lesson is most satisfactory if, as we have 
repeatedly said, the rider invariably allows him relaxation when he has 
done something according to his wishes. [6] For what a horse does under 
                                                
400 ‘on the haunches’ is a prerequisite for elevation and thus classical collection. 
401 PH 1.3-17. 
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constraint, as Simon says, he does without understanding, and with no more 
grace than a dancer would show if he was whipped and goaded. Under such 
treatment horse and man alike will do much more that is ugly than graceful. 
No, a horse must make the most graceful and brilliant appearance in all 
respects of his own will with the help of aids. [7] Further, if you gallop him 
during a ride until he sweats freely, and as soon as he prances in fine style, 
quickly dismount and unbridle him, you may be sure that he will come 
willingly to the prance. [8]  
This is the attitude in which artists represent the horses on which gods and 
heroes ride, and men who manage such horses gracefully have a 
magnificent appearance. [9] Indeed a prancing horse is a thing so graceful, 
terrible and astonishing that it rivets the gaze of all beholders, young and 
old alike. At all events no one leaves him or is tired of gazing at him so 
long as he shows off his brilliance. [10]  
Should the owner of such a horse happen to be a colonel or a general, he 
must not make it his object to be the one brilliant figure, but must attach 
much more importance to making the whole troop behind him worth 
looking at. [11] Now if a horse is leading in the manner which wins most 
praise for such horses, prancing high and with his body closely gathered, so 
that he moves forward with very short steps, the rest of the horses must 
obviously follow also at a walking pace. Now what can there be really 
brilliant in such a sight?402  
This called for a change of bridle, since a collected horse had to be ridden with 
a different kind of bridle. Xenophon therefore advised the use of two kinds of 
bits, as follows: 
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‘To begin with, you should possess two bits at least. One of these should 
be smooth and have the discs of a good size; the other should have the 
discs heavy and low, and the teeth sharp, so that when the horse seizes it 
he may drop it because he objects to its roughness, and when he is bitted 
with the smooth one instead, may welcome its smoothness and may do 
on the smooth bit what he has been trained to do with the aid of the 
rough one. In case, however, he takes no account of it because of its 
smoothness, and keeps bearing against it, we put large discs on the 
smooth bit to stop this, so that they may force him to open his mouth and 
drop the bit. It is possible also to make the rough bit adaptable by 
wrapping it up and tightening the reins. 
But whatever be the pattern of the bits, they must all be flexible. For 
wherever a horse seizes a stiff one, he holds the whole of it against his 
jaws, just as you lift the whole of a spit wherever you take hold of it. But 
the other kind of bit acts like a chain: for only the part that you hold 
remains unbent, while the rest of it hangs loose. As the horse continually 
tries to seize the part that eludes him in his mouth, he lets the bit drop 
from his jaws. This is why little rings are hung in the middle on the 
axles, in order that the horse may feel after them with his tongue and 
teeth and not think of taking the bit up against the jaws. 
In case the meaning of the terms flexible and stiff as applied to a bit is 
not known, we will explain this too. “Flexible” means that the axles have 
broad and smooth links so that they bend easily; and if everything that 
goes round the axles has large openings, and does not fit tight, it is more 
flexible. “Stiff,” on the other hand, means that the pieces of the bit do 
not run over the axles and work in combination easily.403 
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The bit that Xenophon was describing is not the same bit we usually come 
across on vase paintings and other sources. For example, the horses on the Vix-
krater (600 BC) are equipped with bridles that have bits which are very similar 
to the Assyrian bits. The Assyrian bits have a peculiar triangular shape and the 
bridles have a high noseband. Similar bits are visible on the François-vase and 
on the Exekias-amphora (540 BC). Not only were chariot horses bridled in this 
way, but riding horses too. Comparative research by Helga Donder shows that 
early Greek bits (from 1300 – 350 BC approx.) are similar to Scythian or 
Assyrian bits.404  
 
The type of bit Xenophon describes was used next to the other type of snaffle 
from the first half of the fourth century.405 This bit dates from the 5th or 4th 
century and was found originally in Thebes and Corinth.406 It seems this bit was 
adopted from the Celts and was called ‘frenum lupatum’ by the Romans.407 
According to Donder this is not a curb bit, but a severe snaffle bit. According to 
Azzaroli, who follows Vigneron, it is a curb bit,  since he claims a rein would 
be fastened on the lower end of the cheek pieces.  
According to Azzaroli the oldest curb bits are from Thrace and other regions in 
the Danube valley. Curb bits were also found in Italy.408 Xenophon does not 
clearly tell us whether this bit was used as  a snaffle or curb bit.  
 
In his writings about horsemanship, Xenophon regarded hunting and jumping 
as very important, and he advised Greeks to hunt while mounted even though 
                                                
404 H. Donder, Zaumzeug in Griechenland und Cypern, (C.H. Beck'sche Verlags-Buchhandlung 
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405 Donder (1980) 19 – 67. See also Appendix G. 
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407 Azzaroli (1985) 120. 
408 Azzaroli (1985) 120. Dating from approx. 300 – 100 B.C. 
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the Greeks were accustomed to hunting on foot. However, Xenophon’s work 
On Hunting does not make reference to mounted hunting, which is somewhat 
peculiar. Xenophon merely writes about hunting with dogs and refers only to 
mounted hunters when he deals with the hunting of  big game such as lions, 
leopards, lynxes and so on, which may only be captured in other regions such as 
Macedonia, Mysia and Nysa beyond Syria.409  
 
According to Xenophon, Cyrus the Great used to take horsemen out hunting 
when he thought they needed such practice, for he held that this offered 
altogether the best training in military science and superb horsemanship. He 
regarded it as the best exercise for giving riders a firm seat in all conditions, 
because they had to pursue their prey wherever it ran. It was also the best 
exercise for ensuring that they remained active on horseback in view of their 
rivalry and eagerness to hunt down the game. 410 
 
Xenophon also advises the training of horses and riders in jumping and 
galloping up and down hills, which may be linked with hunting or cross country 
riding: 
 
As the horse will frequently have to gallop downhill and uphill and along a 
slope, and as he will have to leap over, and to leap out, and to jump down 
at various times, the rider must teach and practise both himself and his 
                                                
409 Xenophon, Cynegetica 11.1.  
410 Cyr 2.4.18 – 21; Cyr 8.8.12: again in times past they used to go out hunting so often that the 
hunts afforded sufficient exercise for both men and horses. CC 8.1.34 – 35.  
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horse in all these things. For thus they will be able to help each other, and 
will be thought altogether more efficient.411  
 
‘those that are taught and accustomed to jump ditches, leap walls, spring 
up banks, leap down from heights without a spill, and gallop down steep 
places, will be as superior to the men and horses that lack this training as 
birds to beasts. Moreover, those that have their feet well hardened will 
differ on rough ground from the tender-footed as widely as the sound from 
the lame’.412 
 
It all makes good sense, as Dom Duarte informs us: 
 
‘In order to be at ease when riding it is necessary to have a good knowledge 
about all the most important actions you can be required to perform mounted 
on a beast; otherwise you can neither be at ease nor appear so. (…) 
 
You should train yourself fully armed and wearing your armour (as if you 
were going to war) and you should participate in jousts and tournaments 
(…). 
 
Acting similarly you will be able to be at ease when performing several other 
activities also important when you are mounted on a beast such as galloping 
up and down hill, hunting, manoeuvring and throwing spears and playing 
with kanes and striking with a sword. All these activities should be practised 
by all those who want to be at ease when mounted as it is a known fact that a 
good and frequent practise is the best of teachers, without which nobody 
                                                
411 PH  8.1. See also: Arrianus, Ars Tactica 44.1 and Dum-Tragut (205) 118 (tekst 24.53a) 
‘Danach gehe nach einen freien Ort und lass dort eine Grube machen, voneinander [wie] 20 
Ellen entfernt. Richte es so ab, dass es kommt und über diese Grube läuft (= springt).’ 
412 CC 8.3. 
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could acquire the necessary skills; and after having achieved that objective it 
is mandatory to keep practicing, otherwise the skills will be very quickly 
forgotten.’413 
 
As to the use of weaponry, the cavalry needed to choose between flexibility and 
safety. Heavy equipment did not always provide a guarantee for victory on the 
battlefield. The Greek cavalry was equipped with a leather cuirass, a 
breastplate, a helmet, a ‘hand’ or ‘cheir’ in Greek for protecting the arm holding 
the reins (i.e. the left hand). The horse was protected by various armour which 
also served in part for protecting the rider’s legs. The horse’s belly in particular 
had to be protected. In addition, the saddle cloth was used to protect the horse’s 
back. The rider had to wear leather boots.  
 
A Greek cavalryman tended to be armed with a sword, though Xenophon 
recommended the Persian sabre. This offered a more effective thrust. He found 
that two Persian javelins of cornel wood were easier to manage than the long 
shafted spear traditionally used by the Greeks. 
 
‘We say, then, that in the first place his breastplate must be made to fit his 
body. For the well-fitting breastplate is supported by the whole body, 
whereas one that is too loose is supported by the shoulders only, and one 
that is too tight is rather an encumbrance than a defence. And, since the 
neck is one of the vital parts, we hold that a covering should be available 
for it also, standing up from the breastplate itself and shaped to the neck. 
For this will serve as an ornament, and at the same time, if properly made, 
will cover the rider's face, when he pleases, as high as the nose. For the 
helmet we consider the Boeotian pattern the most satisfactory: for this, 
                                                
413 Dom Duarte (1438, in the translation of Preto 2005) 70 – 71. 
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again, affords the best protection to all the parts that project above the 
breastplate without obstructing the sight. As for the pattern of the 
breastplate, it should be so shaped as not to prevent the wearer from sitting 
down or stooping. About the abdomen and middle and round that region 
let the flaps be of such material and such a size that they will keep out 
missiles. 
 
And as a wound in the left hand disables the rider, we also recommend the 
piece of armour invented for it called the “hand.” For it protects the 
shoulder, the arm, the elbow, and the fingers that hold the reins; it will also 
extend and fold up; and in addition it covers the gap left by the breastplate 
under the armpit. But the right hand must be raised when the man intends 
to fling his javelin or strike a blow. Consequently that portion of the 
breastplate that hinders him in doing that should be removed; and in place 
of it there should be detachable flaps at the joints, in order that, when the 
arm is elevated, they may open correspondingly, and may close when it is 
lowered. For the fore-arm it seems to us that the piece put over it 
separately like greave is better than one that is bound up together with a 
piece of armour. The part that is left exposed when the right arm is raised 
should be covered near the breastplate with calf-skin or metal; otherwise 
the most vital part will be unprotected. 
Since the rider is seriously imperilled in the event of his horse being 
wounded, the horse also should be armed, having head, chest, and thigh 
pieces: the last also serve to cover the rider's thighs. But above all the 
horse's belly must be protected; for this, which is the most vital part, is also 
the weakest. It is possible to make the cloth serve partly as a protection to 
it. The quilting of the cloth should be such as to give the rider a safer seat 
and not to gall the horse's back. 
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Thus horse and man alike will be armed in most parts. But the rider's shins 
and feet will of course be outside the thigh-pieces. These too can be 
guarded if boots made of shoe-leather are worn: there will thus be armour 
for the shins and covering for the feet at the same time. 
These are the defensive arms which with the gracious assistance of heaven 
will afford protection from harm.  
 
For harming the enemy we recommend the sabre rather than the sword, 
because, owing to his lofty position, the rider will find the cut with the 
Persian sabre more efficacious than the thrust with the sword. And, in 
place of the spear with a long shaft, seeing that it is both weak and 
awkward to manage, we recommend rather the two Persian javelins of 
cornel wood. For the skilful man may throw the one and can use the other 
in front or on either side or behind. They are also stronger than the spear 
and easier to manage. 414 
 
He recommends, therefore, the use of a Boeotian helmet, and the Persian sabre. 
He also prefers the Persian cornel-wood javelins to the typical Greek lances. 
These are first described in Hellenica, from which we may conclude that Greek 
cavalry were no longer using these javelins at that stage:  
 
‘The Hellenic horse was drawn up like an ordinary phalanx four 
deep, the barbarians presenting a narrow front of twelve or 
thereabouts, and a very disproportionate depth. There was a 
moment's pause, and then the barbarians, taking the initiative, 
charged. There was a hand-to-hand tussle, in which any Hellene 
who succeeded in striking his man shivered his lance with the 
blow, while the Persian troopers, armed with cornel-wood 
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javelins, speedily despatched a dozen men and a couple of horses. 
At this point the Hellenic cavalry turned and fled. (…) It was 
clear enough to his mind that without a proper cavalry force it 
would be impossible to conduct a campaign in the flat country.’415  
 
‘And when the two squadrons saw one another, not so much as 
four plethra apart, at first both halted, the Greek horsemen being 
drawn up four deep like a phalanx, and the barbarians with a front 
of not more than twelve, but many men deep. Then, however, the 
barbarians charged. [14] When they came to a hand-to-hand 
encounter, all of the Greeks who struck anyone broke their 
spears, while the barbarians, being armed with javelins of cornel-
wood, speedily killed twelve men and two horses. Thereupon the 
Greeks were turned to flight. But when Agesilaus came to the 
rescue with the hoplites, the barbarians withdrew again and one 
of them was killed.’416 
 
Throwing a javelin from horseback is anything but an effortless task. A rider 
will need to have excellent control not only over his own movement but also 
over that of his horse. He will need to be able to ride one-handed, so his horse 
will need to be well trained. Arrian tells us that throwing a javelin from 
horseback is fairly difficult and may only be performed by a rider who is well 
educated in horsemanship.417 Xenophon contends that not all men but as many 
as possible should learn how to throw the javelin while mounted. From this 
remark we may deduce that not all riders were proficient in this kind of 
horsemanship, Xenophon advised: 
                                                
415 Hell 3.4.10 and 11. 
416 Hell 3.4.13 – 14. 
417 Arrian, Ars Tactica 40.1.8. 
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‘As soon as they have acquired a firm seat, your next task is to take steps 
that as many as possible shall be able to throw the javelin when mounted 
and shall become efficient in all the details of horsemanship.’418  
 
Xenophon explained how a Greek cavalryman should practise javelin throwing: 
 
(...) it is a good method of training for two riders to work together thus: 
one flies on his horse over all kinds of ground and retreats, reversing his 
spear so that it points backwards, while the other pursues, having buttons 
on his javelins and holding his spear in the same position, and when he 
gets within javelin shot, tries to hit the fugitive with the blunted weapons, 
and if he gets near enough to use his spear, strikes his captive with it.  
 
We recommend throwing the javelin at the longest range possible. For this 
gives a man more time to turn his horse and to grasp the other javelin. We 
will also state in a few words the most effective way of throwing the 
javelin. If a man, in the act of advancing his left side, drawing back his 
right, and rising from his thighs, discharges the javelin with its point a little 
upwards, he will give his weapon the strongest impetus and the furthest 
carrying power; it will be most likely to hit the mark, however, if at the 
moment of discharge the point is always set on it.419 
 
In these manoeuvres, proper timing was important, combined with a good seat. 
Only riders who were seated on their horses in a well-balanced and steadfast 
manner would have been capable of throwing a javelin on horseback. They 
would have needed a lot of previous training. Any false movement or loss of 
                                                
418 CC 1.5-6. 
419 CC 12.12-13. 
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balance would have caused the javelin to miss its target. Furthermore, when 
throwing the javelin, the horse should not be inclined to hesitate or make any 
unwanted moves. The horse had to be steady and easy to steer, responding 
quickly to the aids. Xenophon was well aware of this and understood how 
essential it was. And he wanted the Athenians to appreciate this too. 
 
In Hellenica, Xenophon commented that Agesilaus would allow rich men to 
shirk cavalry duty by paying for their substitutes and by providing horses for 
the cavalry. He advised the Athenian hipparchs to do likewise. 
Accordingly he assigned the richest men of all the cities in that region to 
the duty of raising horses; and by proclaiming that whoever supplied a 
horse and arms and a competent man would not have to serve himself, he 
caused these arrangements to be carried out with all the expedition that 
was to be expected when men were eagerly looking for substitutes to die 
in their stead.  
‘I know that the fame of the Lacedaemonian horse dates from the 
introduction of foreign cavalry: and in the other states everywhere I 
notice that the foreign contingents enjoy a high reputation (…) I believe 
that money would be forthcoming from those who strongly object to 
serve in the cavalry – since even men actually enrolled are willing to pay 
in order to get out of the service ‘420  
 
Xenophon also recounted that Agesilaus organised competitions.  
Accordingly he assigned the richest men of all the cities in that region to 
the duty of raising horses; and by proclaiming that whoever supplied a 
                                                
420 CC 9.4 – 5. 
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horse and arms and a competent man would not have to serve himself, he 
caused these arrangements to be carried out with all the expedition that 
was to be expected when men were eagerly looking for substitutes to die 
in their stead.  
After this, when spring was just coming on, he gathered his whole army 
at Ephesus; and desiring to train the army, he offered prizes both to the 
heavy-armed divisions, for the division which should be in the best 
physical condition, and to the cavalry divisions, for the one which should 
show the best horsemanship; and he also offered prizes to peltasts and 
bowmen, for all who should prove themselves best in their respective 
duties. Thereupon one might have seen all the gymnasia full of men 
exercising, the hippodrome full of riders, and the javelin-men and 
bowmen practising.  
In fact, he made the entire city, where he was staying, a sight worth 
seeing; for the market was full of all sorts of horses and weapons, offered 
for sale, and the copper-workers, carpenters, smiths, leather-cutters, and 
painters were all engaged in making martial weapons, so that one might 
have thought that the city was really a workshop of war. 
And one would have been encouraged at another sight also—Agesilaus in 
the van, and after him the rest of the soldiers, returning garlanded from 
the gymnasia and dedicating their garlands to Artemis. For where men 
reverence the gods, train themselves in deeds of war, and practise 
obedience to authority, may we not reasonably suppose that such a place 
abounds in high hopes? And again, believing that to feel contempt for 
one's enemies infuses a certain courage for the fight, Agesilaus gave 
orders to his heralds that the barbarians who were captured by the Greek 
raiding parties should be exposed for sale naked. Thus the soldiers, seeing 
that these men were white-skinned because they never were without their 
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clothing, and soft and unused to toil because they always rode in 
carriages, came to the conclusion that the war would be in no way 
different from having to fight with women.421  
Xenophon advised the deployment of only the best cavalry and he wanted the 
troops to train themselves. So again he was trying to motivate his troops by 
suggesting a contest for the best cavalry battalion. Traditions in horsemanship 
and public display presuppose that Hippeis thoroughly train themselves. 422 
Abandoning such spectacles as a training and motivation technique would, in 
Xenophon’s view, have had alarming consequences:   
 
‘instruction and practice in horsemanship have died out because there are 
no occasions on which they may give an exhibition and win distinction for 
skill’.423 
 
Anyone who was skilled in each particular exercise was ready to participate in 
combat on horseback.424 To quote Xenophon again:  
 
                                                
421 Hell 3.4.15 – 19. 
422 About Agesilaus writing out contests: Hell 3.4.16-1 and Hell 4.3.9: ‘greatly pleased with his 
exploit in that he had been victorious, over the people who pride themselves particularly upon 
their horsemanship with the cavalry that he had himself gathered together.’; also in Cyr 8.1.34: 
‘Cyrus used to take out hunting those who he thought ought to have such practise, for he held 
that this was altogether the best training in military science and also the truest in horsemanship’; 
also in CC 8.1.35: ‘for it is the exercise best adapted to give riders a firm seat in all sorts of 
places, because they have to pursue the animals wherever they may run; and it is also the best 
exercise to make them active on horseback because of their rivalry and eagerness to get the 
game.’; this is to be found as well in: Cyr 8.8.12: ‘Again in times past they used to go out 
hunting so often that the hunts afforded sufficient exercisefor both men and horses.’ and Cyr 
8.8.13: ‘but instruction and practice in horsemanship have died out because there are no 
occasions on which they may give an exhibition and win distinction for skill.’ 
423 Cyr 8.8.13. 
424 Cyr 3.3.9-10. 
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‘those who are conscious that they have been well drilled are certainly 
more courageous in the face of the enemy.’425  
 
4.6. Influence of Xenophon in Athens 
 
Xenophon would appear to have had immediate success with his treatises. 
Aristotle writes that the deployment of heavy infantry between the cavalry had 
become commonplace in his time.426 Images of Hamippoi seem to be depicted 
on Athenian coins of ca. 350 BC.427  
 
Cavalry inspections 
 
Xenophon also advised the Council to: 
 
‘give notice that in future double the amount of exercise will be required, 
and that any horse unable to keep up will be rejected. This warning would 
put the screw on the men and make them feed their horses better and take 
more care of them. I think it would be well, too, if notice were given that 
vicious horses would be rejected. Under the stimulus of this threat men 
would break in such animals more thoroughly and would be more careful 
in buying horses. Again, it would be well to give notice that horses found 
kicking at exercise will be rejected.’428 
 
Xenophon also advised the holding of dokimasiai or inspections in order to 
establish whether horses were being properly fed, trained and cared for. He also 
                                                
425 Cyr 2.1.29. 
426 Ath. Const. 49. 
427 N. Sekunda, The Ancient Greeks, Osprey Publishing, New York 2005 (1986 1st print) 54. 
428 CC 1.13-15. 
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advised a major review of riding and manoeuvring practices in order to ensure 
that the horses remained obedient and fast enough for military purposes.429 The 
purpose of these inspections was to set a requisite standard of horsemanship and 
to establish whether or not a cavalryman has acquired this standard. Instead of a 
ballot to establish whether a rider was a hippeus by birth or income, these 
inspections, as Xenophon sees them, were needed to confirm their 
horsemanship. This was of course more important on the battlefield than the 
annual allowance. A man from the Thetes-class was permitted to advance to the 
Hippeis. According to Aristotle, Anthemion Diphilos’ son dedicated a statue to 
the gods at the Acropolis after changing his ‘Thetes’-status to Hippeus.430 
 
In 1971, excavation of a well close to the Herms brought to light 111 inscribed 
leaden tablets belonging to an archive that recorded the values of the 
cavalrymen’s horses. These tablets had been dumped in the well in two lots. Of 
these tablets, known as the Agora-tablets, the 4th  century tablets are dated at 
approximately 350 BC, and the 3rd century ones refer to the middle or third 
quarter of the 3rd century BC, being identical in type to the 570-odd lead cavalry 
tablets recovered in 1965 from a well in the courtyard of the Dipylon Gate. 
These are called the Kerameikos-tablets, dating from the 3rd century BC.431  
 
The tablets presumably contain  lists of horse values, estimated for purposes of 
the dokimasiai or cavalry inspections. These dokimasiai were annual 
                                                
429 CC 1.3 – 4; 3.1 and 9. 
430 Ath. Const.  7.4. 
431 J. Kroll, An Archive of the Athenian Cavalry, Hesperia 46, 2, (1977) pp 84 – 100; the 570 
lead tablets discovered by the Dipylon Gate were published by Karin Braun in Athenische 
Mitteilungen 85, 1970, pp 129 – 132 and 198 – 269. 
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inspections of cavalry horses. As Aristotle remarked in his Athenian 
Constitution:432  
 
The Council also inspects the horses belonging to the state. If a man who 
has a good horse is found to keep it in bad condition, he is mulcted in his 
allowance of corn; while those which cannot keep up or which shy and 
will not stand steady, it brands with a wheel on the jaw, and the horse so 
marked is disqualified for service. It also inspects those who appear to be 
fit for service as scouts, and any one whom it rejects is deprived of his 
horse.’ 433 
 
It would be worth taking a look at these tablets from Xenophon’s point of view. 
 
The tablets list, on each line, a masculine name in the genitive, the colour of the 
horse, brand of horse and price. Based on these tables, the average value of 
cavalry horses was 700 drachmae or 7 minae, up to a maximum of 1,200 
drachmae. 434 Kroll observed an increase in the value of the horses on the 
seventeen 4th century tablets on which the valuations are fully preserved: 
‘though small, the 4th century sample implies that during the century that 
separates the earlier and later groups of tablets, the overall value of the horses 
used by the Athenian Hippeis had increased’.435  
 
A number of tablets may be classified on the basis of size, shape, textual 
format, and handwriting. Braun identified six homogeneous series in the 
Kerameikos tablets, while Kroll distinguished even ten series in the Agora 
tablets. Tablets in each series seem to have been inscribed for cavalrymen of the 
                                                
432 Ath. Const. 49.1. 
433 Ath. Const 49. 
434 Kroll (1977) 89. 
435 Kroll (1977) 89. 
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same tribe, in view of the regular mention of cavalrymen’s demotika. Some 
names of cavalrymen recur in more than one series, and this led Kroll to 
conclude that each series recorded the evaluations of horses belonging to 
cavalrymen from a particular tribe for a given year. 436 
 
All in all, Kroll distinguished nine series (I – IX) on Table 1.437 These series 
were assessed by him on the basis of similarities in handwriting, exterior of the 
lead tablets and spelling of the horses’ colours.438 Most of these are linked 
given the repetition of the same horses from one series to the next. He based the 
chronological sequence of these series on the descending values of some horses. 
He assumed also that the horses’ value would fall year on year, as cars do, due 
to age.439 To me it seems rather unlikely, however, for cavalry horses to 
                                                
436 Kroll (1977) 92. 
437 See also Appendix B for a larger image of Table 1. 
438 Kroll (1977) 91. 
439 Kroll (1977) 93. 
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diminish in value due to age alone. An older and presumably more experienced 
horse would be more valuable than a younger horse with little or no experience. 
There is no evidence as to the correct chronological sequence of the series, and 
therefore the horses might well have increased in value. This would be in line 
with Xenophon’s observation on the matter:  
 
If a man buys his horses well, trains them so that they can stand work, and 
uses them properly in the training for war, in the exhibition rides and on the 
battle-fields, what is there then to hinder him from making horses more 
valuable than they are when he takes them over, and why should he not be 
the owner of famous horses, and also become famous himself for his 
horsemanship, provided no divine power prevents?440 
 
Nevertheless, one of the reasons why some horses had decreased in value would 
not necessarily have to do with the age of the horse, but rather with the 
deterioration of a horse owing to a bad rider or trainer or an injury sustained 
during training or battle. From a rider’s point of view, this might have to do 
with bad riders changing their horses because they have destroyed them 
physically or psychologically by their poor horsemanship and training, thus 
diminishing the value of the horses. Xenophon remarked that a horse may also 
become a loss to its owner if trained wrongly and if it keeps throwing him.441 
He also wrote: 
 
‘(…) some have been brought to penury by keeping horses, while 
others prosper by doing so, and moreover glory in their gain? (…) 
seeing that you are forced to meddle with horses, don’t you think 
                                                
440 PH 11.13. 
441 Ec 1.8; 2.11. 
  189 
that common-sense requires you to see that you are not ignorant of 
the business, the more so as the self-same horses are both good to 
use and profitable to sell?’442 
 
There is a likelihood that good riders only changed their horses providing they 
got a relatively good price for them. They were probably reluctant to change 
horses because it meant that they would have to start the training all over again. 
It took a few years to get a horse experienced and well-prepared for battle. A 
cavalryman would have to trust his life to this animal. Therefore if the dating of 
the series is correct and the horses were becoming less valuable, this would not 
necessarily be due to ageing alone. 
If a horse decreased in value each year due to its age, would it not be logical 
that all horses would decrease similarly in value? And if so, why would there be 
a dokimasia? And, one might add, if horses can decrease in value, they may 
also increase in value. If these inspections indeed were held to ascertain the 
acquired standard of horsemanship, with an additional bonus or allowance also 
being applicable, this would be a strong motivation for the Hippeis to ensure 
that their horses received optimum training. 
 
Let us take a closer look at the ancient Athenian series we referred to. Each 
cavalryman who appears in more than one series owned at least two different 
horses during the period covered in Table I, and some would seem to have had 
                                                
442 Ec 3.7 – 9. Xenophon makes it clear that ‘vicious behaviour of horses’ is the fault of their 
riders. He takes his views on horse training as a way of working with your horse instead of 
treating the animals as a subordinate one step further as he comments on the way men were 
treating their wives: ‘men should succeed in winning the co-operation of their wives and should 
instruct them rightly. If they find their wives ignorant, they should blame themselves. He sheds 
a different view on the Greek marriage as he continues: ‘Is there anyone to whom you commit 
more affairs of importance than you commit to your wife? – There is not. Is there anyone with 
whom you talk less? – There are few or none, I confess’. (Ec 3.10 – 14.)  
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four horses in a three-year period.443 Either they were poor riders who had to 
change horses every year, or good trainers who could easily sell off their horses 
at favourable prices.444 A third possibility may well be that horses became lame 
during this period or were put to stud. From a rider’s point of view, if horses 
devalued every year (like cars), why bother training them? And from the horse 
trade point of view: people would only be interested in buying young 
inexperienced horses.  
 
Since tablet 1 gives an overview of a period of some nine years, it would be 
interesting to see if there are any horses called ‘spotted’ (or probably more 
appropriately, ‘dappled’).445 Dappled horses turn white during their lifetime, 
usually at the age of nine. Therefore the dappled horses more likely were 
younger than nine years old. As I stated earlier, the starting age for a cavalry 
charger was presumably about four years old. From this I would conclude that 
the dappled horses were aged approximately 4 – 9 years. We can therefore 
compare at least some of the horses based on their age. 
 
                                                
443 Kroll (1977) 93. 
444 Research on the economics of event horses production shows that the average total period of 
time necessary for the training of a young, unbroken horse to a level where it could be resold, is 
1.7 years. Therefore it is not unthinkable that a good horseman could sell a horse once a year. 
Source: A preliminary investigation of the economics of event horse production, K. D. 
Hennessy, J. Murphy & P. Brophy  (Dublin 2005). 
(http://www.agresearchforum.com/publicationsarf/2005/047_page.pdf) [last visited: 28 juli 
2009] 
445 Kroll translates %!.)$(!- as ‘spotted’ thus missing the connection between white and 
dappled (grey) horses. If there were white horses in Athens, there must have been ‘greys’ as 
well, as this is the first coloured stadium of w white horse, which is born either black, bay or 
chestnut. He does mention the use of /*&$!- in the tablets once which means ‘starling’-
coloured and is also generally translated as dappled. Aristotle explains in Historia Animalium 
9.26 that /*&Ò- is %!.)$(!-, speckled. In Zech 6:3 and 6:6 %!.)$(!- and /*&Ò- are 
alternately used for grey (dappled) horses. It is quite improbable that %!.)$(!- could have 
meant ‘spotted’ as this is a rather rare colour for a horse. Dappled horses are more common and 
the first stadium of white horses.  
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Cavalry Archives 3rd century      
Value   White   Dappled  
        
100        
200      1  
300    1*    
400        
500   4     
600   3 1*    
700   1   2  
800        
900        
1,000   5   5  
1,100        
1,200   2   4 2* 
        
Total   15   12  
        
*White horses valued twice    2     
*Dappled horses valued thrice   1     
        
Average value, all tablets  700      
 
Table 1.  Values of dappled and white cavalry horses in Athens (3rd century BC) 
 
Unfortunately none of the dappled horses return as white horses on the table. 
From the table above we may observe that nine of the twelve younger dappled 
horses were valued at the highest price (1,000 - 1,200 drachmae). Seven of the 
fifteen white horses were also valued at the highest price. We might conclude 
therefore that the younger horses do fetch higher values.446 But when we take 
into account that most horses were valued at 500 drachmae,447 the white horses 
all appear in the upper zones and only one of them is valued at less than 500 
drachmae. This horse is actually valued twice on the tablets, once at 600 
                                                
446 There may be something else at issue. According to Vergil, grey horses were higher valued 
than white ones, on the market (Vergil, Eclogae 3.82). Nor Xenophon nor Pollux, however, 
offer any evidence of this type.  
447 Kroll (1977) 89. 
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drachmae and once at 300. Another white horse is valued twice at 600 
drachmae. 
Some horses are valued at the same amount for a few years in succession. Kroll 
assumes, probably correctly, that these horses were worth more than the 
maximum price the state would offer, therefore these horses could be valued 
each time in succession at 1,200 drachmae. From this I would like to conclude 
that it is not age alone that determines the value of a horse. 
I would also like to make some further remarks on Kroll’s chronology. First of 
all, Kroll did not include some of the tablets from the Erechtheis tribe in his 
table. Philokrates of Kephis had a horse which Kroll values at 900 drachmae 
and the year after at 500. But Braun values the same horse at 400 drachmae and 
at 500 the year after.448  
The white horse with the kranos brand of Theomedes of Anagurias was valued 
at 1,200 drachmae for three years (in the first year, its value was probably 1,100 
drachmae because there was only one place left after the X instead of two449) 
and in the fourth year it was valued only at 1,000 drachmae. Therefore based on 
this conjecture, if the initial value was 1,100 drachmae, this horse would have 
increased and then decreased in value. 
                                                
448 K530 at Braun (1970). She values this horse at  400. Kroll states that ‘with some cleaning, 
traces emerged at the left of a horizontal, suggesting possibly 900. Neither reading allows us 
confidently to associate the chestnut, unmarked horse with the similar horse valued at 500 in 
Series IX, for it would be extraordinary for a horse to gain 100 drachmas or to lose as much as 
400 drachmas in a year.’  Nevertheless, the purros asemos of Philokrates of Euonymon would 
have decreased from 900 to 500 if we accept Krolls chronology. 
449 K203 at Braun (1970). She values the horse at X[  , this can either be XHH or XH. Kroll 
gives X [ ] [ ] here.  
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The asemos horse of Kleochares of Kephis would have been valued at 600 
drachmae for four consecutive years.  Admittedly, Kroll contends that this may 
refer to two horses instead of one, because a purros asemos was quite common. 
Nevertheless why would a rider buy another horse of exactly the same value? 
And even if two different horses were listed here, they would still not have 
decreased in value because of age. 
 
Also, the purros drakoon of Nikomachos of Lamptrai is valued at 1,000 
drachmae, and two years later at 900. This horse did not devalue in the year in 
between. The drakoon horse of Arkesas of Euonymon was valued at 1,200 
drachmae but in two years had decreased in value by an unprecedented 500 
drachmae to 700. This horse cannot have aged more rapidly than the other 
horses. Similarly, in the case with Hieron of Anagurias, his purros ag was 
valued at 700 drachmae and the year after at only 500. His purros bo decreased 
in value from 500 drachmae to 300. The horse of Philokrates of Eonymon 
would have decreased from 900 drachmae to 500 in only one year and his me 
asemos would have dropped in value in a two-year period from 500 drachmae 
to 400, which appears somewhat inconsistent. It is worth noting in my view that 
Chairioon, who had at least four horses during this listed period, owned an 
expensive horse each time. Perhaps he trained his horses well and sold them off 
at a good price or was rewarded for his good horsemanship. As we have seen 
earlier on, Xenophon argued, the proper training of horses can also be 
lucrative.450  
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  195 
On the one hand, the proper training of horses was vital for the rider’s own 
safety and for its military value to the cavalry. On the other hand, it could also 
provide an economic return, which may have been a decisive factor for the 
entrepreneurial Athenian. There was a motivation here to train a horse for war; 
the trainer was valued for the hard work involved and there was a profit to be 
made too.  
 
The Council also inspects the Knights' chargers, and if anybody having 
a good horse keeps it in bad condition, it fines him the cost of the feed, 
and horses that cannot keep up with the squadron or will not stay in line 
but it brands on the jaw with the sign of a wheel, and a horse so treated 
has failed to pass the inspection. It also inspects the mounted 
skirmishers, to see which it considers fit for skirmishing duty, and any 
that it votes to reject are thereby deposed from that rank. It also inspects 
the foot-soldiers that fight in the ranks of the cavalry, and anyone it 
votes against is thereby stopped from drawing his pay.451 
 
As Aristotle informs us above, it had become commonplace in the meantime for 
riders and horses to be evaluated on their standards of horsemanship and 
training, based on the benchmarks which Xenophon set out in his treatises on 
Horsemanship and the Cavalry Commander. The army now had to train for 
their salary.  
 
In the Hellenica, too, this was recommended by Polydamas of Pharsalus in 
Thessaly, in an address he made to the Lacedaemonians when he appeared 
before them in an assembly: 
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`As for numbers,' he [Jason of Pherae, Thessaly] said, `of course as 
great a force might march out of some other city also; but armies made 
up of citizens include men who are already advanced in years and 
others who have not yet come to their prime. Furthermore, in every 
city very few men train their bodies, but among my mercenaries no 
one serves unless he is able to endure as severe toils as I myself.' [6] 
And he himself — for I [Polydamas of Pharsalus] must tell you the 
truth — is exceedingly strong of body and a lover of toil besides. 
Indeed, he makes trial every day of the men under him, for in full 
armour he leads them, both on the parade-ground and whenever he is 
on a campaign anywhere. And whomsoever among his mercenaries he 
finds to be weaklings he casts out, but whomsoever he sees to be fond 
of toil and fond of the dangers of war he rewards, some with double 
pay, others with triple pay, others even with quadruple pay, and with 
gifts besides, as well as with care in sickness and magnificence in 
burial; so that all the mercenaries in his service know that martial 
prowess assures to them a life of greatest honour and abundance.452  
 
We may conclude now, that Athens had finally understood that the Hippeis had 
to train their horses on a daily basis so that a regiment could operate with 
excellent timing and for this, collection and precision are both vital factors. The 
ability to fight in formation, particularly in combination with the infantry, as 
Xenophon advised, calls for special training of horses and men. They must be 
capable of turning quickly and keeping apace. This can only be achieved by 
means of collection. Battle cavalry that will attack hoplites will need to operate 
in small spaces. Therefore collection of the horse is of primary importance. 
Collection is a result of good horsemanship which must be learned and be 
trained regularly. 
                                                
452 Hell 6.1.5 – 6.  
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4.7. Conclusions on Xenophon 
 
It would appear that Xenophon was none too happy with the development of 
Athens over the years as described by Aristotle, who makes clear that it it had 
become democratised and fallen prey to political intrigue and chicanery by 
popular rulers. Nor did Xenophon very much like the consequences this had for 
the state of Athens. This was a development that directly impacted on the army, 
particularly the cavalry because without proper training the cavalry would 
suffer. Moreover the old naucrarian cavalry no longer sufficed, and the new 
battlefield cavalry had to maintain a proper training regime. 
 
The Athenian democracy often backfired, particularly where the army was 
concerned because it had more need for professionals than politicians. It must 
have been a great source of disappointment for Xenophon, who believed that 
his hometown was well-capable of achieving hegemony and yet saw this being 
made impossible time and again with the democratic system. Expeditions led to 
nothing and the cavalry was prevented from developing its full fighting 
potential.  
Xenophon may well have succeeded by his treatises in getting Athens to 
appreciate the importance of hamippoi and to accept their deployment. 
Athenian coins have been found with images of hamippoi in 350 BC. Aristotle 
wrote also that it had become standard practise to deploy hamippoi.  
Also, Xenophon’s recommendation that the cavalry be screened based on 
horsemanship rather than income would appear to have been implemented, as 
we can see from Aristotle’s work and the cavalry tablets that were found.  
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Chapter 5.  Conclusions 
 
Greece saw a development in cavalry warfare between the Archaic period and 
the beginning of the Macedonian domination. Up to then, its main 
preoccupation was dealing with border skirmishes; the cavalry was not being 
deployed on the battlefield but rather for purposes of foraging, harassing the 
enemy, destroying the land around a city and for running to ground retreating 
infantry. This all changed when the Persians began to take an interest in Greece. 
Athens and Sparta were confronted with a land war on different fronts and had 
to face a cavalry that used combat techniques which heretofore were unknown 
to them.  
 
Athens up to that point had a cavalry that was suited to the tasks outlined above. 
This is referred to as a naucrary cavalry, which is an Athenian term. The 
Persians fought from a long distance, fielding their mounted archers, and were 
not able to fight the Athenian infantry. The Athenians soon realised after the 
Persian wars that they needed to increase their cavalry numbers, not in order to 
form a large cavalry battalion, but rather for purposes of deploying more 
naucraries simultaneously. There was little change therefore in the warfare 
techniques. The Athenian cavalry also had little success in Sicily and were 
surprised by the Sicilian cavalry which, contrary to the most powerful cavalry 
of Greece (the Thessalian cavalry), was quite willing to attack the hoplite lines 
and throw their spears.  
 
Thessaly had a relatively enormous cavalry which it deployed on the battlefield. 
However these riders were particularly good in surprise attacks on hoplites who 
were not yet in battle formation or in running retreating soldiers to ground. 
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They would not attack hoplites who were in battle formation. Boeotia had its 
own cavalry, and in the Persian Wars sided with the Persians. The Boeotians 
supported the Persians with their cavalry and in fact deployed the cavalry 
similarly to the Thessalians.  
 
Unrest persisted throughout the classical period because Athens, Sparta and 
Thebes continued to fight amongst themselves for hegemony in the Greek part 
of the Mediterranean Sea.  Their level of training was now improving all the 
time because they were fighting now more and more in situations in which 
cavalry could do a useful job. The cavalry found itself playing an increasingly 
important role in these wars. The Greeks therefore developed their cavalry 
tactics and battle cavalry during this period, and this represented a departure 
from the standard raiding and other tasks to which the cavalry had been 
accustomed heretofore. 
 
Boeotia developed hamippoi, who were hoplites working together with the 
cavalry. These were being deployed on the battlefield as early as 419 or 418 BC 
and were proving very effective. The Boeotian battle cavalry dominated the 
battlefield. The Athenian naucrary cavalry was not a match for it. The Spartan 
king, Agesilaus II, seems to have begun deploying infantry and cavalry together 
on the battlefield around 395 BC, according to Xenophon, after discovering 
during his campaign in Caria in Asia Minor that the infantry alone would not 
suffice against the Persian cavalry.  
 
In the Battles at Tegyra (375 BC), Leuctra (371 BC) and thereafter in the Battle 
at Mantinea (362 BC), the Boeotian general from Thebes, Epaminondas, 
deployed his cavalry, infantry and hamippoi in a dense square formation. With 
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his improvement of these Boeotian battle tactics he outgeneraled Agesilaus on 
the battlefield.  
Epaminondas had well-trained men at his command who were very capable of 
converting his tactical insight into action on the battlefield and forming dense 
formations of both cavalry and infantry, thus allowing him to score several 
decisive victories over Sparta and Athens. The square cavalry formation usually 
deployed as a dense horse phalanx supported by heavy infantry began to be 
seen on the battlefield. Thebes defeating Sparta and Athens left the Greek states 
in confusion. A power vacuum arose.  
 
Xenophon analysed this situation meticulously and tried to get the Athenians to 
do something about the power vacuum that had arisen after the Battle at 
Mantinea.  
 
Xenophon understood how important the cavalry fighting in formation would 
become on the battlefield and how necessary it would be for the cavalry and the 
infantry to be deployed as a tactical unit. The Athenians had to recognise this 
and to discontinue with their ad hoc training of both these units. Xenophon also 
recognised the importance of discipline and authority within the army. He 
described how questioning the capacity of one’s command could impact 
negatively on the overall functioning of the force and that the command should 
only be assumed by people who were professionally competent to perform this 
task. When there is no confidence, orders cannot be passed on and the soldiers 
or cavalrymen will not know where they stand. This can be fatal on the 
battlefield and while on a march. 
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He was thus concentrating his efforts because he needed to alert Athens to the 
importance of taking the cavalry and acquiring horsemanship seriously. All 
aspects of horsemanship are important to the functioning of cavalry, especially 
if it is to fulfill its task as a battle cavalry fighting in formation. The 
performance of the cavalry as a combat unit will succeed or fail depending on 
the level of training received by both horse and rider alike. Horses must be 
prepared for all eventualities, such as unexpected situations (sudden enemy 
attack which necessitates a galloping retreat, dead bodies, an ability to leap over 
trenches, making quick  turns and various assault manoeuvres). Moreover 
horses must work closely with their riders, forming one unit. The riders need to 
train their horses to such an extent that they will be able to withstand hardship 
and trust their riders, who in turn require a good understanding of speed, 
formation and tactics. 
Horsemanship is a skill that encompasses not only the riding of a horse, but also 
thorough knowledge of horses, horse breeds, their character, build, training 
requirements, use of bridles, and so on. For the cavalryman, this demands a 
thorough knowledge of weaponry, exercises, formations and cavalry tactics. 
The cavalry commander should be better than his riders, otherwise he cannot 
substantiate his superior position. He must therefore be a superior horseman, 
better in combat tactics and be capable of training his men well. In addition, he 
needs to have a good strategic insight in order to be successful in war and on 
the battlefield. 
 
When lacking a high standard of horsemanship, a cavalry may be successful in 
minor skirmishes but if facing a cavalry on the battlefield that is being deployed 
as a tactical and strategic weapon, a poorly trained cavalry will prove 
unsuccessful.  
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Xenophon appeared to be making every attempt to encourage the Athenians to 
prepare themselves before it was too late, and before another attack from 
Thebes, despite the fact that they were at peace after 362 BC. In his two books 
called ‘On Horsemanship’ and ‘Cavalry commander’, he set out the experiences 
he had gained himself in Persia with Agesilaus, his Spartan friend, during 
various cavalry battles. However his accounts on the cavalry and horse training 
were not restricted to these books alone. In a number of philosophical works 
and in his analyses of Agesilaus and Cyrus the Great we see further mention of 
these.  
 
He carefully studied the tactics used in the Battle at Mantinea. Epaminondas 
was a commander who was an excellent leader and strategist, who knew well 
how to train and field his cavalry. In Cavalry Commander, he made reference 
also to a number of tactical issues, including the formation the Boeotians had 
used in the battles against Sparta and how this formation could best be 
employed and why. Epaminondas is referred to in Xenophon’s Cavalry 
Commander, which he constructed in a manner that concealed the fact that he 
was referring to a Boeotian strategist. Xenophon had a deep hatred against 
Thebes, as did Agesilaus, and other Athenians and Spartans.  
Thus, he could not refer to Epaminondas by name and in fact the Cavalry 
Commander is the only work of Xenophon which lacks an ‘example’. In his 
other works he concentrated on or mentions significant figures from earlier or 
his own times such as Agesilaus, Cyrus the Great and Socrates. In ‘On 
Horsemanship’ he refers to Simon of Athens. His own voice though comes 
through in Ways and Means, in which he sets out his views on Athens and 
proceeds to make his own recommendations, including his wish that Athens 
would once regain hegemony in Greece. In this context, he wrote his ‘On 
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Horsemanship’ and ‘On the Cavalry Commander’ in his attempt to emphasise 
and re-emphasise the importance of cavalry training, formation and tactics in 
which in his view the Athenians would need to train themselves, to be able to 
face Thebes or any other enemy. 
 
Why had it not been possible up to that point to upgrade the Athenian cavalry to 
a higher level of horsemanship? Athens, a democracy, had a lot of difficulties 
with its cavalry. This was because time and again the democracy had sought to 
have people in leadership positions on the basis of general elections, and this 
did not automatically deliver the most suitable people to these positions, i.e. 
men who were fit for the job, a job which after all went to those who ran the 
best election campaigns. This is a criticism that was also made at the time, 
especially since the beginning of the 4th century when democracy had reached 
its summit and politicians only thought of their own profits, according to 
Aristotle and others. 
 
With the positions of leadership being filled by people who knew next to 
nothing about the actual issues of horse training, cavalry training, tactics and 
strategy, cavalrymen had little confidence in leaders or refused point blank to 
obey orders or to serve under such people. The cavalry in this respect was a 
much more vulnerable part of the army than the infantry, simply because horses 
were being used and horses require a certain degree of appropriate training in 
order to function as planned. This training would not only cost time; it also 
demanded insight and experience, and it was almost impossible to gain this on 
the battlefield.  
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In the Athenian democracy, people were appointed to the position of cavalry 
commander once elected to that position. Therefore it was not a question of 
who was the best cavalryman or who made the best general but rather who had 
gained the greatest popularity. It now became impossible to properly train and 
lead the cavalry, due also to the fact that the real horsemen who were serving in 
the cavalry felt nothing but scorn for such a leader. Moreover Athens was a 
commercial city that was motivated by profit. Businessmen of the top classes 
were mainly interested in money-making or politics and did not want to be 
wasting their time and money with horses and horse training. Athens fell far 
short in the quality of its horsemanship owing to the democratic and 
commercial system that prevailed.  
Particularly so after the Oligarchy of the Thirty in 404, when they determined 
that the scrutiny of the cavalry would be based on their political and economical 
merits for the city of Athens. The ultimate result being that the cavalry could 
have no real success on the battlefield. In the fourth century, the Athenian 
cavalry had to resign itself to this fact as soon as they found themselves faced 
with a state led by capable generals.  
 
This cavalry tended to come from aristocratic or oligarchic regimes, where the 
cavalry traditionally belonged to the aristocracy exclusively and where 
horsemanship was accorded a much higher status. The aristocrats were well 
trained horsemen in this regard, and moreover were led by commanders who 
had attained a high level of horsemanship.  
 
The cavalry had always been associated with aristocratic or oligarchic states. 
The horse was used by the aristocracy mainly for parading, racing or other 
competitions during peacetime, but in times of war these horses were also 
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deployed on the battlefield. The aristocracy was traditionally regarded a horse-
minded class. For them, however the horse is not a means of existence as it is 
for the nomads. The aristocracy uses the horse for hunting, parading or battle 
and in that sense one might say that they are knowledgeable in the art of 
training and handling horses. They more than likely can afford to pay for the 
keeping and training of their horses. They appreciate the importance of ongoing 
training for the horse. Many aristocrats had their own studs with special 
bloodlines which produced good racehorses or warhorses. They also kept good 
racehorses, as did Hiero of Syracuse or Alkibiades of Athens. These men knew 
how to handle their horses. 
 
Horsemanship is a craft which can be acquired only by daily training and giving 
oneself over to what we call ‘horsemindedness’. This is all the more important 
for those in a superior position. If they don’t understand what they are talking 
about, they will soon lose the respect of their men. Horsemindedness is a 
quality that will be prevalent amongst people who are used to working with 
horses, for example, the Scythian nomads. For these people, horses are part of 
their daily lives. The expert handling, training and riding of horses for them is 
an everyday experience. In other cultures we see the horse traditionally being 
associated with the aristocracy, because in an urban culture, the horse is 
regarded a luxury item. A businessman or worker will be too busy with 
business or work and will have little time to devote to the training of a horse, 
unless there is commercial gain to be had.  
 
After the decline of Sparta as a military power in 362 BC Xenophon wanted to 
pass on his expertise on horsemanship, cavalry training and warfare, so that 
Athens could once again reach for hegemony in Greece. It would appear that 
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Xenophon’s recommendations after the Battle at Mantinea were incorporated in 
the Laws of Athens. According to Aristotle, the combination of cavalry and 
infantry became commonplace and the annual cavalry inspections were no 
longer held mainly for determining whether the Hippeis conformed to the 
income standards but rather to determine whether the horses were in good shape 
and were receiving adequate training. The horses were then valued on the 
results and were accorded a timesis or value. There is archaeological evidence 
of the existence of hamippoi in Athens dating from around 350 BC. According 
to Aristotle, as well, hippodromoi or hamippoi were deployed by Athens in his 
time. 
 
The conclusion of my research therefore must be that notwithstanding the 
various victories scored by the Athenians in a number of skirmishes, it seems 
the insight was lacking when it came to their cavalry and the need for their 
training. In practice they were forced to learn time and again from bitter 
experience on the battlefield itself and from the ‘trial and error’ of politics.  
The Athenians have experienced some successes, especially in pursuing and 
finishing off other cavalry, as happened at Mantinea after Epaminondas had 
died, but a properly efficient and strong cavalry which could fight in square 
formation was never within their grasp because they simply lacked the requisite 
level of military horsemanship, which demands much more than mere horse 
riding skills.  
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APPENDIX A 
Ordnance Notes - No. 297, Washington, May 7, 1883 
 
THE CAVALRYMAN AND HIS HORSE 
 
    By Lieut. S. C. ROBERTSON, ! First Cavalry, U. S. A. 
 
    [ From the United Service ] 
 
         In a country like ours, with its more than eleven million 
     horses, where soil and climate give us the best of breeds, and where 
     there are some of the finest natural horsemen in the world, it is a 
     matter for regret that horsemanship in its higher form should not be 
     more thoroughly developed. With respect to our cavalry service, 
     especially, is this to be deplored. Possessing a splendid personnel, 
     good horses, and a perfect equipment, we need but the acquirement of 
    this art to make ours the superior of almost every other service in 
     the world. That the necessity for attaining it exists, few of our 
    10  officers will deny; the history of our frontier service is replete 
     with incidents which prove it. In how many Indian fights of even 
     recent years have unfortunate troopers fallen victims to bad riding 
     or unskillful management of their horses, and how many valuable 
    animals have been lost to the Government in our campaigns by bad 
    seats and the ignorance of men untrained to the saddle? 
 
         For all these things the peculiar nature of our past service has 
     been to a certain extent an excuse, but in the near future, as 
     isolated detachments are consolidated in permanent posts, and 
     thorough drill is thereby rendered possible, our attention must 
    20 unavoidably be directed to the more perfect training of the cavalry 
    trooper. As long as cavalry exists, however it may be armed or 
     maneuvered, the fundamental principle of such instruction will be 
     horsemanship; that science which gives the soldier perfect control 
     over the machine which transports him; which makes it safe for 
    himself and effective against his enemy; which gives him confidence 
     in his own prowess, and which inspires him with an esprit de corps, 
     and a love for his horse and the saddle which every cavalryman who 
    is really master of his steed must feel. There is nothing chimerical 
     in these ideas. Scientific riding is an art more practiced by the 
    30 civilian abroad to-day than ever before, and all of the great 
     cavalry services-those of Germany, Austria, Russia, France, England, 
     even poor, unhorsemanlike Italy-are devoting their every energy 
     toward perfecting both officers and men in it. Shall we, their 
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    equals in nearly all else, their superior in many things, confess 
     ourselves behind them in one of the most important departments of 
    our profession ? No one can claim that our tactics do not 
     contemplate instruction in equitation and the knowledge of the 
     horse, for, brief as its requirements are, and skeleton-like as are 
     its elementary rules upon the former subject, it does prescribe that 
   40 officers shall "have a thorough knowledge of the structure and 
     powers of endurance of horses," and be "familiar with the rules for 
     their management under all circumstances. to understand in detail 
     the method of shoeing them, and to be able to treat all ordinary 
     cases of injury and disease." West Point gives a better education 
     than any other school the world, but of these matters what does it 
     teach? A graceful position, a fairly good seat, to use the saber and 
     pistol (this excellently well, too) on horseback, to mount at a 
     gallop, and one or two other accomplishments of a similar nature, 
     and there our horsemanship and knowledge of the horse end, the 
   50 latter never passing zero during the whole time. On the frontier 
     this is supplemented by such information as individual ambition or 
     research, or accident, may supply. The refinements of equitation, 
     however, the principles of the haute ecole, as it is called 
     abroad, we neglect almost entirely. With such exercises as the 
     "piaffer," "pirouette," "circling on the forehand," "changing of 
     hand," the "volte," the different "passages," and many other 
     exercises in the "setting-up" of horse and rider, we never bother 
     ourselves. Yet they are considered the A B C of his profession by 
     even the youngest cavalry "sub" abroad, and certainly no horseman 
    60 calls himself really accomplished without being able to perform 
     them. In no other way can he reach the end supposed to be desirable 
     with every cavalryman, of communicating to his charger his every 
     impulse, of making him obedient and ready to act instantly and 
     according to his will in every emergency., in short, of making his 
     steed and himself, as nearly as possible, one. But, leaving out the 
     question of accomplishment and the haute ecole, should not all of 
     us in our arm understand thoroughly the breaking, bitting, and 
     training of the horses drafted into the cavalry? We have to deal 
     here with a question involving not only professional pride, but 
    70 professional duty. Do we understand these things as we should or is 
     not rather the following the actual case very often, and a reply to 
     the question at the same time? 
 
         A horse is assigned to a troop. Nothing is known of him except 
     that he has been ridden, and appeared sound to the purchase board 
     when bought. He is assigned to a trooper-possibly a recruit. To this 
     man has been issued a bridle. It may have a No .1, or a No. 2, or, 
     for all that he generally knows, a No.10 bit. It don't matter; in it 
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     goes, without reference to the size of the animal's mouth perhaps 
     without even adjusting the check-piece, so as to place it at the 
    80 proper height in the mouth (few men know this height anyhow) he 
     leads the poor brute, with its cheeks pinched, or possibly its 
     tongue nearly cut in two by a narrow port, out to drill.  Is it any 
     wonder that the horse becomes unmanageable, or that it is known in a 
     week or so as the "champion bucker" of the troop. The man lingers 
     on, dreading every "boots and saddles" as a call from the lower 
     regions themselves, bound to a creature which he can neither ride 
     nor manage, until, finally, the poor animal goes the way of nearly 
     all such horseflesh and is condemned for his ill nature or some curb 
    90 or spavin which the torture inflicted on him had produced. This 
     result, of course, is brought on in many cases by some other species 
     of ignorance than that displayed in bad bitting, but the 
     illustration chosen represents many actual cases and shows the 
     necessity of knowledge on such points. The non-commissioned officers 
     who are the drill-masters of recruits have learned in the same 
     school as the latter, and consequently know nothing more than they, 
     except the few things that longer experience-not instruction-in the 
     service has taught them. Were there skillful horsemen among the 
     officers of their troops, officers who understood thoroughly this 
    100 portion of their profession and who made it their business to see 
     that the men under them were intelligently taught how to handle 
     their horses and become good riders themselves, then indeed, and not 
     till then, would we be, in the true sense of the word, cavalrymen. 
     Foreign nations consider the smallest details of all this 
     instruction as necessary for the education of both officers and men. 
 
         In the French school of cavalry at Saumur, where the writer had 
     the privilege of spending nearly a year, he has seen a class of 
     officers kept for days in recitation upon the single subject just 
     referred to - bitting; and he has seen the same class " stand to 
    110 horse" for nearly three-quarters of an hour in the riding hall until 
     every bit, curb, and strap about their horses' heads was placed to 
     the instructor’s satisfaction. Any bit that did not fit, whose 
     mouth-piece was too narrow, or too thick, or the reverse, or whose 
     bars were too powerful for a particularly tender mouth, or which had 
     some other defect discernible only to his practiced eye, was either 
     exchanged for another or turned over to the armorer for alteration. 
     The idea of fitting bits, saddles, or other gear indiscriminately to 
     their animals would be to them preposterous. They may appear at 
     first glance overscrupulous in their attention to these things, but 
    120 the result justifies them, for their horses are magnificently 
     "dressed," and their mouths, in most cases, simply perfect. The 
     animals thus trained were no more docile than our own usually are on 
  210 
     entering the service, yet their education for the ranks by the 
     employment of these careful and judicious methods was, in most 
     cases, fully completed in two or three months. 
 
     To understand more finely the importance attached to everything 
     connected with horsemanship and the horse in the mounted services 
     abroad , let us examine briefly the training of the French cavalry 
     officer in these respects, and then let us confess how culpable and 
    130 unworthy, by comparison, is our own indifference in regard to them. 
     He enters St. Cyr with usually about the same proficiency in riding 
     as the average West Pointer; for coming, as he nearly always does, 
     in the case of a cavalry cadet. from an aristocratic family, he has 
     probably seen and ridden good horses from earliest boyhood. During 
     his first year's course his studies are in common with those of the 
     infantry cadet, and he rides, like the latter, only three times a 
     week. At the end of the first year he expresses his preference for 
     the cavalry arm. He is then immediately separated from his infantry 
     colleagues, and his education as a trooper commences in real 
    140 earnest, everything else being subordinate to this training. He 
     studies an extensive course in hippology, is taught practically all 
     the elementary principles regarding the treatment of sick horses and 
     their handling, and is kept in the riding-hall or at mounted drill 
     on the cavalry plain during an average of three hours a day. A 
     slight calculation will show how much more he rides in his two 
     years' course than the cadet in our academy during his four. After 
     graduating at St. Cyr and spending another year in the cavalry 
     school at Saumur he enters a service, not where his acquirements 
     thus gained are valueless and left to rust and decay, but where his 
    150 enthusiasm is fostered and his /esprit de corps /continually 
     encouraged by the nature of both his duties and amusements. As a 
     second lieutenant he is required personally to drill recruits both 
     in the riding-hall and on the drill-ground, and to teach them in 
     theory and practice all the elementary details concerning the 
     management of their horses, the adjustment of their harness, &C He 
     himself is either required, or from voluntary pride seeks, to 
     perfect himself in skillful feats of horsemanship, iii the 
     riding-school or on the steeple-course. He is constantly drilled, 
     and goes over frequently in the regimental schools the theory of 
    160 hippology and equitation, which he has studied as a cadet and at 
     Saumur. He is surrounded by officers, old and young, who encourage 
     his interest in these things by that which they display in them 
     themselves. Much of their spare time is spent in the handling of the 
     difficult horses of their squadrons, or in the training and 
     exercising of their own chargers. The writer has often seen an 
     officer after several hours' hard drill dismount and immediately 
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     leap to the back of some horse of his own held in waiting by his 
     orderly, and then spend the same length of time perhaps in putting 
     his animal through the manege drill, or in teaching him some 
    170 little trick of taking a hurdle upon the steeple-course. He does 
     this for his own amusement and from a spirit of emulation excited in 
     him by the zeal which the officers about him display in the same 
     occupations. Even the gray headed colonels do not disdain to 
     countenance this enthusiasm by their own example, and they are often 
     seen on the training- ground or following the hounds with as much 
     enthusiasm as their subalterns. in another service that we know of, 
     is not the young officer who shows a fondness for the horse and for 
     being constantly in the saddle looked upon with a sort of pity as a 
     "green youngster" who will "get over such nonsense when he is 
    180 older," and do not many of the older officers-those, too, whose age 
     in nowise unfits them for the saddle-seem to consider it more 
     consistent with their rank and dignity to drive about in their 
     ambulances and buggies than to be seen on horseback? Why should such 
     false ideas exist? 
 
         In the other army we speak of they would not be tolerated, and 
     officers who thus shunned and renounced their steeds would bring 
     themselves into great contempt for such lack of /esprit de corps, 
     for such it certainly is. 
 
         The conversation of their mess-table at Saumur (and the same 
    190 thing may be said of all messes at which the writer has been in 
     their cavalry garrisons) abounded in "horse talk," most interesting 
     to those who love and understand the horse, but incomprehensible to 
     those who do not. At each breakfast, for instance, Lieutenant X 
     would tell to interested listeners at his end of the table how 
     Lieutenant Y, in the same division, had come off in the morning 
     steeple-chase with certain officers in another division, or how 
     Lieutenant Z had lost the brush from a fall, or bad riding, in the 
     previous day’s hunt or perhaps another party would be discussing 
with an animation worthy of the most serious subject the points and 
    200 action of Lieutenant So-and-So's new purchase in the horse line. 
     Conversation was always ready among these officers. and numerous 
     other topics existed, but on none was interest so constantly 
     unflagging as upon this. 
 
     The above seem trivialities too small almost to be written, but 
     the writer's object is to portray the different lights in which 
     these matters are viewed at home and abroad. 
 
     As has been previously intimated, the hunt is much in vogue in 
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     all French cavalry garrisons, even the smallest of them generally 
     managing to have its meet at least once a week in the season. Of 
    210 course this induces a love for good, blooded horses, and many of the 
     officers-even those who can afford no other luxury, perhaps- 
     contrive to have their thoroughbred hunters. Steeple-coursing is a 
     sport equally popular, and serves, unlike the hunt, to amuse them 
     throughout the whole year. It is customary at the school of cavalry 
     to have two grand meets on the steeple-course a year, one in May and 
     one in July, and it would be necessary only for one of our officers 
     to witness them to conceive how much interest and amusement they can 
     afford to the participators. The officers from neighboring garrisons 
     and hundreds of their friends from even Paris-200 miles 
    220 distant-encourage them by their presence. The horses which enter are 
     usually thoroughbreds ridden by their owners among the officers of 
     the school. Ordinary troop horses, however, sometimes contest, and 
     occasionally with success. The costume worn is either the regular 
     uniform of the different corps or that of the gentleman jockey, with 
     its gaudy colors selected according to the fancy of the owner. The 
     course is one as serious in its difficulties as those ridden over on 
     the regular turf, and requires good riding and skillful jockeying. 
     Indeed, their leisure time of each day for a month or six weeks 
     beforehand is usually devoted by the contestants to training for 
    230 these races. 
 
         The sight of a full field of twelve or fifteen officers 
     stretching away at full speed over a three-mile course covered with 
     ditch, wall and hedge, the gay dress of the riders, the waving 
     handkerchiefs of fair spectators, and the applause of admiring 
     comrades, all this would arouse enthusiasm in the breast of the most 
     soulless spectator, and would cause any of our true cavalrymen 
     regret that such manly and professional sport was not encouraged in 
     our own service. 
 
         In the different garrisons it is a custom for the captains and 
    240 subalterns of each squadron to stroll through the stables each 
     morning while smoking their after-breakfast cigar. The horses are 
     critically examined, the sick ones visited, and the features of each 
     particular malady noted and discussed with interest. Besides this 
     the "subs" attend both morning and evening stables, as in our 
     service, though with them they last about twice as long in each 
     case. After the young officer receives his promotion as first 
     lieutenant he is, if he has shown him-self diligent and attentive to 
     duty, sent a second time to Saumur, where he studies a more advanced 
     course than the first. He is made to go back to the ranks and the 
    250 riding-hall, however, as when a cadet, and his instruction in 
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     equitation he receives entirely fresh. He is, beside this, taught 
     the art of shoeing, and takes a quite extensive course in veterinary 
     surgery. He goes through the infirmary with the instructor each 
     morning, and in his turn examines each horse and enters the result 
     of his examination in his note book. He has to state first, what, in 
     his opinion, is the animal's malady, from what causes it probably 
     proceeds and what treatment is advisable. He then estimates the 
     horse's age and gives an appreciation of his points. On all of these 
     things he is strictly marked. He is also taught here how to 
    260 competently purchase remount horses. The horses of the school-some 
     nine hundred odd-are assembled for this purpose in requisite 
     numbers, and are told off in squads corresponding to the different 
     geographical departments. 
 
      Each officer is then supposed to represent the purchasing 
     officer for a depot in that department, and is required to go 
     through all the paper forms necessary for the purchase, as well as 
     to note down all the qualifications which the horses before him 
     possess for troop purposes; likewise any defects that exist among 
     them, their age, amount of blood, etc. The writer followed the course 
    270 of these latter officers (the first lieutenants), and it strikes him 
     that it is the most admirable that can be conceived for the forming 
     of a perfect cavalry officer, one who knows every detail of his 
     duty, and who is imbued with a knightly love for his horse, his 
     saber, and his corps. 
 
     Such a system of minute instruction, as that just described is, 
     and will, of course, be for many years impossible in our service; 
     but cannot a system of education in the matter of equitation and the 
     horse, upon a smaller scale, combined with the individual effort 
     which corps pride should induce us to make, bring us somewhat nearer 
    280 perfection in these matters than at present ~ Suppose, for instance, 
     to deal with the first part of the question, a small school of 
     officers and non-commissioned officers, selected, as might be 
     convenient, from the different regiments of cavalry, be established 
     at Leavenworth, either combined with or separated from the main 
     school. Let it be in its general nature a school for the training of 
     troop horses and for the teaching of both officers and men the art 
     of scientific equitation and horse-breaking. Let it be devoted to 
     instruction of this sort exclusively, so that the whole time of its 
     members might be given to these subjects alone. In such a school 
    290 officers would have not only an opportunity for perfecting 
     themselves in the haute ecole of riding, but they would be able to 
     go through all the necessary processes for creating out of a raw and 
     untrained horse the perfectly-drilled and docile troop charger with 
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     cadenced gaits, graceful action, and stipple movement. They should 
     learn practically and teach to the non-commissioned officers under 
     them the proper manner of subduing by gentle, patient treatment 
     refractory young horses, and they should thoroughly acquire all the 
     details of scientific bitting and saddling. Such an institution 
     would cost the Government absolutely nothing beyond the erection of 
    300 a riding hall (which is almost indispensable) and the time of the 
     officers and men detailed thereat. Who can doubt the advantage the 
     carrying out of this idea would confer upon the service. The 
     officers upon graduating need have no distinctive position as riding 
     masters conferred upon them as in foreign armies; the service might 
     simply be left to benefit from the knowledge they have acquired, and 
     which would be gradually, but surely, disseminated throughout the 
     different regiments as these officers rejoined them. 
  
         The object of this article, however, is not the really 
     presumptuous one of making suggestions to the authorities in the 
    310 army who control these matters, for they are certainly competent to 
     deal with them for themselves it is rather an appeal to my younger 
     brothers in "the service of horse" to let their professional 
     interest be aroused in some of the subjects mentioned above, so as, 
     by taking advantage of such opportunities as are offered them, to 
     develop in our corps that love for equestrianism and mounted sport 
     which alone can render it entirely worthy of outside admiration, or 
     entitle us to be proud of it. It is the custom in our service to 
     think that certain things are impossible or impracticable simply 
     because they have never been done in the past. One often hears that 
    320 such and such practices are "well enough for European armies, but in 
     our own 'different conditions,' 'frontier service,"' etc., to the end 
     of the chapter. Let us see if we are not running in a groove in many 
     of these matters. At all large posts, and especially Leavenworth, 
     let officers aspire to have good horses; let their training be the 
     pride and pastime of their owners. Let clubs for the promotion of 
     steeple-coursing and the hunt, wherever the latter is practicable, 
     be formed, and let skillful feats of horsemanship and a love for the 
     saddle as a means of pleasure be encouraged. Jockeying should be 
     scientifically learned and practiced in order to ride well over any 
    330 course. All of the terms of sport of this sort should be familiar to 
     those who wish to be thoroughly accomplished in it. The art of 
     training horses according to their temperament and breed and the 
     nature of the service for which intended, whether for the troop, 
     hunt, or steeple-course, should be made a matter of study, so as to 
     be understood in all its niceties. In fact, a thorough knowledge of 
     the horse should be considered essential from motives dictated by 
     both duty and pleasure. Few officers have any idea how much 
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     amusement can be derived from work of this kind, or how much the 
     dullest garrison at which there are half a dozen devotees of such 
    340 sport can be enlivened by it. 
 
       Though it may seem but a trifling detail, the etiquette of the 
     horseman's dress should be observed as strictly as possible. neat 
     fitting riding trousers and close, stiff-legged top-boots, with the 
     proper style of spur, should be worn whenever mounted; and it should 
     be borne in mind that nothing adds so much to the eclat of a race 
     and the appearance of a hunting field, or to the satisfaction of the 
     riders themselves, as correctness of costume. 
 
         All of the above points-the construction of steeple-courses, 
     rules for the hunt, dress, etc., may be easily learned from several 
    350 good manuals existing upon the subject. 
 
         There is nothing visionary or impracticable in these 
     suggestions. Many of the horses now used in the service for troop 
     purposes may be converted into fair hunters or steeple coursers. 
     "Riding rings" may take the place of regular halls where the latter 
     do not exist, and steeple courses can be laid out in the 
     neighbor-hood of any of our cavalry garrisons. We have both time and 
     opportunity, and nothing is lacking but the enterprise and interest 
    necessary to take up and develop those pursuits. Let them be once 
     started, and their growth is certain. They will finally prove not 
    360 only gratifying to the officers who engage in them, but they will 
     inspire a horsemanlike spirit in our cavalry which will do more than 
     any other thing to perfect the arm and make it in this, as it is in 
     all else, a credit to the Army of the United States. 
 
    S.C. ROBERTSON, 
    Secoud Lieutenent, First Cavalry. 
 
    FORT WALLA WALLA, W.T., January 24, 1883. 
    ORDNANCE OFFICE, 
    WASHINGTON, May 7, 1883. 
    Publication authorized by the SECRETARY OF WAR: 
    S.V. BENÉT, 
    Brigadier-General, Chief of Ordnance. 
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Appendix B  Tribe of Erechtheis  
Kroll, An Archive of the Athenian Cavalry, Hesperia 46 , Vol 2 (1977) 
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Appendix C Values of Dappled and White Cavalry Horses in Athens (4th 
and 3rd century B.C.) according to Braun (1970) and Kroll (1977). 
 
P 132 Kroll: nr 81 (IL 1545) Fig 9, Pl 38.  
Aristioon  Aristioonos leukos asemos timema G  (600) 
See also 75 (unopened) and nr 44 in the Kerameikos tablets timema: 600 
 
P 118 Kroll: nr 42 (IL 1611 + 1614) Fig 5. 
Theomedou  Theomedou Anagu poikilos kran time X (1000) 
P 135 Kroll: nr 88 (IL 1565) fig 10. 
   Prootarchou leukos asemos timema HHH (300) 
Kerameikos nr 460:  same horse 600 
 
P 138 Kroll: nr 108 (Il 1602 + IL 1645) fig 12. 
Luandrou  Luandrou PI poikilos kranos timema XHH (1200) 
 
P 213 Braun:  
nr 338 poikilos X (1000) (Euboulos) 
Nr 465 poikilos X (1000) (Euboulos) 
 
P 215 Braun: 
Nr 201 leukos artemis X (1000) (Theomedos) 
Nr 202 poikilos kranos XHH (1200) (Theomedos) 
Nr 203 poikilos kranos X.. (at least 1000) Theomedos)  
 
P 216 Braun: 
Nr 215 poikilos drakoon (Theudoros) XHH (1200) 
 
P 217 Braun: 
Nr 247 leukos aetos (Hieron) X (1000) 
Nr 250 leukos koroone (Kalenikos) X (1000) 
Nr 251 leukos koroone (Kallenos) X (1000) 
 
P 218 Braun: 
Nr 264: leukos asemos (Kall…) X (1000) 
Nr 265: leukos drakoon (Kallipos) 500 
Nr 270: poikilos asemos (Kallisthenos) 700 
 
P 219 Braun: 
Nr 291: leukos krater (Kineus) 500 
 
P 221 Braun: 
Nr 325: leukos koroone (Leosthenes) XHH (1200) 
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P222 Braun: 
Nr 345: poikilos ortyx (Lysippos) 700 
 
P227 Braun: 
Nr 156 Leukos krater (Pausanias Oinaios) XHH (1200) 
 
P 228 Braun: 
Nr 460: leukos asemos (Protarchos) 600 
 
P 229 Braun: 
Nr 479 poikilos drakoon (Spoudias) 1200 
 
P 230 Braun: 
Nr 492: poikilos drakoon (Timoth) 1200 
Nr 493: poikilos drakoon (Timotheus) 1200 
 
P231 Braun: 
Nr 514: leukos ageter (Philias) 500 
 
P 232 Braun: 
Nr 519: leukos aetos (Philistides) 500 
 
P 233 Braun: 
Nr 542: leukos nike (Phormion) 700 
Nr 543: poikilos drakoon (Phrynichos) X (1000) 
 
P 235 Braun: 
Nr 572: poikilos koroone (Charopinos) 200 
  219 
Appendix D  Maps of Greece 
 
 
 
Map of Ancient Greece 
 
  220 
 
 
Map of Ancient Greek world including Near East 
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Map of Central Greece and Peloponnese 
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Map of Ancient Attica 
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Map of Ancient Athens inside the walls
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Appendix E Cavalry formations 
 
From: ‘The tactics of Aelian, Comprising the Military System of the Grecians’, 
with a preliminary discourse by Henry Augustus Viscount Dillon (London 
1814) 
 
 
 
 
The rhomboid formation as described by Aelianus Tacticus  
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The heteromekes square formation  (rectangle) as described by Aelianus Tacticus 
 
the tetragonal square formation as described by Aelianus Tacticus 
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wedge formation as described by Aelianus Tacticus 
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different square formations as described by Aelianus Tacticus
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Hollow square infantry formation as used by Agesilaus 
 
‘Embolon’ Formation or Deepened Phalanx of Epaminondas 
 
This picture shows how Epaminondas lead his troops in a deepened phalanx with a 
smaller front head on towards the enemy lines. He used them as a wedge or ‘embolon’ 
in order to split up the large front. With his cavalry he had intermingled ‘hamippoi’ 
(heavy armed footsoldiers) to surprise the enemy’s cavalry. According to Xenophon 
Epaminondas did not care where he hit the enemy lines, because he figured that when 
he could break the line, he would have won the battle all together. He kept the other 
lochoi behind the first deepened phalanx to lure the enemy’s other wing into attack. 
(Diodorus Siculus 15.55) Hence the expression ‘oblique’ phalanx.  
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Appendix F Battle plans 
 
 
 
 
Plans of Marathon, Kromayer and Veith, Schlachtenatlas, Leipzig 1929 
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Battle Plan of Coronea (394 BC) of Agesilaus II with Xenophon against the 
Athenians and Thebans 
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Leuctra (371) and Mantinea (362), Kromayer and Veith, Schlachtenatlas Leipzig 1929 
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Leuctra (371 BC), wikipedia.com
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Appendix G Horsebridles  
 
Ancient Greek horsebridles (H. Donder, Zaumzeug in Griechenland un 
Cypern, 1980) 
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Horsebit described by Xenophon in ‘On Horsemanship 10’ 
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Chronological record of Greek bits (H. Donder 1980) 
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Modern bridles 
 
                
 
Left:  a police or cavalry curb bit  
Right: a cavalry pelham bit  
 
   
 
left: double bridle with curb and snaffle 
right: snaffle bit 
  237 
Appendix H Timeline of Greek warfare 
!
 546 BC    Peisistratus becomes tyrant of Athens 
!!!
 527 BC Peisistratos dies. His sons become tyrants of 
Athens  
 
512 BC Battle at Phaleron (Sparta attacks Athens), Athens 
is freed of tyranny; start of democracy at Athens. 
     
 499 BC   Ionian revolt     
  
 494 BC   Persians defeat the Ionian revolt 
     
 497 – 479 BC  Persian Wars 
 
490 BC   Battle at Marathon; Athens wins 
 
479 BC Battle at Thermopylae; Battle at Salamis; Battle at 
Plataeae 
   
Start Classical Period at Athens 
 
477 BC Athens forms an Empire with the Delian League     
!!
461 – 445 BC First Peloponnesian War (Athens, Sparta, Boeotia) 
 
460 – 429 BC   Pericles; Golden Era of Athens 
 
446/445 BC Thirty Year Peace Treaty between Sparta and 
Athens 
 
431 – 404 BC   Second Peloponnesian War 
 
431 – 421 BC Archidamian War 
 
 
424 BC   Battle at Delium 
 
421 BC   Peace of Nicias 
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418 BC   Battle at Mantinea 
 
415 – 413 BC Sicilian Expedition; Syracuse defeats Athens
    
      
406 BC Spartan commander Lysander wins Battle at 
Notium 
 
404 BC Athens defeated by Sparta; surrender to Sparta 
      
404 BC Thirty Tyrants rule Athens supported by cavalry 
class 
  
403 BC Democracy restored in Athens; cavalry suffers 
 
401 BC Xenophon, Proxenus and Agesilaus join Cyrus the 
Younger to fight Artaxerxes II in Persia. Battle at 
Cynaxa. Cyrus dies. Xenophon leads 10,000 
Greek mercenaries back to Greece (Anabasis). 
 
400 BC Wars between Sparta and Persia  
 
399 BC Agesilaus II becomes King of Sparta 
 
399 – 395 BC   Agesilaus against Persia 
 
395 – 387 BC Corinthian War (Sparta against Athens, Thebes 
and Argos, backed by Persia) 
 
394 BC Spartan Agesilaus II wins against Thebes and 
Athens at Coronea, Xenophon fights with him in 
this battle. 
 
391 BC Athenian Iphicrates wins a battle at Lechaeum, 
near Corinth, against Agesilaus 
 
387 BC King’s Peace between Persia, Sparta and Athens, 
also known as Peace of Antalcidas or Common 
Peace 
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386 BC Spartans sack Mantinea 
 
382 BC Spartans conquer the citadel of Thebes 
 
379 BC Thebans regained their city; Second Athenian 
League 
 
378 BC Boeotian War 
 
376 BC Sparta defeated by Second Athenian League at 
Naxos 
 
375 BC Agesilaus fights Battle at Tegyra against Thebes 
led by Epaminondas, Thebes wins 
 
375 BC Renewal of the King’s Peace 
 
373 BC Plataeae attacked by Boeotians 
 
371 BC Peace of Callias; Battle at Leuctra, Epaminondas 
defeats Agesilaus again 
 
370 BC First Theban invasion of the Peloponnese 
 
369 BC Second Theban invasion of the Peloponnese 
 
368 BC Agesilaus II declines from military service; his 
son Archidamus wins the Tearless Battle in 
Arcadia 
 
366 BC Thebes seizes Oropus 
 
364 BC Thebes destroys Orchomenus; Battle at 
Cynoscephalae, Thebans against Thessalians; 
Pelopidas dies. Thessalians win. 
 
363 BC Epaminondas wins against Alexander of Thessaly 
 
362 BC Battle at Mantinea, Epaminondas defeats Sparta; 
Epaminondas dies; peace ensues between Greek 
cities, except Sparta. 
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361 BC Archidamus III, son of Agesilaus II, becomes 
King of Sparta. 
 
360 BC Agesilaus II dies 
 
355 BC Xenophon dies 
     
350 BC Rise of Macedonian phalanx,  Philip of Macedon 
is said to have been a pupil of Epaminondas in 
tactics 
  241 
Appendix I Timeline Military Horsemanship 
 
  
1400 BC Kikkuli, famous horsetrainer in Mittanni. He 
wrote a treatise on horsetraining in Hittite. 
 
360 BC Xenophon. He wrote a treatise on both 
horsemanship and cavalry training. 
 
200 BC Philopoemen. The ‘last great’ cavalry commander 
of Greece, according to Polybius and Plutarch.  
 
150 BC Polybius. Roman cavalry commander. He wrote a 
treatise on Philopoemen, on cavalry and infantry 
tactics, on the Numantine war. 
 
100 AD Lucius Flavius Arrianus Xenophon. He wrote a 
treatise on infantry and cavalry tactics.  
 
200 AD Aelianus Tacticus. He wrote an extensive work on 
‘Tactical Arrays of the Greeks’ about Hellenistic 
tactics, originating of Macedonian tactics.  
 
430 AD Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus. A Roman 
horseman who wrote a treatise both on military 
matters as on horse medicine. 
 
1250 AD Cilician manuscript on cavalry horse training and 
medicine.  
 
1438 AD Dom Duarte. King of Portugal. He wrote a treatise 
on knightly horsemanship and jousting. 
 
1550 AD Federico Grisone, Naples. Founder of Riding 
Academy. Published ‘Gli Ordini di Cavalcare’ or 
‘The Rules of Horsemanship’. 
 
1550 AD Pignatelli, riding master in Naples. Pupil of 
Grisone. Rediscovers Xenophon. 
 
  242 
1560 AD Thomas Blundeville translates Federice Grisone 
and Xenophon. First English publication on 
horsetraining.  
 
1600 AD Antoine de Pluvinel, pupil of Grisone, spreads the 
riding principles of Grisone to France. He 
publishes L’Instruction du Roy en l’exercice de 
monter à cheval. He works on the side movements 
such as shoulder-in, and high collection exercises 
like levade. Like Xenophon he advocates gentle 
riding so that the horse finds pleasure in being 
ridden. 
 
1650 AD William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle. He wrote 
a treatise on horsetraining advocating voltes and 
draw reins to flex the horse. 
 
1700 AD François Robichon de La Guérinière. Director of 
the Académie d'équitation in Caen, the academy 
of Pluvinel. In 1733 he published L'École de 
Cavalerie, "The School of Horsemanship". He 
perfectioned the shoulder-in exercise of Pluvinel, 
he discovered the ‘flying changes’ and the 
‘counter-canter’.  
 
1850 AD Louis Seeger. German horsetrainer who was 
highly influenced by Guérinière. Published System 
der Reitkunst. He also published Herr Baucher 
und seine Künste - Ein ernstes Wort an 
Deutschlands Reiter, "Monsieur Baucher and his 
Methods", in which he criticized the training 
techniques of François Baucher, after riding 
several horses trained by Baucher. 
 
1850 AD François Baucher. He wrote several works on 
horsemanship. His aim was to dominate the horse 
in every aspect and to ‘annul the instinctive forces 
of the horse’. He did this by bringing the head of 
the horse towards its chest and by using spurs and 
hands excessively. His method made the horses go 
on the forehand. His method is used in modern 
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day dressage, known as rollkur or LDR or 
hyperflexion. Classical trained riders oppose to 
this as this goes against every classical principle 
and it produces horses which lack energy and 
impulsion with the hindlegs dragging out behind 
them and stiff hindlegs. According to Seeger these 
horses were difficult to sit, dead to the leg, moved 
flat, and travelled on the forehand.  
Unsurprisingly, they could not take up even 
contact with the reins, and had great difficulty 
bending the joints of their hind legs, swishing 
their tail in displeasure when asked. They were 
also very stiff at the canter, including during the 
one-tempi flying changes, and could not collect, 
having a canter more hopping than a jumping 
motion. The piaffe was very incorrect, with stiff 
hind legs and the horses stepping sideways or 
backwards, the forelegs having little action since 
the horse was on the forehand, and the hind legs 
having most the action. The passage was stiff, 
instead of elastic and springy, and Baucher had to 
use a great deal of leg, spur, and whip to keep the 
horse going (contrary to the correct way, where 
the rider appears to be doing nothing at all). The 
horses would throw themselves around in the 
pirouette, instead of easily turning around. 
(source: wikipedia.com) 
 
1830 AD Gustav Steinbrecht, pupil of Seeger and strong 
opposer of Baucher. He wrote one of the most 
influential works on classical  horsetraining today: 
Das Gymnasium des Pferdes. First published in 
1886. 
 
1890 AD James Fillis publishes ‘Breaking and Riding’. 
Fillis is acknowledged as one of the greatest 
trainers. He opposed Baucher, although at first he 
was trained by Baucher. 
 
1937 AD Van Reede, Rijden en Africhten. Work on military 
horsemanship, based on Fillis and Steinbrecht. 
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1898 – 1973  AD Alois Podhajsky, Director of the Spanish Riding 
School in Vienna. Writer of a number of books on 
classical horsemanship. 
 
1937 – 1999 AD Dr Reiner Klimke, trained by Paul Stecken. 
Dressagerider who trained his horses based on 
principles of classical training. He won several 
gold olympic medals and world and european 
championships. His horses Ahlerich, Mehmed and 
Biotop are worldfamous. Paul Stecken is one of 
the trainers of Annelies’ dressage trainer. 
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Appendix J Classical Dressage Explained 
 
Collection may refer to collected gaits. Collection requires greater muscular 
strength, so must be advanced upon slowly. When in a collected gait, the stride 
length should shorten, and the stride should increase in energy and activity. 
When a horse collects, more weight moves to the hindquarters. Collection is 
natural for horses and is often seen during pasture play. A collected horse is 
able to move more freely. The joints of the hind limbs have greater flexion, 
allowing the horse to lower the hindquarters, bringing the hind legs further 
under the body, and lighten and lift the forehand. In essence, collection is the 
horse's ability to move its centre of gravity to the rear.  
 
Shoulder in, an exercise which loosens the shoulders in order to get the horse 
more manoeuvrable 
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Half-pass, an exercise to enhance the horse’s manoevrabilty sideways 
 
 
Conversano in ‘working trot’. Here the horse is using its hind legs to propel 
rather than carry itself. Its frame is moving more forward (propulsion) than 
upward and looks ‘extended’. 
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Conversano in a collected trot. Here the horse is carrying itself more on its 
hind legs. Slight elevation at the front. To the eye the horse’s frame looks 
‘shorter’. Self-carriage means more balance, as the horse brings his hind legs 
closer to its point-of-gravity. Here the right hind leg is placed more ‘under the 
body’ in comparison with the working trot. 
 
Eventually self-carriage and collection will result in the highest form of 
collection and balance: canter pirouette, piaffe, passage and the airs above the 
ground. 
 
  248 
 
Canter pirouette, an exercise which learns the horse to pivot 
 
 
 
Passage. Conversano is moving upwards instead of forwards. High self-
carriage and elevation at the front. 
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Conversano in a piaffe.  
 
The apex of collection is the levade, in which the horse takes on all weight on 
the hind quarters. The preliminary exercise for the levade is the piaffe which 
should free the shoulders by bringing the hind legs further under the body. 
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Head rider of the Spanish Riding School in a Courbette, one of the Airs above 
the Ground. Here the rider sits without stirrups 
 
 
Longe lessons without stirrups at the Spanish Riding School 
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Natural horsemanship 
 
  
 
Assyrian archer (left) and Hungarian archer (right).
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Appendix K Horse builds 
 
 
Conversano, a typical Baroque Lipizzaner horse. A horse with a broad chest 
and short legs. Powerful haunches. Very capable of collection. 
 
               
Lipizzaner                                                      Thoroughbred 
 
The photos illustrate the difference between a horse with a naturally 
‘standing’ neck and a horse with a naturally ‘hanging’ neck. The first horse 
will be easy to collect (it is already more balanced) whereas the second horse 
is difficult to collect because of all the weight placed on its shoulders. 
 
Left picture: Conversano Romania II R 
Right picture: Reflex
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List of Pictures 
 
Maps 
 
www.Plato-Dialogues.org, last visited 9 February 2012 
 
Kromayer and Veith, Antike Schlachtfelder (Leipzig 1929) 
 
Wikipedia, last visited 9 February 2012 
 
‘The tactics of Aelian, Comprising the Military System of the Grecians’, with a 
preliminary discourse by Henry Augustus Viscount Dillon (London 1814) 
 
Photos of Conversano and Reflex 
 
Marcel Gijben 
Annelies Koolen 
 
Greek bridles 
 
H. Donder, Zaumzeug in Griechenland und Cypern (1980) 
 
Archive Athenian Cavalry 
 
H. Kroll, An Archive of the Athenian Cavalry (1977) 
 
Spanish Riding School  
 
Herbert Graf at www.Spanish Riding School.com 
 
police or cavalry curb bit: www.horsetackinternational.com 
cavalry pelham bit: www.saddler.co.uk 
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Summary 
 
Griekenland had een ontwikkeling in de oorlogsvoering van de cavalerie vanaf 
de archaïsche periode (800 – 490 voor Christus) tot het begin van de 
Macedonische overheersing in ongeveer 350 voor Christus. In de archaische 
periode was het belangrijkste doel in de oorlogen het verdedigen van grenzen 
en het houden van patrouilles. In deze tijd werd de cavalerie niet ingezet op het 
slagveld, maar ten behoeve van foerageren, het hinderen van de vijand, het 
vernietigen van het land rondom een stad en om de terugtrekkende infanterie te 
achtervolgen.  
 
Dit alles veranderde toen de Perzen zich begonnen te interesseren om 
Griekenland te veroveren. Athene en Sparta werden geconfronteerd met een 
landoorlog op verschillende fronten en moesten  strijden tegen een cavalerie die 
streed met  technieken die tot nu toe onbekend waren. Athene had tot op dat 
moment een cavalerie die geschikt was voor de taken zoals hierboven 
beschreven. Dit wordt in dit proefschrif aangeduid als een naucrarie cavalerie, 
een Atheense term.  
 
De Perzen vochten vanaf grote afstand met grote aantallen cavalerie van 
voornamelijk boogschutters te paard, en waren niet in staat om de Atheense 
infanterie te bestrijden. De Atheners beseften al snel na de Perzische oorlogen 
dat zij hun cavalerie aantal dienden te verhogen, niet om een groot cavalerie 
regiment te vormen, maar eerder ten behoeve van de inzet van meer naucraries 
tegelijk. Er was dan ook weinig verandering in de technieken van de 
oorlogsvoering bij de Grieken onderling. De Atheense cavalerie had ook weinig 
succes in Sicilië en werden verrast door de Siciliaanse cavalerie, die, in 
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tegenstelling tot de meest machtige slagcavalerie van Griekenland, de 
Thessalische cavalerie, wel bereid was om de hoplieten in slaglinie aan te 
vallen. 
Thessalië had een enorme cavalerie die het ingezet kon worden op het slagveld. 
Maar deze ruiters waren bijzonder goed in verrassingsaanvallen op hoplieten 
die nog niet in slagorde stonden of bij het achtervolgen en afmaken van zich 
terugtrekkende infanteristen. Zij vielen hoplieten die zich in slagorde bevonden 
niet aan. De landstreek Boeotië had zijn eigen cavalerie en in de Perzische 
Oorlogen kozen zij de zijde van de Perzen. De Boeotianen ondersteunden de 
Perzen met hun . 
 
Gedurende de klassieke periode bleef er voortdurend onrust, omdat Athene, 
Sparta en Thebe onder elkaar voortdurend met elkaar in de clinch lagen om de 
hegemonie in het Griekse deel van de Middellandse Zee. Hun niveau van 
tactiek en krijgskunde verbetert nu gedurende de jaren, omdat ze meer en meer 
op het vasteland oorlog voeren. De cavalerie had een steeds belangrijkere rol in 
deze landoorlogen. De Grieken konden dus hun cavalerietactiek en 
gevechtscavalerie ontwikkelen in deze periode. Dit betekende een afwijking 
van de standaardtaken zoals fourageren, achtervolgen en hinderen van 
infanterie, waar de cavalerie tot nu toe aan gewend was.  
 
Boeotië had hamippoi ontwikkeld, dit waren hoplieten die samen met de 
cavalerie werkten. Deze werden ingezet op het slagveld al in 419 of 418 voor 
Christus en waren zeer effectief. De koning van Sparta, Agesilaus II, lijkt te zijn 
begonnen met het inzetten van infanterie en cavalerie samen op het slagveld 
rond 395 voor Christus, volgens Xenophon, na het ontdekken tijdens zijn 
campagne in Caria in Klein-Azië, dat de infanterie alleen niet voldoende zou 
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zijn tegen de Perzische cavalerie. Hij lijkt ook de uitvinder te zijn van de 
‘uitgeholde vierkantsformatie’, welke hij met succes gebruikte tegen de 
Thessaliers in de Slag bij Coronea in 394 voor Christus. 
 
In de Slag bij Tegyra (375 voor Christus), Leuctra (371 BC) en daarna in de 
Slag om Mantinea (362 vC), zette de generaal van Thebe, Epaminondas, zijn 
cavalerie, infanterie en hamippoi in een dichte vierkante formatie. Hij versloeg 
Agesilaus op het slagveld.  
Epaminondas had goed getrainde mannen onder zijn leiding, die heel goed 
waren in het omzetten van zijn tactische inzicht in actie op het slagveld en het 
vormen van formaties van zowel de cavalerie en infanterie, waardoor het 
mogelijk was om meerdere beslissende overwinningen te behalen tegen Sparta 
en Athene. De vierkantsformatie begon gezien te worden op het slagveld. Thebe 
versloeg in deze periode Sparta en Athene en liet de Griekse staten in 
verwarring achter. Een machtsvacuüm ontstond. 
 
Xenophon analyseerde deze situatie zorgvuldig en probeerde de Atheners zover 
te krijgen om iets te doen aan het machtsvacuüm dat was ontstaan na de slag 
van Mantinea. Xenophon begreep hoe belangrijk het zou worden om te vechten 
in formatie op het slagveld en om de cavalerie en de infanterie in te zetten als 
een tactische eenheid. De Atheners moesten dit erkennen en stoppen met hun ad 
hoc training van beide onderdelen.  
Xenophon herkende ook het belang van discipline en autoriteit binnen het leger. 
Hij beschreef hoe twijfels over de capaciteit van een commandant bij de 
manschappen een negatieve invloed kunnen hebben op de algemene werking 
van het leger en dat de leiding eigenlijk alleen  zou moeten worden gedragen 
door mensen die deskundig zijn. Als er geen vertrouwen is in een commandant, 
worden bevelen niet goed uitgevoerd of zelfs genegeerd en de soldaten of de 
  267 
ruiters zullen niet weten waar ze aan toe zijn. Dit kan fataal zijn op het slagveld 
en tijdens een mars.  
 
Hij bundelde al zijn expertise, omdat hij het nodig vond om Athene te wijzen op 
het belang van de cavalerie en het verwerven van horsemanship. Alle aspecten 
van horsemanship zijn belangrijk voor het functioneren van de cavalerie, vooral 
als het diens taak is om als een strijdcavalerie te vechten in formatie. De 
inspanningen van de cavalerie als een gevechtseenheid zullen slagen of 
mislukken, afhankelijk van het niveau van de opleiding van zowel paard als 
ruiter. Paarden moeten worden voorbereid op alle mogelijke situaties, zoals een 
plotselinge vijandelijke aanval waarbij terugtrekken nodig is, dode lichamen, 
het springen over greppels, het maken van wendingen en pirouettes en diverse 
aanval manoeuvres. Bovendien moeten de paarden nauw samenwerken met hun 
ruiters en met hen een eenheid vormen. De ruiters moeten hun paarden te 
trainen zodat ze in staat zijn om ontberingen te doorstaan en vertrouwen hebben 
in hun ruiters, die op hun beurt een goed begrip van snelheid, opstelling en 
cavalerietactiek nodig hebben. 
 
Horsemanship is een vaardigheid die niet alleen het berijden van een paard, 
maar ook grondige kennis van paarden, rassen, hun karakter, bouw, training, het 
gebruik van hoofdstellen, et cetera, omvat. Met betrekking tot de ruiter vraagt 
dit om een grondige kennis van wapens, oefeningen, formaties en tactieken 
cavalerie.  
De cavaleriecommandant moet hierin superieur zijn aan zijn ondergeschikten, 
omdat hij anders zijn leidinggevende positie niet kan waarmaken. Hij moet dan 
ook een superieure ruiter zijn, beter in cavalerietactiek en in staat zijn om zijn 
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mannen goed op te leiden. Daarnaast moet hij een goed strategisch inzicht 
hebben om succesvol te zijn in de oorlog en op het slagveld.  
Wanneer een cavalerie geen hoog niveau van horsemanship heeft, kan cavalerie 
weliswaar succesvol zijn in kleine schermutselingen, maar als deze wordt 
geconfronteerd met een cavalerie op het slagveld die wordt ingezet als tactisch 
en strategisch wapen, zal een slecht opgeleide cavalerie zal onsuccesvol blijken. 
 
Xenophon leek de Atheners aan te willen sporen om zich voor te bereiden 
voordat het te laat was, waarschijnlijk omdat hij een andere aanval van Thebe 
vreese, ondanks het feit dat er vrede was gesloten na 362 voor Christus. In zijn 
twee boeken over ‘De Rijkunst’ en ‘De cavaleriecommandant’ zet hij zijn 
adviezen uiteen. Hiervoor gebruikt hij de ervaringen die hij zelf had opgedaan 
in Perzië met Agesilaus, zijn Spartaanse vriend, tijdens verschilllende 
cavaleriegevechten. Maar zijn adviezen met betrekking tot de cavalerie en het 
trainen van paarden waren niet beperkt tot deze boeken alleen. In een aantal 
filosofische werken zien we nog meer verwijzingen, alsmede in zijn boeken 
over Agesilaus en Cyrus de Grote. 
 
Hij bestudeerde zorgvuldig de tactieken die gebruikt werden in de Slag bij 
Mantinea door de Thebaanse aanvoerder Epaminondas. Epaminondas was een 
uitstekende leider en strateeg, die goed wist hoe hij zijn cavalerie moest trainen 
en in het veld moest gebruiken. In de Cavalerie Commandant, verwijst hij ook 
naar een aantal tactische kwesties, waaronder formatie van de Boeotiërs die 
Epaminondas had gebruikt in de strijd tegen Sparta en hoe deze formatie het 
best kan worden gebruikt en waarom. Epaminondas wordt niet genoemd in 
Xenophon's Cavalerie Commandant, waarin hij duidelijk heeft geprobeerd te 
verbergen, dat hij in feite verwijst naar een Boeotische strateeg. Immers, 
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Xenophon had een diepe haat tegen Thebe, evenals Agesilaus en andere 
Atheners en Spartanen. 
 
Hij kon dientengevolge niet naar Epaminondas met name verwijzen. De 
Cavalerie Commandant is het enige boek van Xenophon waarin hij niet naar 
een voorbeeld van hemzelf verwijst. In zijn andere boeken concentreert hij zich 
op of noemt hij belangrijke mensen uit vroegere of zijn eigen tijd, zoals 
Agesilaus, Cyrus de Grote en Socrates. In de ‘Over de Rijkunst’ noemt hij als 
voorbeeld Simon van Athene. Zijn eigen meningen uit hij in Ways and Means, 
waarin hij geeft zijn visie op Athene en verder gaat met het doen van zijn eigen 
aanbevelingen. Hij ventileert daarin ook zijn wens, dat Athene opnieuw de 
hegemonie in Griekenland zou krijgen. Hij schreef zijn 'On Horsemanship' en 
'On the Cavalry Commander' om het belang van de cavalerie training, opstelling 
en tactiek te benadrukken. Deze vaardigheden hadden de Atheners in zijn 
beleving nodig om Thebe of een andere vijand het hoofd te kunnen bieden in de 
toekomst. 
 
Waarom was het niet mogelijk tot op dat moment om de Atheense cavalerie 
naar een hoger niveau van horsemanship te brengen? Athene, een democratie, 
had veel moeite met zijn cavalerie. In Athene kwamen mensen op 
leidinggevende posities terecht, die niet automatisch de meest geschikte mensen 
voor deze posities waren, dat wil zeggen mannen die opgeleid en deskundig 
waren voor die functies. De leidinggevende functies gingen naar degenen die de 
beste verkiezingscampagne hadden gevoerd. Deze kritiek werd ook in die tijd 
veelvuldig geuit, met name vanaf het begin van de 4e eeuw, toen de democratie 
een hoge vlucht had genomen en politici steeds meer voor het eigen gewin 
gingen, volgens Aristoteles en anderen. 
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Omdat de leidinggevende functies werden vervuld door mensen die bijna niets 
wisten over de werkelijke speerpunten van het trainen van paarden, 
cavalerietraining, tactiek en strategie, hadden de cavaleristen weinig vertrouwen 
in hun leiders of weigerden eenvoudigweg om bevelen op te volgen of om te 
dienen onder deze mensen. De cavalerie was in dit opzicht een veel 
kwetsbaarder deel van het leger dan de infanterie, simpelweg omdat er paarden 
werden gebruikt en paarden een zekere mate van opleiding nodig hebben om te 
kunnen functioneren zoals men wil. Deze training kost niet alleen tijd, maar 
eiste ook inzicht en deskundigheid, en het is bijna onmogelijk om 
deskundigheid en ervaring op het slagveld te krijgen.  
 
In de Atheense democratie werden mensen aangesteld als commandant, omdat 
zij ooit gekozen waren voor die positie. Daarom was het niet een kwestie van 
wie de beste ruiter was of wie de beste leider zou zijn, maar wie de grootste 
populariteit had verworven. Het was dan ook onmogelijk om de cavalerie goed 
op te leiden of te leiden, mede door het feit dat de echte ruiters die in de 
cavalerie waren, alleen maar minachting voor zo’n leider konden voelen.  
Bovendien Athene was een commerciële stad waar de inwoners werden 
gedreven door winst. Ondernemers uit de bovenlaag waren slechts 
geïnteresseerd in geld verdienen of politiek en wilden waarschijnlijk niet hun 
tijd en geld verspillen met paarden en het trainen van paarden. Athene verloor 
aan niveau van horsemanship als gevolg van het democratische en commerciële 
systeem dat de overhand had. 
 
Vooral na de Oligarchie van de Dertig in 404, toen de Atheners vaststelden, dat 
de ballotage voor de cavalerie zou worden gedaan op basis van politieke en 
economische verdiensten voor de stad Athene. Het eindresultaat was dat de 
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cavalerie geen echt succes op het slagveld meer kon hebben. In de vierde eeuw 
moest de Atheense cavalerie het dan ook vrijwel altijd afleggen tegen een 
cavalerie die geleid werd door een capabele generaal. Deze cavalerie was 
doorgaans afkomstig van aristocratische of oligarchische regimes, waar de 
cavalerie van oudsher exclusief behoorde tot de aristocratie en waar 
horsemanship een veel hogere status had. De aristocraten waren goed getrainde 
ruiters, en bovendien werden zij vaak geleid door commandanten die zelf een 
hoog niveau van horsemanship hadden bereikt. De cavalerie was altijd in 
verband gebracht met aristocratische of oligarchische staten.  
 
Het paard werd gebruikt door de aristocratie voor parades, races en andere 
wedstrijden in vredestijd, maar in tijden van oorlog werden deze paarden 
ingezet op het slagveld. De aristocratie wordt traditioneel beschouwd als een 
horseminded klasse. Maar voor hen is het paard niet een middel van bestaan zo
als voor nomaden als de Scythen. De adel maakte gebruik van het paard voor de 
jacht, om te flaneren of in de strijd en in die zin zou men kunnen zeggen dat ze 
bekend zijn met de kunst van het opleiden en omgaan met paarden. Zij kunnen 
het zich waarschijnlijk veroorloven om te betalen voor het onderhoud en de 
opleiding van hun paarden. Zij waarderen het belang van voortdurende scholing 
van hun paard. Veel aristocraten hadden hun eigen fokkerijen met speciale 
bloedlijnen die goede renpaarden of cavaleriepaarden produceerden. Ook 
hielden ze goede renpaarden, net als Hiero van Syracuse of Alcibiades van 
Athene. Deze mannen wisten hoe ze met paarden moesten omgaan. 
 
Horsemanship is een ambacht dat alleen kan worden verworven door dagelijkse 
training en zich volledig te richten op paarden en zich over te geven aan wat we 
noemen ‘horsemindedness’. Dit is des te belangrijker voor mensen in een 
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hogere positie in de cavalerie. Als ze niet begrijpen waar ze het over hebben, 
zullen ze al snel het respect van hun mannen verliezen. 
Horsemindedness komt voor bij mensen die gewend zijn aan het werken met 
paarden. Voor deze mensen maken paarden deel uit van hun dagelijks leven. 
Het omgaan met, de training en het rijden van paarden is voor hen een 
dagelijkse bezigheid. In andere culturen zien we dat het paard van oudsher 
wordt geassocieerd met de aristocratie, want in een stedelijke cultuur wordt het 
paard beschouwd als een luxe-item. Een zakenman heeft het te druk met zaken 
of werk en wil weinig of geen tijd besteden aan de opleiding van een paard, 
tenzij er commercieel gewin kan worden behaald.  
 
Na de val van Sparta als een militaire macht in 362 voor Christus wilde 
Xenophon wilde zijn expertise door geven op het gebied van horsemanship, 
cavalerietraining en oorlog, zodat Athene weer kon streven naar hegemonie in 
Griekenland. Het lijkt erop, dat de aanbevelingen van Xenophon na de slag van 
Mantinea werden opgenomen in de wetten van Athene. Volgens Aristoteles 
werd de combinatie van de cavalerie en infanterie normaal en de jaarlijkse 
cavalerie inspecties werden niet langer voornamelijk gehouden om te bepalen 
of de Hippeis voldeden aan de norm van inkomen voor die klasse, maar om te 
bepalen of de paarden goed waren opgeleid en in de juiste conditie verkeerden. 
De paarden werden vervolgens gewaardeerd op de resultaten door middel van 
het toekennen van een timesis of waarde. Er is archeologisch bewijs voor het 
bestaan van hamippoi in Athene rond 350 voor Christus en ook Aristoteles 
schrijft dat hippodromoi of hamippoi werden ingezet in Athene in zijn tijd. 
 
De conclusie van mijn onderzoek moet dan ook zijn, dat ondanks de 
verschillende overwinningen behaald door de Atheners in een aantal gevechten, 
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het inzicht lijkt te ontbreken als het ging om hun cavalerie en de noodzaak 
training. In de praktijk werden ze gedwongen om steeds weer te leren op het 
slagveld zelf en er lijkt sprake van 'trial and error' van de politiek.  
De Atheners hebben een aantal successen op het slagveld gehad en zij waren in 
het bijzonder goed in het achtervolgen van en het afmaken van andere cavalerie, 
zoals gebeurde bij Mantinea na de dood van Epaminondas. Maar een goede, 
efficiënte en sterke cavalerie, die zou kunnen vechten in formatie is nooit 
binnen hun bereik geweest, omdat ze simpelweg niet over de vereiste mate van 
military horsemanship beschikten, dat immers veel meer dan alleen het goed 
kunnen rijden, behelst.  
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